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Two and a HaH Ethical Theories: Re-examining the Foundations 
of the Carnegie Report 
MARKF. KIGHTLINGER" 
ABSTRACT 
In the past three years, the American Bar Association, several major state 
bar associations, the Association of American Law Schools, the New York 
Times, law students, and many legal educators have called for fundamental 
changes in the way we educate new lawyers. Some critics have suggested 
that legal education faces a crisis that will be exacerbated by rising tuitions, 
declining enrollments, and a precipitous drop in the demand for new 
lawyers. Most of those calling for change have relied on the critical 
analysis of modem legal education presented in a 2007 report by the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching entitled Educating 
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law. Despite the central role of 
the Carnegie Report in current debates about legal-education reform, 
however, no one has yet made a careful study of the theoretical foundations 
and, in particular, the ethical grounding of the Report itself. This Article 
fills that important gap in the literature by critically analyzing the three 
ethical frameworks that organize and underpin various aspects of the 
Report's account of modem legal education and its failings. Although a 
teleological ethical framework with roots in the philosophy of Aristotle 
provides the Report's backbone, the Report's treatment of that framework is 
incomplete, somewhat careless, and ultimately unconvincing. Competing 
with the teleological framework throughout the Report are an emotivist 
framework with relativist and possibly nihilist implications and a 
contractarian framework that makes little sense on its own terms and 
contradicts key assumptions of the core teleological framework. Before we 
can justify implementing educational reforms based on the Carnegie 
Report's analysis and recommendations, we must do a great deal of 
additional scholarly work to resolve a number of basic theoretical problems 
that threaten to undermine the intellectual foundations of the Report itself. 
• Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of 
Law; 1.0., Yale Law School, 1988; Ph.D., Yale University, 1991; B.A.IM.A., Cambridge University, 
1983/1995; B.A., Williams College, 1981; Partner, Covington & Burling, 1999-2004. I would like to 
thank my research assistant, Thomas Cothran (J.D. 2012), without whose assistance this Article would 
not have been possible. In particular, Thomas's research on the scholarly literature surrounding the 
subject of this Article proved invaluable. 
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Otherwise, efforts to refonn legal education may do little more than build 
glass houses on shifting sands. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2007, the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of
Teaching ("Carnegie Foundation") released a report entitled Educating
Lawyers: Preparation for the Profession of Law ("Carnegie Report" or
"Report").' The Report paints a bleak portrait of the current state of the
legal profession.
Many commentators from within law schools have also pointed
to troubling declines in public esteem for the profession and
attorneys' apparently growing dissatisfaction with their work,
offering empirical evidence that these problems are widespread and
serious. According to many observers, the 'crisis of
professionalism' is manifest in a decline of civility and an increase
in adversarialism, a decline in the role of the counselor and in
lawyers' competence, including ethical competence, and a new
sense of the law as a business, subject to greater competitive
economic pressures and answerable only to the bottom line. Others
note a loss of calling or sense of purpose among lawyers.2
According to the Report, critics also have accused lawyers and other
professionals of "professional self-absorption and irresponsible
disconnection from the public."' As the Report argues, "[w]hatever the
merits of 'value-free' knowledge, they do not transfer well to the idea of
'value-free' professionals."4
In response to these serious concerns about the legal profession's ethical
(dis)engagement and loss of purpose, the Report calls for reforming legal
education, because "[a] reawakening of professional 61an must include
1. wILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PROFESSION
OF LAW (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT].
2. Id. at 136-37.
3. Id. at 7.
4. Id. at 136-37.
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revitalizing legal preparation."5 The Report "examines the dramatic way
that law schools develop legal understanding and form professional
identity."6  In particular, the Report focuses on the question "[h]ow
effectively does legal education integrate the moral obligations of lawyering
with its intellectual and clinical demands?"7  Summarizing their
conclusions, the authors of the Report state:
The dramatic results of the first year of law school's emphasis on
well-honed skills of legal analysis should be matched by similarly
strong skill in serving clients and a solid ethical grounding. If legal
education were serious about such a goal, it would require a bolder,
more integrated approach that would build on its strengths and
address its most serious limitations.
In a 2011 editorial entitled "Legal Education Reform,"9 the New York Times
picked up on these themes from the Carnegie Report and sounded an alarm.
According to the editorial,
American legal education is in crisis. The economic downturn has
left many recent law graduates saddled with crushing student loans
and bleak job prospects. The law schools have been targets of
lawsuits by students and scrutiny from the United States Senate for
alleged false advertising about potential jobs. Yet, at the same time,
more and more Americans find that they cannot afford any kind of
legal help.
Addressing these issues requires changing legal education and
how the profession sees its responsibility to serve the public interest
as well as clients.'o
5. WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., SUMMARY, EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE
PROFESSION OF LAW 3 (2007) [hereinafter CARNEGIE REPORT SUMMARY],
http-//www.carnegiefoundation.org/sites/default/files/publications/elibrary_pdf_632.pdf. For a historical
analogue to the Carnegie Foundation's approach, one might go back to "1870 when Christopher Colum-
bus Langdell refounded the Harvard Law School, and in so doing, many would say, refounded the
American legal profession." Robert Stevens, Aging Mistress: The Law School in America, 2 CHANGE IN
HIGHER EDUC. 32, 34 (1970).
6. CARNEGIE REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 3.
7. Year in Review 2007, CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADAVNCEMENT OF TEACHING,
http://www.camegiefoundation.orglabout-uslyear-review/year-review-2007 (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
8. CARNEGIE REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 4.




TWO AND A HALF ETHICAL THEORIES
If in fact we face a crisis in legal education, then the Carnegie Report's
demand that we get "serious" about providing law students with a "solid
ethical grounding" takes on new urgency."
The question that this Article raises is whether the Carnegie Report is
itself "serious" about matching its analysis of legal education with a "solid
ethical grounding" for its criticisms and recommendations. This Article
argues that the Carnegie Report lacks and fails to provide such an ethical
grounding. We find running through the Report evidence of at least three
different ethical theories or frameworks that shore up claims its authors
make and criticisms its authors raise. The mere fact that we find evidence
of three ethical theories instead of one clearly articulated and defended
theory suggests a lack of seriousness. When careful analysis reveals that
each of these ethical theories is questionable on its own terms and that the
three theories conflict with one another, we cannot help but ask whether the
authors of the Carnegie Report are entirely serious about demanding that
legal education provide an ethical grounding for law students.
This Article takes as its starting point the Carnegie Report's call for an
examination of the ethical grounding that legal education provides to law
students.12 Treating the basic description of legal and ethical education in
the Report as a given, the Article asks what sorts of philosophical
foundations or premises we must recognize and accept in order to justify the
kind of educational experience and ethical grounding for law students that
the Report argues we can and must provide.13  By offering a critical
reexamination of the intellectual foundations or premises for the arguments
presented in the Report, this Article should serve as a propaedeuticl4 to any
further substantive work-whether theoretical or practical-on the ethical
grounding of a legal education such as that described in and recommended
by the Report. Accordingly, the Article pursues two interrelated
propaedeutic objectives. The first is to identify and critically analyze the
11. CARNEGIE REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 4.
12. Id. at 4.
13. See generally id. at 6; see also infra Part V.
14. I have borrowed the term "propaedeutic" from Immanuel Kant, who referred to his First
Critique as a propaedeutic-a preliminary inquiry that would clear the way for a future philosophical
system founded on pure reason. See IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 149 (Paul Guyer &
Allen W. Wood eds. and trans., 1998) ("we can regard a science of the mere estimation of pure reason,
of its sources and boundaries, as the propaedeutic to the system of pure reason."). My objective in this
Article is, of course, much more modest than Kant's in the First Critique. It is to identify some key
issues that must be addressed before the project announced and recommended in the Carnegie Re-
port-i.e., providing an ethical grounding for law students through a reformed system of legal educa-
tion-can be carried forward in an intellectually honest and persuasive manner. In Kant's language, the
Article seeks to identify at least some of the "sources and boundaries" of the ethical theory or theories
that underpin the Camegie Report and thereby to provide the necessary foundations for further work. Id.
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competing ethical theories or frameworks that organize and underpin the
Report's account of modem legal education and its failings. Drawing on
this critical analysis, the second objective is to outline the key questions that
must be addressed before the Report or any future work-either theoretical
inquiry or pedagogical practice-based on it can persuasively claim to
provide an ethical grounding for legal education and, thus, for law students
who receive such education. In later articles, I will offer examples of
constructive arguments built on and responsive to the propaedeutic work
undertaken here.
Although few will question the importance of ensuring that law students
receive some kind of ethical grounding for the practice of law, it is
important to note at the outset that the argument in this Article touches at
least implicitly on a much larger and, arguably, more important issue. That
issue is whether it is possible at the beginning of the twenty-first century to
lay an adequate foundation on which to construct a rationally persuasive
ethical theory that an intellectually honest and self-critical person could
justify teaching to anyone and by which such a person could justify
conducting his or her own life. In 1987, Allan Bloom asserted that "[t]here
is one thing a professor can be absolutely certain of: almost every student
entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative."' 5
Moreover, the widespread, modem belief in the relativity of truth applies
with special force to what once would have been called moral or ethical
truth.'6 This Article's search for the ethical foundations of the Carnegie
Report's account of legal education poses a potential challenge, or at least a
first step in a challenge, to such modem moral relativism. If we could find
persuasive grounds for thinking that moral or ethical truth is not relative in
the field of legal education, we might have a basis for asserting that moral
or ethical truth is not relative at all. This Article does not directly address
these broader issues raised by Bloom's assertion about modem relativism.' 7
Nevertheless, it is important for the reader to see this Article's discussion of
the theoretical foundations for providing "a solid ethical grounding" to law
students as part of a wider debate about the theoretical foundations for
ethical inquiry and ethical judgments in general. And that wider debate-
the intellectual context for this Article-should interest anyone who claims
or hopes or even pretends to live and assist others to live a moral or ethical
life.
15. ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 25 (1987). For more on Bloom's
views, see infra notes 441, 450, 463, 473, 482 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the belief that moral or ethical judgments are relative and the role that this
belief plays in the argument of the Carnegie Report, see infra Part I.A.
17. BLOOM, supra note 15, at 25.
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Part II of this Article discusses the impact of the Carnegie Report and
explains why the Report is significant enough to justify a careful look at the
Report's ethical foundations. Part m examines the ethical theory that
serves as the backbone of the Report-a teleological theory with roots in the
work of Aristotle. My discussion of this theory draws heavily on the
writings of Alasdair MacIntyre. Part IV discusses two other ethical
theories-namely emotivism and contractarianism-that compete,
implicitly or explicitly, throughout the Carnegie Report with the teleological
theory. I show that each of these three ethical theories reveals internal flaws
and that the three theories conflict on key issues with one another. Drawing
on the critical discussions in Parts III and IV, Part V provides a punch list of
the major questions that must be addressed and, if possible, resolved before
a legal education of the sort outlined in the Carnegie Report can offer an
intellectually defensible and persuasive ethical grounding to law students.
H. BROAD IMPACT OF CARNEGIE REPORT JusTIFIES CAREFUL STUDY
This Article devotes considerable attention to the foundations of the
ethical theories or frameworks operating in the Carnegie Report, but it is
reasonable to ask at the outset why one would focus this kind of attention on
a report about legal education from the Carnegie Foundation. This might be
called the "who cares?" threshold objection. In fact, as discussed in Parts H
A and B, there are at least two good reasons to care. First, in the roughly
five years since its publication, the Carnegie Report has had a significant
impact on practical efforts to reform and improve legal education.' 8 Calls
for reform of legal education have become increasingly adamant in the
wake of widely circulated reports that the costs associated with attending
law school are far too hi relative to the benefits that most students receive
from a legal education.' Citing the Carnegie Report, the New York Times
18. See infra Part L.A.
19. See David Segal, Is Law School a Losing Game?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 9, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/091aw.html?_r=1; David Segal, Law School Ecnomics:
Ka-Ching!, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/17/business/law-school-
economics-job-market-weakens-tuition-rises.html. For a response to David Segal's criticisms, see
Richard A. Matasar, Law School Cost, Educational Outcomes, and a Reforner's Agenda, N.Y. LAW
SCH. (July 19, 2011), http://www.nyls.edulnewsandevents/matasars responseto nytimes. For a
follow-up debate about the current model of legal education, see Opinion, The Case Against Law School,
N.Y. TIMms, July 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/07/21/the-case-against-law-
school/. The U.S. Senate and the ABA also have entered the discussion about whether law schools
deliver what they advertise. See Karen Sloan, ABA Defends Its Oversight of Law Schools to Senator,
LAw.coM (July 25, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsplarticle.jsp?id=1202504855291&hbxlogin=l &shetur
n=20120904181424. For a more aggressive version of the argument that a legal education is not worth
what it costs, see Complaint at INf[ 2, 4, Alaburda v. Thomas Jefferson Sch. of Law, 2011 WL 2109327
(Cal. Super. 2011) (No. 27-2011-00091898-CU-FR-CTL) (demanding damages for, among other things,
fhlse advertising and the excessive cost of legal education). See also Alfred S. Konefsky & Barry Sulli-
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recently called for reforms in legal education "to help reinvigorate the legal
profession and rebuild public confidence in what lawyers can provide."20
Thus, efforts to reform legal education will continue and the Carnegie
Report will influence, if not guide, these efforts. Second, the Report has
spawned a growing secondary literature, 21 none of which appears to have
focused on the fundamental philosophical problems that this Article
addresses. Continuing academic interest in the Carnegie Report suggests
that it would be worthwhile to take a hard look at the Report's ethical
grounding. In sum, it seems fair to say that the Report and work based on it
reflect the state of the art in the field of legal education reform, and that the
Report will continue to affect developments at the practical and theoretical
levels. Thus, we should care whether the ethical foundations of the Report
provide adequate support for its analysis and recommendations.
A. The Carnegie Report and Current Efforts to Reform Legal
Education
An anecdote about how I first encountered the Carnegie Report
illustrates the work's impact on reform of legal education. In the spring of
2007, the Executive Associate Dean and the incoming Acting Dean of the
University of Kentucky ("UK") College of Law asked me to take over the
chair of the College's Curriculum Committee. As preparation for the role,
they recommended that I read two books. One was the Carnegie Report.22
The Deans said that they expected the American Bar Association ("ABA")
and the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") to rely heavily on
the Report in developing new proposals for curriculum reform and revision
of law school accreditation standards. As I have learned from that
occasionally frustrating experience, the UK College of Law's approach to
curriculum reform is rather conservative, sometimes approaching
hidebound. Thus, when the UK College of Law, or at least our Curriculum
van, There's More to the Law Than 'Practice-Ready', THE CHRON., Oct. 23, 2011,
http://chronicle.com/articlefTheres-More-to-the-Law-Than/129493/ (identifying as reasons for the recent
spate of critical commentary about law schools "the high price of legal education, the failure of many
law schools to respond to a serious decline in the demand for lawyers, and lawsuits challenging the
'sales practices' used by some law schools to meet the fierce competition for students."). For a recent,
provocative discussion of what is wrong with legal education by a well-respected legal scholar, see
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
20. Legal Education Reform, supra note 9.
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. The other book that they recommended was ROY STUCKEY ET AL., BEST PRACTICES FOR
LEGAL EDUCATION (2007). That book itself frequently quotes and relies heavily on the Carnegie Re-
port's account of current practices in legal education. See, e.g., id. at 3, 4, 17, 19-20, 61, 62, 99, 100,
134, 183, 237, and 285. Thus, the Carnegie Report is arguably the more important and more foundation-
al of the two works, and it certainly is worthy of separate discussion.
[Vol. 39120
TWO AND A HALF ETHICAL THEORIES
Committee, turns to the Carnegie Report for guidance, that fact alone
suggests that other law schools may be turning, or may already have turned,
to the Report. Certainly there is no reason to believe that the UK College of
Law is eccentric or outside of the mainstream in the area of curriculum
development and reform. Thus, my home institution's interest in the Report
provides suggestive, albeit anecdotal, evidence of the book's impact on
curriculum reform in legal education.
It should come as no surprise that law schools such as mine would
review and follow the recommendations of a Carnegie Foundation report on
legal education. The Carnegie Foundation began looking at the challenges
facing legal education in the United States more than 100 years ago.23
1908, the annual President's Report to the Carnegie Foundation stated that
[w]ith respect to the practice of law, the public interest is dependent
... on the enforcement of high professional standards ... . [N]o
other profession is so closely related to the development of justice
and to the progress of sound public policy. There is no way by
which the public can tell whether the practitioner of law will
develop into a wise advocate or into a sharp attorney. The only
criterion it can impose for its own protection is to require such
training for entrance to the profession as will fit the ordinary man
for good work in it and will at the same time serve as a means to
exclude the unfit.24
In 1913, the ABA's Committee on Legal Education and Admissions to the
Bar asked the Carnegie Foundation to undertake an "investigation . .. into
the conditions under which the work of legal education is carried on in the
United States."25 The Carnegie Foundation issued its first major study of
23. For a short history of the Carnegie Foundation's work on professional education, see ELLEN
CONDLIFFE LAGEMANN, PRIVATE POWER FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD: A HISTORY OF THE CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING 60-93 (1983). For a summary of the Foundation's
work on legal education, see id. at 75-84.
24. Henry Smith Pritchett, Standards of Professional Education in the United States, in THE
CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING: THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT AND TREASURER 157, 160 (1908).
25. Henry S. Pritchett, Preface to ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC
PROFESSION OF THE LAW: HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF
LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND
CANADA xviii (15th bull. 1921). This call for an investigation of legal education followed an earlier and
very influential report by the Carnegie Foundation on medical education. See generally ABRAHAM
FLEXNER, MEDICAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE
FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (4th bull. 1910). For a discussion of the Flexner
Report, see LAGEMANN, supra note 23, at 61-72. During this era, the Carnegie Foundation also pub-
lished studies calling for reform in the fields of teaching and public education as well as engineering.
See LAGEMANN, supra note 23, at 75-89; WILLIAM S. LEARNED ET AL., THE PROFESSIONAL
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legal education-The Common Law and the Case Method in American
University Law Schools-in 1914.26 In 1921, the Carnegie Foundation
issued Alfred Reed's much more extensive report entitled Training for the
Public Profession of the Law ("Reed Report"),27 which focused on the
history of legal education in the United States and Canada, and in 1928, the
Foundation released a follow-up by Reed entitled Present-Day Law Schools
in the United States and Canada.28 Carnegie money also supported a
project called the Survey of the Legal Profession that resulted in, among
other things, a 1953 study by Albert Harno entitled Legal Education in the
United States.29  Another Carnegie entity, the Carnegie Commission on
Higher Education, sponsored a 1972 collection of essays entitled New
Directions in Legal Education.o
There is little doubt that the Carnegie Foundation's work during the
twentieth century spurred debate and galvanized the legal profession to take
action that altered the standards governing legal education. Ironically,
however, the galvanic impact of the Foundation's work did not necessarily
prompt the profession to follow the Foundation's advice. Discussing the
impact of the Reed Report, one scholar has written,
[b]y urging recognition of a diversified bar and by recognizing the
night schools that were the viaducts for immigrant entrance to law
and politics, the Reed report obtained for the academic lawyers
what they had not been able to obtain for themselves: strong ABA
endorsement of uniformly high academic standards as a prerequisite
for admission to the bar. In other words, the Reed report united the
two elites that were represented by the profession's major organized
PREPARATION OF TEACHERS FOR AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1920); CHARLES RIBORG MANN, THE
CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING: A STUDY OF ENGINEERING
EDUCATION (11th bull. 1918).
26. JOSEF REDLICH, THE COMMON LAW AND THE CASE METHOD IN AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
LAW SCHOOLS: A REPORT TO THE CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING (1914).
For a comparison of the Redlich Report with the Carnegie Report, see generally James R. Maxeiner,
Educating Lawyers Now and Then: Two Carnegie Critiques of the Common Law and the Case Method,
35 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 1, 1-2 (2007).
27. ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPAL CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS OF LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES WITH SOME ACCOUNT OF CONDITIONS IN ENGLAND AND CANADA (15th bull. 1921)
[hereinafter REED REPORT].
28. ALFRED ZANrIZNGER REED, PRESENT-DAY LAw SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND
CANADA (2 1st bull. 1928).
29. ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1953). For a discussion of
the Survey of the Legal Profession, see generally Reginald Heber Smith, Survey of the Legal Profession:
Its Scope, Methods and Objectives, in ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN
TIMES vii (1953).
30. HERBERT L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION (1972).
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public lobby, its major national association, against its
conclusions. 1
Thus, although the legal profession and legal educators have not always
followed the Carnegie Foundation's recommendations, the Foundation's
work has, from the beginning, generated discussion and led to significant
changes in the field of legal education.3 2  A growing body of evidence
suggests that the Carnegie Report will have an impact as significant as that
of the 1921 Reed Report, with the important difference that this time around
the profession's response to the Carnegie Foundation's recommendations
might be more positive.33
A comprehensive survey of educational reform efforts at U.S. law
schools is well beyond the scope of this Article, but a variety of evidence
suggests that the Carnegie Report has affected and continues to affect the
ways in which law schools are approaching educational reform. 4 Two
scholars have suggested that the Carnegie Report is "perhaps the most
influential document in current debates about the future of legal
education,"3  while others have observed that the Report has caused law
31. LAGEMANN, supra note 23, at 81-82. Reed had recommended that the legal profession sup-
port rather than oppose the existence of different types of law schools ranging from urban night schools
to elite schools such as Harvard and Yale producing different types of lawyers with different profession-
al trajectories and subject to different standards of legal education. Id. at 80. In Reed's view, this ap-
proach would have assisted people of different classes, including poor people and immigrants, to enter
the bar. Id. at 80-81. Reed believed a diversified bar was vital to the maintenance of law as a "public"
profession in a democratic society. Preble Stolz, Training for the Public Profession of the Law (1921):
A Contemporary Review, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION app. II to app. A, at 227, 243
(1972) [hereinafter Stolz, Training]. Rejecting Reed's proposal, the "two elites" that united to support a
unitary bar and a uniform national standard of legal education were the academic lawyers teaching full-
time students and the very small percentage of U.S. lawyers who belonged to the ABA in the early part
of the twentieth century. LAGEMANN, supra note 23, at 77-78. Jerold Auerbach has suggested that
another factor helped to unify law teachers and practitioners around the idea of a uniform standard of
education--i.e., the desire to exclude Jews and immigrants from the bar. Jerold S. Auerbach, Enmity
and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-1922, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 551, 586 (Don-
ald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971). According to Auerbach, "[w]hen the storm [that Reed
caused] had subsided, the [ABA and the AALS] stood arm-in-arm against their common enemy: the
night law schools and the immigrants who crowded into them." Id. at 558. Leaving aside the distasteful
causes of the profession's decision to support a unitary bar, Stolz has pointed out that it took roughly
fifty years for the profession to move from that decision to the "threshold of achieving a unitary bar."
Stolz, Training, supra, at 249. Ironically, at almost the same time that Stolz announced the advent of a
unitary bar (i.e., the early 1970s), Robert Stevens commented that "[alt long last the idea of a unitary
profession is being seriously questioned . . . ." Stevens, supra note 5, at 41.
32. For further discussion of the complex reception that the Redlich and Reed Reports received at
the hands of the bar, see ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850s TO THE 1980s 112-23 (1983). For a lengthy discussion of the Reed Report and its impact, see
generally Stolz, Training, supra note 31.
33. See supra note 31. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
34. See infra notes 35-74 and accompanying text.
35. Rebecca Sandefur & Jeffrey Selbin, The Clinic Effect, 16 CLINICAL L. REv. 57, 70 (2009).
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schools to examine their curricula in new ways.36  The Institute for Law
Teaching and Learning ("ILTL"), a joint effort of the Gonzaga University
School of Law and the Washburn University School of Law, has published
a Chart of Legal Education Reform ("ER Chart") reflecting the results of a
survey on recent curriculum reform activities, a survey to which sixty law
schools apparently provided useful responses.37 Underneath the title, the
ER Chart contains a rather cryptic note: "I have marked with an asterisk
those relatively older reforms that I think are still relevant, especially in
light of the Carnegie and Best Practices (CLEA) reports on legal
education." Although this note is open to interpretation, it suggests that
the author of the ER Chart believes that the Carnegie Report provides a
baseline against which to measure the significance of recent legal
educational reform efforts, including efforts that predate the Report itself.
One reform effort mentioned on the ER Chart is the new Daniel Webster
Program at the University of New Hampshire School of Law (formerly the
Franklin Pierce Law Center).39  The Daniel Webster Program is based on
recommendations from the Carnegie Report.4 0 The ER Chart also mentions
that William Mitchell is working on reforms that are based on the Carnegie
Report.4 1 Studies suggest that several other law schools also have instituted
reforms in response to the Carnegie Report.42
36. Kristin B. Gerdy, Clients, Empathy, and Compassion: Introducing First-Year Students to the
"Heart" of Lawyering, 87 NEB. L. REv. 1, 3 (2008) (predicting that the Carnegie Report will continue
to cause schools to reevaluate their curricula); Suzanne E. Rowe, Learning Disabilities and the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act: The Conundrum of Dyslexia and Time, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL
WRITING INST. 165, 166 (2009) (predicting that schools will do more skills training as a result of the
Carnegie Report); Jonathan Todres, Beyond the Case Method: Teaching Transactional Law Skills in the
Classroom, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 375, 375 (2009).
37. Chart of Legal Education Reform, INST. FOR LAW TEACHING & LEARNING (May 2009),
http://lawteaching.org/publications/ILTLchartoflegaleducationreform2009O5.pdf
38. Id. at 1.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Paul Maharg, Simulation Square, BEST PRACTICES FOR LEGAL EDUC. BLOG (Mar. 18, 2011),
http://bestpracticeslegaled.albanylawblogs.org/2011/03/18/simulation-squared-2; see also Daniel Web-
ster Scholar Honors Program, U. OF N.H., SCHOOL OF LAw, http://law.unh.edu/academics/jd-
degree/daniel-webster-scholars (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
41. Chart ofLegal Education Reform, supra note 37, at 8.
42. See Glenn Cohen, Harvard Law's Curricular Reform: 3 Years In, PRAWFSBLAWG (Dec. 8,
2011), http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/12/harvard-laws-curricular-reform-3 -years-
in.html (Harvard's new Problem Solving Workshop for ILs "is nicely responsive to concerns raised by
the Carnegie report"). See generally, e.g., Earl Martin & Gerald Hess, Developing a Skills and Profes-
sionalism Curriculum - Process and Product, 41 U. TOL. L. REv. 327 (2010) (addressing Gonzaga Law
School's curricular reform); Elizabeth Pendo, A Service Learning Project: Disability, Access, and
Health Care, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 154 (2010) (Carnegie Report motivated the author's decision to
incorporate a public service project into her disability law class); Stephen A. Rosenbaum, The Juris
Doctor Is In: Making Room at Law School for Paraprofessional Partners, 75 TENN. L. REV. 315 (2008)
(addressing University of Tennessee Law School's curricular reform); Melissa H. Weresh, An Integrated
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As Dean Minow of Harvard Law School observed in late 2010, the
Carnegie Report "has stimulated much discussion about how to better tackle
the cognitive, ethical, and practical dimensions of making lawyers."43  One
commentator has noted that, since the publication of the Carnegie Report,
rethinking the preparation of young lawyers has become a cottage
industry. Law school calendars have been littered with forums,
seminars, and panel discussions about the future. . . . Paradoxically,
it seems that the 200 U.S. law schools accredited by the American
Bar Association (ABA) have taken 200 different routes to address
the turmoil."
At least one law school advertises that it has long adhered to the standards
outlined in the Carnegie Report.4 5  The Thomas M. Cooley Law School
website states that the Report's "recommendations, which came about in
2007, are precisely the type of education Cooley has provided since its
founding in 1972."4 The unstated major premise of Cooley's "argument,"
of course, is that the Carnegie Report provides a valid measure, and perhaps
the best measure, for the type of education a law school should provide. 4
Thus, a law school that complies and has always complied with the Report's
recommendations would be a good law school. And Cooley is not alone in
declaring that it had complied with the Carnegie Report avant la lettre.4
Approach to Teaching Ethics and Professionalism, 18 No. 2 PROF. LAW. 25 (2007) (addressing Drake
University Law School's curricular reform).
43. Martha L. Minow, Making Global Lawyers for the 21st Century: Keynote Address to the
FutureEd 2 Conference at Harvard Law School, HARv. LAW SCHOOL (Oct. 15, 2010),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/plp/pdflMinowBluePaper.pdf. Minow also identifies other
"long-term trends" that have led to a reevaluation of legal education, including "globalization" and the
"digital revolution." Id.
44. Sarah Kellogg, The Transformation of Legal Education, DC BAR (May 2011),
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/resources/publications/washington lawyer/may_201 I/legal education
.cfin.
45. See Educating Lawyers, THOMAS M. COOLEY LAW SCHOOL, http://www.cooley.edu/rankings
/camegie _report.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
46. Id.
47. See Nelson P. Miller, An Apprenticeship of Professional Identity: A Paradigm for Educating
Lawyers, 87 MICH. B.J. 20, 21(2008), available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4articlel3
08.pdf (discussing the similarities between the Camegie Report and the curriculum at Cooley).
48. See, e.g., C. Michael Bryce, Teaching Justice to Law Students: The Legacy of Ignatian Edu-
cation and Commitment to Justice and Justice Learning in 21st Century Clinical Education, 43 GoNZ. L.
REV. 577, 596-97 (2008) (arguing that Jesuit law schools have long been aware of both the importance
of ethical training, and the unity of intellectual learning and practice); Lawrence K. Hellman, RichardE.
Coulson: The Indispensable Link Between the Past and the Future of a Developing Law School, 34
OKLA. CrrY U.L. REv. 1, 2 (2009) (addressing Oklahoma City University Law School's curricular
reform).
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Emanating from various quarters of the ABA, there is considerable
evidence of support for the Carnegie Report's analysis and
recommendations.4 9 In an October 2010 presentation to the FutureEd 2
conference at Harvard Law School, Professor Henderson and colleagues
stated:
[t]he ABA's comprehensive review of accreditation standards,
and the comments received through that process, come in the larger
context of wide ranging critiques and reassessments of American
legal education, particularly informed by the 2007 study by the
Carnegie Foundation. Clearly the time has come for serious,
collaborative work to develop outcome measures focused on
professionalism and understanding of professional identity along
with assessment tools for demonstrating whether desired outcomes
have been achieved.50
As one would suspect from Professor Henderson's comment, an important
theme of the Carnegie Report is the need to educate law students to think
about professional identity.5 A range of evidence supports Henderson's
claim that organs of the ABA have begun to rely on the account of legal
education in the Report.5 2  For example, in a July 2008 Report of the
Outcome Measures Committee of the ABA's Section of Legal Education
and Admission to the Bar, the authors observe that:
[t]he legal education system has lagged behind ... other fields but
has begun to focus on the topic of outcome measures in very recent
years. This recent change in direction has been fueled in large part
by the publication, in 2007, of two influential reports on legal
education. . . .s
49. See generally Are We Making a Difference? Developing Outcome Measures to Evaluate the
Effectiveness of Law School Efforts to Teach Ethics and Develop Professionalism, Future Ed 2, HARV.
LAW SCHOOL, (Oct. 15-16, 2010), http://www.nyls.edu/user-files/1/3/4/30/58/1053/Henderson&Organ
&Longan&Berry&Cunningham.pdf.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text.
52. See generally Catherine Carpenter et al., Report of the Outcome Measures Committee,
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One of those reports is the Carnegie Report. 54 In their proposal to expand
the use of learning outcome measures in the law school accreditation
process, the authors of the Outcome Measures Committee report repeatedly
cite and rely on the Carnegie Report." Other documents emanating from
the ABA also rely on the Report.16  For example, in a 2009 letter to the
Chair of the ABA Accreditation Standards Review Committee, the Chair of
the ABA Standing Committee on Professionalism wrote "[t]he Committee
supports the accreditation review process and remains strongly committed
to the principles enunciated in the Carnegie Report."57
Professional organizations in the field of legal education also have
indicated support for the Carnegie Report.58 In a letter to the Chair of the
ABA Accreditation Standards Review Committee, Ian Weinstein, the
President of the Clinical Legal Education Association ("CLEA"), remarked
on the "disconnect between legal education and the legal profession
exposed in detail by the Camegie Foundation and other critics of the
standard form of legal education."59 According to Weinstein, "[iln response
to the critique, many law schools have redesigned curricula. Numerous
conferences and meetings have explored the kinds of changes in legal
education that might better prepare students for the profession . . . .",o
Weinstein singles out one such "Conference on the Future of the Law
School Curriculum" that the AALS held in June 2011.61 In a brochure
advertising the conference, the AALS stated that "[w]e are at a pivotal
54. Id. at 5-6 (not surprisingly, the other report on which the authors rely is Best Practices). See
generally STUCKEY, supra note 22.
55. See, e.g., Carpenter et al., supra note 53, at 6-10, 18, 19.
56. See generally Letter from Melvin F. Wright, Jr., Chair, N.C. Chief Justice's Comm'n on
Professionalism, to Donald J. Polden, Chair, ABA Accrediation Standards Review Comm., (Nov. 24,




58. See generally Letter from Ian Weinstein, President, Clinical Legal Educ. Ass'n, to Donald J.




60. Id. at 3.
61. See id. See generally Ass'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., WORKBOOKLET ON THE CONFERENCE ON
THE FUTURE OF THE LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM (JUNE 11-14, 2011) & CONFERENCE ON CLINICAL
LEGAL EDUCATION (2011), available at http://www.aals.org/clinical20l /Clinical&CurriculumWorkboo
klet.pdf
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moment in the history of legal education.",62  The brochure specifically
identifies the Carnegie Report as a source of pressure for curriculum reform:
reformist initiatives fashioned outside the academy, such as the
Carnegie Report, are calling on law schools to improve the way
they prepare students for professional roles, offering their own
distinctive vision of the law school curriculum and pedagogy.
Simultaneously, new developments within the academy are
generating momentum for curricular change as well. . . . Among
the ranks of both established law schools and recently-founded
institutions can be found instances of significant innovation in
response to these forces.
Thus, both the AALS, which currently includes in its membership 176 law
schools," and CLEA, which advocates on behalf of clinical legal
educators,6 5 recognize the substantial influence that the Carnegie Report
continues to exercise on the reform of legal education.
State bar associations also have cited the Carnegie Report with approval
and in some instances have taken actions based on the Report. 6 Writing for
the Michigan Bar Journal in early 2008, Professor Nelson Miller
commented presciently that "[e]very so often, a profession faces an
assessment or event that demands a new paradigm. The just-released
Carnegie Foundation report . . . , years in the making, may prove to be just
such a watershed for legal education."67 In a 2009 report "on suggested
methods for improving the development of professionalism and professional
identities in the law school experience," the National Organization of Bar
Counsel, which represents state bar officials who are responsible for
enforcing ethics rules, relied heavily on the framework developed in the
Carnegie Report. In 2009, an Ohio State Bar Association ("OSBA") Task
62. ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., BROCHURE ON THE CONFERENCE ON THE FUTURE OF THE LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULUM 2 (June 11-14, 2011), available at
http://www.aals.org/curriculum2011/CurriculumBrochure2011.pdf.
63. Id.
64. See What is the AALS?, ASS'N OF AM. LAW SCHS., http://www.aals.org/about.php (last visit-
ed Sept. 20, 2012).
65. See Mission, CLINICAL LEGAL ED. ASS'N, http://clea.memberiodge.org/mission (last visited
Sept. 20, 2012).
66. See Report of the Task Force on Legal Education Reform, OHIO ST. BAR ASS'N 2 (Dec.
2009), https://www.ohiobar.org/General%20Resources/pubs/OSBALegalEducationTaskForce Rep
ort.pdf [hereinafter Report ofthe Task Force].
67. Miller, supra note 47, at 20.
68. See Law School Professionalism Initiative Report, NAT'L ORG. OF BAR COUNSEL, at 1, 2, 3,
25-27 (Dec. 2009), http://www.nobc.org/uploadedFiles/Committees/Law/*20School/20Professionalism
%20Initiative%2OReport/o2OFinal.doc.
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Force on Legal Education Reform that included representatives from all
Ohio law schools issued a report later adopted by the OSBA expressly
endorsing the recommendations of the Carnegie Report.69  In April 2010,
Howard Miller-then president of the State Bar of California-wrote "[t]he
world of legal education is staring in the mirror at its standard model with
fading confidence, caused by both academic criticism and client reaction to
how legal services are delivered and priced. The academic criticism came
most forcefully in the 2007 Carnegie Foundation Report . . .."70 Discussing
"[t]he effort to understand what lawyers should know and be able to do,"
the New York State Bar Association ("NYSBA") Task Force on the Future
of Legal Education declared: "[t]wo recent documents-the 'Carnegie
Report' and 'Best Practices'-have transformed the current conversation
within law schools."7  At its annual meeting in 2011, the ABA adopted a
Resolution based directly on the NYSBA's Task Force report (and therefore
on the Carnegie Report) urging law schools to "develop practice-ready
lawyers." 72
Although the evidence presented in this Part is clearly not
comprehensive, it seems to be clear, consistent, and highly suggestive. In
the past, the Carnegie Foundation's studies have exercised considerable
influence on the development of legal education in the United States.
Based on comments by various educators, law schools, bar associations, and
professional organizations, it seems highly likely that the latest Carnegie
Report has had and will continue to have an impact on efforts to reform
legal education.74 Indeed, the evidence discussed in this Part shows that the
Carnegie Report consistently appears at the forefront of practical
discussions about legal education reform.7 ' Thus, it seems fair to say that
the Carnegie Report and the debate it has provoked reflect the state of the
69. Report ofthe Task Force, supra note 66, at 3.
70. Howard Miller, Legal Education for the 21st Century, CAL. B.J. (Apr. 2010),
http://www.calbajournal.com/April2OlO/Opinion/FromthePresident.aspx.
71. Report of the Task Force on the Future of the Legal Profession, N.Y. ST. BAR ASS'N 43
(April 2, 2011), http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=TaskForce-ontheFuture-of the-
Legal ProfessionHome&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfin&ContentlD=48108.
72. See A.B.A. House of Delegates, Resolution 1OB: Report to the House of Delegates, A.B.A.
18 (Aug. 8-9, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house of delegates/
resolutions/201 1_hod annualmeetingdailyjournalFINAL.authcheckdam.pdf. For the New York
State Bar Association's document supporting the ABA Resolution, a document containing several refer-
ence to the Carnegie Report, see Vincent E. Doyle III, Report to the House of Delegates, A.B.A. (Aug.
8-9, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/house-of delegates/resolutions
/2011_hod annual meeting_10b.doc.
73. See Sean C. Goodlett, The Carnegie Foundation: A Website Review, 3 CuRRENTS: TEACHING
& LEARNING 46, 46 (2010).
74. See Miller, supra note 47, at 20.
75. See Goodlett, supra note 73, at 46.
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art in the field. This Article will perform an important service by examining
whether and to what extent the Report rests on intellectually sound
foundations.
B. Academic Discussions of the Carnegie Report
The Carnegie Report already has given rise to a substantial scholarly
literature and this provides further evidence of the Report's state-of-the-art
status." The scholarly literature says very little about the ethical
foundations of the Carnegie Report and thus a detailed discussion of the
literature is beyond the purview of this Article. Nevertheless, a brief
summary of the literature will help to convey its scope and underline the
importance of the Carnegie Report as a trigger for academic discussions
about improving the practice of legal education. Not surprisingly, one
group of authors has focused on concerns that the Report raises about the
way law schools typically teach legal doctrine and legal reasoning and, in
particular, the way law schools use the case dialogue to teach the first-year
curriculum.77 For example, some scholars have agreed with the Report's
criticisms of the gap between the teaching of legal theory and the teaching
of law's practical or utilitarian side. Others have objected in particular to
the fact that the case-dialogue method deemphasizes transactional skills.
Still others have used their discussion of the Report as an occasion to argue
that the case-dialogue method dehumanizes students or reflects a form of
76. Jason Dolin recently asserted that "the recommendations of the Carnegie Report have been
largely ignored by legal academia." Jason Dolin, Law Schools: Why Faculties Fight Change,
COLUMBUS BAR LAWYERS Q., 14-15 (Spring 2011). For reasons outlined in this and the previous sec-
tion, I believe Professor Dolin overstates his point but I would agree with him that law schools and the
law faculties who run them may be in no great hurry to change what they do and how they do it in re-
sponse to the Report's recommendations. Clinging to a comfortable status quo is an all-too-human
reaction.
77. For a discussion of the Carnegie Report's analysis of the case dialogue as a method for teach-
ing the novice law student to think like a lawyer, see infra Part III.B.2(a).
78. See Sean M. O'Connor, Teaching IP from an Entrepreneurial Counseling and Transactional
Perspective, 52 ST. LOUis L.J. 877, 877-78 (2008); see also Kate Nace Day & Russell G. Murphy, "Just
Trying To Be Human in This Place:" Storytelling and Film in the First-Year Law School Classroom, 39
STETSON L. REV. 247, 254 (2009); Jessica Dopierala, Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice:
Why are Students Falling Off the Bridge and What are Law Schools Doing to Catch Them?, 85 U. DET.
MERCY L. REv. 429, 439 (2008); Jerry R. Foxhoven, Beyond Grading: Assessing Student Readiness to
Practice Law, 16 CLINICAL L. REv. 335, 338-39 (2010).
79. See Seth Freeman, Bridging the Gaps: How Cross-Disciplinary Training With MBAs Can
Improve Transactional Education, Prepare Students For Private Practice, and Enhance University Life,
13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 92 (2008); Celeste M. Hammond, Borrowing from the B Schools:
The Legal Case Study as Course Materials for Transaction Oriented Elective Courses: A Response to
the Challenges of the MacCrate Report and the Carnegie Foundation for Advancement of Teaching
Report on Legal Education, 11 TRANSACTIONS 9, 9-10 (2009) (proposing law schools make up for the
deficiencies of the Socratic method by borrowing pedagogical methods from business schools).
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gender bias.so One scholar has called for replacing the case-dialogue
method with an approach that focuses on problems and problem solving.8 '
Legal scholars being notoriously fractious, it is not surprising that some also
have used the Report as an opportunity to defend the case-dialogue
method.82
Perhaps the largest body of secondary literature on the Carnegie Report
deals with concerns about teaching practical skills to novice lawyers.83
Numerous scholars agree with the Carnegie Report's view that training in
legal skills is important and that law schools do not provide enough of such
training." One scholar has argued for more training in legal research" and
80. See Peggy Cooper Davis, Radical Proposals to Reform Legal Pedagogy: Slay the Three-
Headed Demon!, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 619, 620 (2008) (gender bias inherent in privileging
analytic over linguistic thinking); Michael Hunter Schwartz, Humanizing Legal Education Symposium:
An Introduction to a Symposium Whose Time Came, 47 WASHBURN L.J. 235, 241-43 (2008) (discussing
dehumanizing aspects of law school in general and Socratic method in particular).
81. Shirley Lung, The Problem Method. No Simple Solution, 45 WILLIAMETrE L. REv. 723, 723-
25 (2009) (contrasting the problem method with the case-dialogue method, and crediting the Carnegie
Report with the increasing use of the former).
82. See, e.g., Margaret Moore Jackson, Confronting "Unwelcomeness "from the Outside: Using
Case Theory to Tell the Stories of Sexually-Harassed Women, 14 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 61, 83-85
(2007). See generally Ryan Patrick Alford, How Do You Trim the Seamless Web? Considering the
Unintended Consequences of Pedagogical Alterations, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1273, 1273-74, 1278 (2009)
(arguing that the case-dialogue method has deep roots in Western intellectual history and that it initiates
students into a dialectical approach to reasoning that is crucial to the practice of law).
83. For a discussion of the Carnegie Report's account of the way that skills are and should be
taught to novices, see infra Part III.B.2(b).
84. See, e.g., Leah M. Christensen, The Power of Skills: An Empirical Study ofLawyering Skills
Grades as the Strongest Predictor ofLaw School Success (or in Other Words, it's Time for Legal Edua-
tion to Get Serious About Integrating Skills Training Throughout the Law School Curriculum if We Care
About How Our Students Learn, 83 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 795, 796-97 (2009) (Carnegie Report that law
schools neglect skills training); Kris Franklin, Sim City: Teaching "Thinking Like a Lawyer" in Simula-
tion-Based Clinical Courses, 53 N.Y.L ScH. L. REV. 861, 862-64 (2008/2009) (relying in part on the
Carnegie Report to argue that clinical education should be as fundamental as doctrinal training); Anahid
Gharakhanian, ABA Standard 305's "Guided Reflections ": A Perfect Fit For Guided Fieldwork, 14
CLINICAL L. REV. 61, 72-73 (2007) (discussing the Carnegie Report's judgment that schools do too little
practical skills training); Harriet N. Katz, Evaluating the Skills Curriculum: Challenges and Qportuni-
ties for Law Schools, 59 MERCER L. REv. 909, 909-10 (2008) (discussing how a law school can review
its skills curriculum in light of the Carnegie Report and other studies); Lawrence E. Singer & Megan
Bess, Teaching Health Law: Combining Pedagogy and Practice: Creating a 21st Century Health Law
Curriculum, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 852, 852-53 (2009) (asserting that legal professionals agree with the
Carnegie Report's conclusion that law schools do too little practical preparation); Carrie W. Teitcher,
Legal Writing Beyond Memos and Briefs: An Annotated Bibliography, 5 J. AsS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRs.
133, 133-34 (2008) (Camegie Report is having an impact on writing programs in law schools). But see
Anthony V. Alfieri, Against Practice, 107 MIcH. L. REV. 1073, 1075 (2009) (arguing that the Carnegie
Report overlooks the ability of law schools to teach students how to deal with people from diverse back-
grounds); Jon Siegal, Changing Law School, LAW PROF ON THE LOOSE (Feb. 20, 2007, 8:40 AM),
http://jsiegel.blogspot.com/2007/02/changing-law-school.html (pointing out that "[a] lawyer has her
whole life to learn how to practice," and that the law school offers experiences that practice does not);
Gordon Smith, The Problem ofLegal Education: What's the Diagnosis?, THE CONGLOMERATE (July 20,
2009), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/07/the-problem-of-legal-education-whats-the-
diagnosis.html (remarking that law schools do have a desire to incorporate practical skills into the cur-
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another has argued for more legal clinics.86  Several scholars follow the
Carnegie Report in asserting that law schools place insufficient emphasis on
legal writing skills.87 For example, one has recommended that law schools
teach first-year law students to draft contracts," another that schools should
teach writing in a manner that emphasizes different types of thinking
skills,89 and others that instruction in writing should be part of a "General
Practice Skills" course.9
A third, somewhat smaller body of literature has taken up the Carnegie
Report's concerns about the teaching of professionalism, professional
identity, and ethical lawyering.9' One group of scholars has supported the
Report's claim that law schools currently give knowing the law priority over
ethical lawyering.9 2  Other commentators have supported the Report's call
for more discussion in the classroom of issues related to justice." One
scholar has argued that law schools should take advantage of social science
riculum and have met with some success, but asserting that those who criticize law schools for not focus-
ing enough on practical skills often have unrealistic expectations).
85. See, e.g., Brooke J. Bowman, Researching Across The Curriculum: The Road Must Continue
Beyond The First Year, 61 OKLA. L. REv. 503, 504-05 (2008).
86. See Foxhoven, supra note 78, at 335-40.
87. See John A. Lynch Jr., Teaching Legal Writing After a Thirty-Year Respite: No Country for
Old Men?, 38 CAP. U.L. REv. 1, 11 (2009) (arguing law schools do not take into account the Carnegie
Report's emphasis on practical skills as much as they claim, because legal writing professors do not
receive the same treatment as doctrinal professors). Cf E. Joan Blum & Kathleen Elliott Vinson, Teach-
ing in Practice: Legal Writing Faculty as Expert Writing Consultants to Law Firms, 60 MERCER L. REV.
761, 761-62 (2009) (discussing the policy of many law firms to hire legal writing instructors to improve
the legal writing skills of junior lawyers).
88. See Deborah A. Schmedemann, Finding a Happy Medium: Teaching Contract Creation in
the First Year, 5 J. ASS'N LEGAL WRITING DIRS. 177, 180 (2008).
89. See Andrea McArdle, Writing Across the Curriculum: Professional Communication and the
Writing That Supports It, 15 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 241, 246-48 (2009) (writing
instruction should emphasize narrative, intuitive, and analytical skills).
90. See Stephen Gerst & Gerald Hess, Professional Skills and Values in Legal Education: The
GPS Model, 43 VAL. U.L. REv. 513, 527-32 (2009).
91. For a discussion of the Carnegie Report's analysis of the way law schools teach professional-
ism and professional ethics, see infra Part HI.B.2(c).
92. See Arthur Best, Student Evaluations of Law Teaching Work Well: Strongly Agree, Agree,
Neutral, Disagree, Strongly Disagree, 38 Sw. L. REv. 1, 31-32 (2008) (supporting the Carnegie Report's
assertion that ethical training is largely overlooked in law schools by pointing out that few student evalu-
ation forms ask about whether ethics receives attention in class); Deborah L. Rhode, Lawyers as Citi-
zens, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1323, 1333 (2009); David M. Tanovich, Learning to Act Like a Lawyer:
A Model Code of Professional Responsibility for Law Students, 27 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS JUST. 75, 77-
78 (2009) (exploring legal professionalism issues in Canada).
93. See L. Timothy Perrin, The Perplexing Problem of Client Perjury, 76 FORDHAM L REV.
1707, 1720-21 (2007); see also Stefano Moscato, Teaching Foundational Clinical Lawyering Skills to
First-Year Students, 13 LEGAL WRITING: J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 207, 217-18 (2007) (agreeing with the
Carnegie Report that practical training, such as students receive in clinics, has benefits that extend to the
teaching of ethical lawyering). See generally Robert K. Vischer, Professionalizing Moral Engagement
(A Response to Michael Hatfield), 104 Nw. U. L. REv. COLLOQUY 33, 42-44 (2009) (discussing the
widespread absence of meaningful discussions of justice in law schools).
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research on "emotional intelligence," which he describes as "a set of
emotional competencies involving self-awareness of emotions, empathetic
awareness of the emotions of others, and the ability to use this awareness to
influence the behavior of others." 94 Such training suFposedly would make
lawyers both more persuasive and more empathetic.9 Two other scholars
draw on social science literature from the fields of psychology and social
work to argue for what they call "Relationship Centered Lawyering" as a
way to enhance professionalism.9 6
Not surprisingly, a small number of scholars have used the Carnegie
Report as an occasion to call for a wholesale reconstruction of legal
education. Some have recommended replacing the current approach to
legal education with a model based on the U.S. approach to medical
education.98 Catherine Dunham and Steven Friedland have suggested that
we should eliminate the traditional legal classroom entirely and take the
show on the road using online technology." Other scholars have put
forward the potentially revolutionary suggestion that law school teachers
should use empirical techniques to determine whether and how their
methods actually work.' 0 For example, three scholars used an empirical
analysis to show we could improve student performance on final exams by
requiring students to take practice exams. 10 This particular insight is, of
course, not revolutionary, but one suspects that using empirical techniques
to study legal education in practice could lead to much more dramatic
insights concerning how law professors teach (or fail to teach) and what law
students learn (or fail to learn).
As this brief review shows, the Carnegie Report has generated a
substantial body of academic literature in the four years since its
94. John E. Montgomery, Incorporating Emotional Intelligence Concepts into Legal Education:
Strengthening the Professionalism ofLaw Students, 39 U. TOL. L. REv. 323, 326 (2008).
95. Id. at 326, 335-38, 349-50.
96. Susan L. Brooks & Robert G. Madden, Relationship-Centered Lawyering: Social Science
Theory for Transforming Legal Practice, 78 REv. JuR. U.P.R. 23, 24 (2009).
97. See, e.g., Jason M. Dolin, Opportunity Lost: How Law School Disappoints Law Students, the
Public and the Legal Profession, 44 CAL. W. L. REv. 219, 251-56 (2007).
98. Id. at 251-52; Michael Martinez, Legal Education Reform: Adopting a Medical School Mod-
el, 38 J.L. & EDUc. 705, 708-10 (2009).
99. Catherine Dunham & Steven . Friedland, Portable Learning for the 21st Century Law
School: Designing a New Pedagogy for the Modern Global Contest, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER &
INFO L. 371, 372-74 (2009).
100. See Dolin, supra note 97, at 251-52.
101. See generally Andrea A. Circio, Gregory Todd Jones & Tanya M. Washington, Does Prac-
tice Make Perfect? An Empirical Examination of the Impact of Practice Essays on Essay Exam Perfor-
mance, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 271, 271 (2008).
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publication. 02 Thus, the Report has become a focus, if not the focus, of
discussions about educational reform not only in law schools, professional
associations, and bar organizations (as shown in Part H.A), but also in
scholarly circles. 03 Indeed, the sheer volume of scholarly work-whatever
its merits-supports my contention that the Report and efforts based on it
stand at the cutting edge of legal education reform.10 Thus, a hard look at
the ethical grounding of the Carnegie Report itself is not only desirable but,
perhaps, overdue.
m. THE CARNEGIE REPORT'S BACKBONE: A TELEOLOGICAL ETHICAL
FRAMEWORK
This Part of the Article and Part IV argue that there are three-or at
least two-and-a-half-ethical theoretical frameworks operating in or just
below the surface of the Carnegie Report. 05 For reasons that will become
clear, I refer to these as the teleological framework,'0 the emotivist
framework, 07 and the contractarian framework.'08 This Part of the Article
examines the teleological framework in some detail because the teleological
framework provides the backbone of the Report and, as discussed in Part V,
it should serve as a premise for any future discussions about reforming legal
education that claim to be based on the Report. Part III.A carefully
examines the difficult and long-debated concept of teleological explanation.
Part Ill.B shows the many ways in which teleological explanation frames,
informs, and organizes the analysis of legal education in the Report. Part
HlI.B also identifies internal weaknesses and inconsistencies in the Report's
teleological explanation of legal education. Part HI.B discusses the
Report's analysis and conclusions in considerable detail because, along with
Part V, Part I.B is intended to serve as a propaedeutic for future work
based on the Report. Part IV.A discusses the emotivist framework that,
throughout the Report, seems to shadow and cast doubt on the teleological
framework. Part IV.B analyzes the contractarian framework that appears to
function in the Report as a somewhat half-hearted defense against key
102. See, e.g., Lisa T. McElroy, Christine N. Coughlin & Deborah S. Gordon, "Yes, We Came-
gie!" Conference: The Carnegie Report and Legal Writing: Does the Report Go Far Enough?, 17
LEGAL WRITNG 279, 279 (2011).
103. Id.
104. See generally, e.g., McElroy, supra note 102.
105. I refer to these "theoretical frameworks" as frameworks rather than as theories because they
provide structure(s) and organizing principles for the Carnegie Report's analysis and critique of legal
education but they do not themselves receive detailed theoretical examination or elaboration in the
Report.
106. See infra Parts UL.A, B.
107. See infra Part IV.A.
108. See infra Part IV.B.
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objections to the teleological framework, including objections posed by the
emotivist framework. If the arguments presented here are correct, then the
ethical grounding of the Report embodied in the three theoretical
frameworks does not provide adequate, internally consistent support for the
authors' analytical conclusions or recommendations.
A. What Is a Teleological Ethical Theory?
According to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, "teleology" means
"[t]he study of the ends or purposes of things."'" The term comes from the
Greek word "telos," meaning "end or goal." 0 "Teleology" also has been
defined as "the philosophical doctrine that all of nature, or at least
intentional agents, are goal-directed or functionally organized.""' These
rather technical and bloodless definitions do not, however, capture the
traditional significance of teleological explanation either for human life and
activity or for the life and activity of non-human nature. To understand the
significance of teleological explanation, we need to place it in historical
context. The telos is one element of a broader explanatory scheme that
received its classical form in Aristotle's account of the Four Causes."12 As
one commentator has written,
109. Teleology, in THE OxFoRD DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 362 (Simon Blackburn ed., 2d ed.
2005).
110. RICHARD SORABJI, NECESSITY, CAUSE, AND BLAME: PERSPECTIVES ON ARISTOTLE'S
THEORY 156 (1980). As Professor Moravcsik states, the telos "can be described as the functional factor.
This .. . covers what would be described in modem terms by such different terms as end, aim, goal, and
function." Julius M.E. Moravcsik, Aristotle on Adequate Explanations, 28 SYNTHESE 3, 9 (1974).
111. Teleology, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 905 (Robert Audi ed., 2d ed.
1999). The definition continues: "Aristotle invested nature itself with goals - internal teleology." Id. at
906. "Each kind has its own final cause, and entities are so constructed that they tend to realize this
goal." Id.
112. For explanations of Aristotle's account of the Four Causes, see R.J. Hankinson, Philosophy of
Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 109, 120-22 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1995);
DAVID Ross, ARISTOTLE 71-75 (1964); A.E. TAYLOR, ARISTOTLE 44-54 (1955). For an argument that
the Greek term usually translated as "cause," i.e., aition or aitia, should be translated as "because" or,
perhaps, "explanation," (as in the Four Types of Explanation), see Max Hocutt, Aristotle's Four Becaus-
es, 49 PHIL. 385, 387 (1974). Professor Hocutt follows Professor Vlastos on this point. See Gregory
Vlastos, Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo, 78 PHIL. REV. 291, 294 (1969). Professor Moravcsik
supports Hocutt's point that we should understand Aristotle's account of the Four Causes as an "account
of what constitutes an adequate explanation" or "whatever answers a 'why'-question." Moravcsik,
supra note 110, at 3. Accord SORABJI, supra note 110, at 40. But see David Furley, What Kindof Cause
is Aristotle's Final Cause?, in RATIONALITY IN GREEK THOUGHT 59,60 (Michael Frede & Gisela Striker
eds., 1996) ("I shall avoid the word 'explanation' because I believe it normally refers to a proposition or
set of propositions - a verbal item - and Aristotle uses aition to refer to a fact or a state of affairs or a
thing or a person. . . . And I shall avoid talking about 'becauses' since I do not understand the distinc-
tion people want to make when they use that term instead of 'causes."'). For a careful examination of
the development of the notion of a "cause" in ancient philosophy, see generally Michael Frede, The
Original Notion of Cause, in DOUBT AND DOGMATISM: STUDIES IN HELLENISTIC EPISTEOMOLOGY 217,
217-21 (Malcolm Schofield et al. eds., 1980).
136 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVEW [Vol. 39
Aristotle's scheme incorporates the matter, which is . . . the
potential bearer of form (and of its privation); the form, or structural
organization which is realized in the matter; the agent, or efficient
cause, which brings that information about; and (in some cases at
least) the goal, or final end [i.e., the telos], toward which that
process tends." 3
Thus, the Four Causes are the material, formal, efficient or active, and final,
i.e., the teloS.114 Under Aristotle's scheme, the potter would be the agent or
efficient cause who molds clay-the matter or material cause-into the
form of a pot. Raw clay possesses the potential to be a pot and the potter
actualizes the potential by forming or informing the clay as a pot. As
Aristotle remarked, the form and the telos are often the same in an analysis
using the Four Causes, meaning that the final end or purpose toward which
a process tends often is the realization or embodiment of form in matter." 5
To return to the example of the potter, we might say that the telos of the
pottery process is the form of a pot embodied in clay. Thus, the pot is both
formal and final cause. The pot is the final end toward which pottery as a
process moves. We could take the analysis a step further and say that the
telos (purpose or function) of a pot is containing liquid. Thus, we might
113. Hankinson, supra note 112, at 122. See ARISTOTLE, ARISTOTLE'S PHYSICS 28 (Richard Hope
trans., 1961). In the standard form for citations to Aristotle, the reference is PHYSICS ii.3 194b25-195a2.
Id.
114. See SORABJI, supra note 110, at 51. After arguing the word usually translated as "cause"
should be translated as "explanation," Professor Hocutt's asserts that only Aristotle's efficient or moving
cause is a "cause" as the term is used in modern English. Hocutt, supra note 112, at 386. Accord
Furley, supra note 112, at 62 ("we can understand ... the material, formal, and final causes as being
different aspects of the efficient cause, or perhaps different kinds of efficient cause."). Responding to
this line of argument, Professor Mure rejects the effort to restrict the term "cause" to Aristotle's efficient
cause. G. R. G. Mure, Cause and Because in Aristotle, 50 PHIL. 356, 356 (1975). Professor Gotthelf
also argues that, for Aristotle, final causes are not reducible to efficient causes. See Allan Gotthelf,
Aristotle's Conception ofFinal Causality, in PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN ARISTOTLE'S BIOLOGY 204, 213
(Allan Gotthelf & James G. Lennox eds., 1987) [hereinafter Gotthelf, Aristotle's Conception]. For a
useful discussion of the links between final and efficient causes in Aristotle, see SARAH BROADIE, Na-
ture and Craft in Aristotelian Teleology, in ARISTOTLE AND BEYOND 85 (2007) [hereinafter BROADIE,
Nature and Craft].
115. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 113, at 35 [PHYSICS ii.7 198a25-26]. For discussions of Aristo-
tle's view on this issue, see John M. Cooper, Aristotle on Natural Teleology, in LANGUAGE AND LOGOS
197, 200-01 (Malcolm Schofield & Martha Nussbaum eds., 1982); Hankinson, supra note 112, at 122;
Ross, supra note 112, at 74; TAYLOR, supra note 112, at 51-52. See also T.H. Irwin, The Metaphysical
and Psychological Basis ofAristotle's Ethics, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE's ETHICS 35, 39-41 (Am6lie 0.
Rorty ed., 1980) (explaining the relationship between form and function in Aristotle). Hocutt suggests
that Aristotle's position on this issue may provide a justification for collapsing the final cause into the
formal cause as a "constituent" and thus effectively eliminating final causes or teloi as a separate type of
explanation. Hocutt, supra note 112, at 399. Professor Mure rejects Hocutt's attempt to reduce Aristo-
tie's four causes to three, stating bluntly and somewhat hyperbolically that "Aristotle's Nature operates
teleologically. . . ." Mure, supra note 114, at 357.
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describe the telos of the pottery process as embodying in clay a form that
can contain liquid.
It seems unlikely that anyone would seriously dispute the claim that the
craft of pottery involves a teleological process in which the goal or purpose
in the mind of the potter finds its formal embodiment in the matter of the
pot. Aristotle went further, however, and claimed that we can and must use
the Four Causes, including the final cause or telos, to explain human and
non-human natural processes, i.e., processes in the world that do not
involve the shaping of an artifact to reflect a conscious purpose."' 6  Why
does Aristotle insist on seeking teleological explanations for non-conscious
natural processes? Richard Rubenstein has argued that Aristotle sought
teleological explanations because he (Aristotle) believed such explanations
render the natural world in which we live meaningful:
[w]e have our reason, which makes it possible for us to think
logical, purposive, patterned thoughts, but the universe has its own
logic and purposes. If it did not-if the world inside and outside us
were not intelligible-our thoughts would disappear into that void
like light lost in pure darkness.
Unlike the Jews, Muslims, and Christians who would one day
seize on this insight as proof of the existence of a supernatural
Creator, Aristotle held that the natural universe, although
meaningful, is self-sufficient. And, unlike the secularists, who
would one day deny that it has any intrinsic meaning at all, he
asserted that it is full of purpose. Everything that exists, he taught,
strives to fulfill itself-to realize (or, in his language, to 'actualize')
its inherent potential. This great law makes nature comprehensible
and invites us to fulfill our own destiny by learning to comprehend
it."
As Rubenstein points out, however, Aristotle did not make the foolish
mistake of claiming that a being such as a plant realizes a telos in the sense
116. As Aristotle says in the Physics when introducing his discussion of the Four Causes, "[i]t
must clearly, therefore, be our aim in the present inquiry to get knowledge of the first principles to which
we may refer any problem in our exploration of generation and destruction and of any natural transfor-
mation." ARISTOTLE, supra note 113, at 28 [PHYSICS 11.3, 194b20-24] (emphasis added). For a brief
description of the various ways in which Aristotle seeks to explain nature teleologically, see ANDREW
wOODFIELD, TELEOLOGY 5-6 (1976).
117. RICHARD E. RUBENSTEIN, ARISTOTLE'S CHILDREN: How CHRISTIANS, MUSLIMS, AND JEWS
REDISCOVERED ANCIENT WISDOM AND ILLUMINATED THE DARK AGES 42-43 (2003).
2012] 137
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
that it pursues conscious goals and purposes just as human beings do."' 8 A
plant's roots draw water and nutrients from soil in order to nourish the
plant, but the plant and the roots pursue the telos of nourishment and the
higher, all-inclusive telos of staying alive unconsciously. Indeed, it will
turn out to be a crucial element of Aristotle's ethical theory that human
beings are similar to plants and to organs in living organisms in the sense
that human beings also have a telos or teloi that they naturally pursue but of
which they may not be aware or fully conscious." 9
For a skeptic steeped in the modem scientific view that the only real
causes are efficient causes, Aristotle's notion that we can find real, intrinsic,
unconscious teloi-goals, ends, purposes-in nature might seem bizarre.12 0
To Aristotle, however,
the opposite notion, that the universe is totally unlike us, that it is
chaotic matter on which we impose a purely subjective mental
order, he would have thought both arrogant (because it locates all
meaning in the human mind) and despairing (because it deprives the
nonhuman universe of meaning). The lynchpin of his thinking-the
idea that connects the meaning inside people with the meaning
outside them-is the presence of form in nature. Every natural
substance, he declared, whether a tree, a star, or a person, is a
compound of matter and form. 'Form,' as he uses the word, means
shape, but it also means that which makes a substance what it most
truly is: the thing's internal structure and its animating force, the
factor that realizes or actualizes a thing's potential to be the kind of
thing that it iS.121
By growing into an oak, an acorn actualizes its potential and achieves its
true form and inner purpose or end, i.e., its telos. 22 For Aristotle, we find
meaning in the world by finding the form(s) and end(s) in things-i.e., by
developing a teleological explanation of things such as plants and animals
as well as of people.123 As Karl Liwith has written, "[i]t is not by chance
118. See id. at 43. See also W. K C. GuTHIUE, Aristotle An Encounter, 6 A HISTORY OF GREEK
PHILOSOPHY 107 (1981) ("Aristotle was not a fool, therefore he could not have been guilty of such crude
anthropomorphism, or alternatively could not have entertained such an illogical idea as that of uncon-
scious purpose.").
119. See infra notes 146-160 and accompany text discussing the human telos.
120. See supra note 114.
121. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 117, at 43-44.
122. See GUTHRIE, supra note 118, at 116 ("If the building up ofan oak from an acorn were an art
practised by man, instead of being achieved by nature unaided, everyone would exclaim at the intelli-
gence, skill and ingenuity involved.").
123. See generally supra note 94; see also supra note 95.
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that we use the words 'meaning' and 'purpose' interchangeably, for it is
mainly purpose which constitutes meaning for us." 24
Before examining Aristotle's account of teleological explanation and its
application to human beings more closely, it is important to underline one
point that Rubenstein makes.'2s For Aristotle, teleological explanation is
not a method of "impos[ing] . . . a purely subjective mental order" on an
otherwise disorderly and meaningless universe. 2 6  Teleological explanation
is not, in other words, a purely heuristic technique with which we analyze
the natural world as if things in it pursued ends or purposes.'27 Rather, as
Professor Moravcsik has argued, the Four Causes "referred to by Aristotle
are indeed, elements of reality, or roles played in some context by elements
of reality. And thus the relationships introduced are ontological
relationships; and not relations between the world and elements of language,
or some given state of human understanding." 28  If Aristotle were to say
that the mature, living oak tree is the telos or purpose or end of the acorn, he
would not be speaking metaphorically or by analogy. He would not be
saying we could somehow understand the acorn better by treating it "as if'
the oak were its telos. Rather, he would be saying that the mature oak really
is the form and end toward which the acorn develops and that the acorn is as
124. KARL IOWrH, MEANING IN HISTORY: THE THEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 5 (1949). L4with goes on to suggest that purpose can be found only in things
that were created by God or by human beings, but as indicated in the text, Aristotle believed that one can
find purposes or ends for many things in nature, things not made by human beings, without presuming
that some kind of god created or fashioned those things. Id. Indeed, Aristotle rejected the notion of a
divine, world-shaping Craftsman defended by his teacher, Plato. See Furley, supra note 112, at 65
(Aristotle's "cosmos certainly has no purposive Craftsman, and is not constructed according to the
intention of any Mind."). But cf GUTHRIE, supra note 118, at 108 ("All things considered, we must at
least say that if nature for Aristotle was end-directed, that was because it was divinely ordered.").
125. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 117, at43.
126. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
127. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 117, at 43.
128. Moravcsik, supra note 110, at 7. Accord David M. Balme, Teleology and Necessity, in
PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN ARISTOTLE'S BIOLOGY 275, 280-81 (Allan Gotthelf & James G. Lennox eds.,
1987); Gotthelf, Aristotle's Conception, supra note 114, at 228. Although I concur with Moravcsik,
Balme, and Gotthelf that for Aristotle teleological explanation has an ontological, real-world basis, it is
important to acknowledge that there is a robust debate among Aristotle scholars about the precise status
of the Four Causes, and in particular the status of the final cause or telos. See Allan Gotthelf, Under-
standing Aristotle's Teleology, in FINAL CAUSALITY IN NATURE AND HUMAN AFFAIRS, 30 STUDEIS IN
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 71, 75-79 (Richard F. Hassing ed., 1997) (identifying
five main lines of interpretation and two branch lines) [hereinafter Gotthelf, Understanding Aristotle's
Teleology]. Professor Gotthelf notes, for example, that as distinguished a scholar as Professor Nuss-
baum appears (at least in her earlier writings) to favor the view that teleological explanation is primarily
of heuristic or "pragmatic" value. See id. at 76. See, e.g., MARTHA CRAVEN NUSSBAUM, Aristotle on
Teleological Explanation, in ARISTOTLE'S DE MOTU ANIMAlUM 59, 70, 84-85 (Martha Craven Nuss-
baum ed. & trans., 1978).
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it is and develops as it develops, in Aristotle's phrase, "for the sake of" 29
the mature, living oak. 3 0  By denying that teleological explanation is
merely a heuristic technique, however, Aristotle is certainly not denying
that we can and do use teleological explanation heuristically.' 3' In fact,
teleological explanation helps us to understand and find meaning in the non-
human world precisely because, according to Aristotle, things in the world
really do act for the sake of and in pursuit of teloi or goals and ends. 32 As
Professor Gotthelf explains, Aristotle's teleology "identifies the ontological
basis of the awareness that the existence and stages of a development can be
understood only in terms of its end ....
In a somewhat cryptic comment describing the relationship between the
telos and the other three causes, Aristotle writes, "there are the ends or the
good of the others; for all the others tend toward what is best as toward their
end."'1' In this comment, Aristotle appears to identify the telos or end with
the good or best for that of which it is the end. Thus, we could say that as
the telos of the acorn, the oak is the good of the acorn or what the acorn is
good for. What is an acorn good for? First and foremost, producing an oak.
As Professor Cooper says:
Aristotle believed that many (not, of course, all) natural events
and facts need to be explained by reference to natural goals. He
understands by a goal .. . whether natural or not, something good
(from some point of view) that something else causes or makes
possible, where this other thing exists or happens (at least in part)
because of that good. So in holding that some natural events and
facts have to be explained by reference to natural goals, he is
holding that some things exist or happen in the course of nature
because of some good that they do or make possible. 3 5
Elaborating on this point, Professor Furley writes:
129. ARISTOTLE, supra note 113, at 28 [PHYSICS ii.3 194b32-34]. For an analysis of the different
senses in which a thing could be "for the sake of' its telos, see Wolfgang Kulhnann, Different Concepts
of the Final Cause in Aristotle, in ARISTOTLE ON NATURE AND LIVING THINGs: PHILOSOPHICAL AND
HISTORICAL STuDiEs 169, 172 (Allan Gotthelf ed., 1985).
130. For a summary of Aristotle's arguments in support of the view that teloi or ends and purposes
are an intrinsic and irreducible element of the natural world, see Cooper, supra note 115, at 207-16.
131. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 117, at 43-44.
132. See Cooper, supra note 115, at 214.
133. Gotthelf, Aristotle's Conception, supra note 114, at 229.
134. ARISTOTLE, supra note 113, at 29 [PHYSICS ii.3 195a22-23].
135. Cooper, supra note 115, at 197.
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What is to count as a goal? Natural processes have many
outcomes. . .. Aristotle's answer was that the goal must be
recognizably a good.... The cases that most interested him were
the structures and functioning of the parts of animal bodies, and in
these cases the good in question is clearly to be identified as the
good of the animal itself, and (except in the case of man, whose life
involves moral and intellectual goals as well as physical ones) is
always related to the animal's capacity for surviving in its
environment.3 6
We might say that the natural end or telos of the deer's eye is seeing, and
seeing allows the deer to move through its environment, to identify food, to
avoid predators, and thus to survive. It is, in Furley's phrase, "recognizably
a good" 37 for the deer to see, and by seeing, to eat and avoid being eaten.'38
The claim here is not that a previously blind species of deer somehow grew
eyes in order to see food and stop blundering into ravenous packs of gray
wolves. Rather, Aristotle asserts that one can understand fully what the
deer's eye really is and what it means only if one understands what it does
and what good(s) it actually serves for the deer. 139  Summing up the
conclusions of his monograph analyzing teleological explanation, Professor
Woodfield generalizes Aristotle's point:
the different types of teleological explanations are variations on a
single theme. This theme is, to put it simply, the idea of a thing's
happening because it is good. More exactly . . . the [teleological
descriptions] I deal with convey the idea that the thing happens or
exists because it leads or is believed to lead to something which is
good.'
136. Furley, supra note 112, at 66.
137. Id.
138. See Balme, supra note 128, at 281 (final cause "is not directed towards the good of anything
other than the individual animal.").
139. Professor Nagel frames the point with reference to the ergon (i.e., the specific function or
work) of a thing. Thomas Nagel, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHics 7, 8
(Amdlie 0. Rorty ed., 1980). "The ergon of a thing, in general, is what it does that makes it what it is.
Not everything has an ergon, for there are things to be which is not to do anything. But when something
has an ergon, that thing's good is specified by it." See id. Thus, we could say that the ergon of the deer's
eye is seeing. Id. at 7-8. Seeing is also the good of the eye. Id. The measure of the eye's excellence
will be how well it performs its ergon--in this case, how well it sees. See id.
140. WOODFIELD, supra note 116, at 205. But cf Gotthelf, Aristotle's Conception, supra note
114, at 214 n.18 ("Since a naturalistic account can .. .be given of the notion of the good with which
Aristotle operates in his biology, it seems to me that the fundamental account of the final cause need not
make use of that notion."), 233 ("the goodness of the end is not an independent constituent of the analy-
sis, nor what centrally establishes that end as the end.").
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Teleological explanation for Aristotle rests, in part, on the claim that
every type of being, or at least every species of living being, has a "nature"
(in Greek, physis).14' According to Professor Broadie, "[n]ature, in this
context, is not Nature in general, or the cosmos, but the specific essential
nature of an individual substance, the inner principle of its behaviour and
organisation."l 4 2 As we come to understand the active nature or physis of a
thing, we also learn to see and specify the thing's excellence, i.e., what the
thing does when it performs its function and does what it is good for
doing.143 In Broadie's account,
the excellence of a thing [is] the quality whereby it functions well
according to its kind or essential nature; but 'whereby' is not causal
here. The difference between possessing and not possessing the
excellence is simply the difference between functioning well and
not always so well, whenever an occasion arises for active
functioning.'"
Thus, a living thing such as a thoroughbred horse achieves its specific
excellence by functioning well and fulfilling its nature, i.e., actualizing its
potential, achieving its telos, and thereby doing what it is good for doing, as
a thoroughbred horse. We might, for example, say that a thoroughbred
horse galloping at the peak of its powers in the Kentucky Derby actively
achieves its telos and the specific excellence of its nature. The good of the
thoroughbred, what the thoroughbred is good for, is running and running
well.
Just as a thoroughbred has a specific or essential nature and therefore a
characteristic telos in a teleological explanation, so also do human beings
have a specific or essential nature in Aristotle's sense and therefore a telos
that is intrinsic to them as human beings regardless of their particular and
individual purposes, intentions, or interests. To show how Aristotle's
notion of a teleological explanation based on a thing's specific nature
applies to human beings, Alasdair MacIntyre outlines the elements of a
teleological "moral scheme." 45
141. For a discussion of the roots of Aristotle's Physics in this notion of physis, see John Herman
Randall, Jr., Introduction to ARISTOTLE, supra note 113, at v-vii.
142. BROADIE, Nature and Craft, supra note 114, at 85-86.
143. SARAH BROADIE, ETHICs wITH ARISTOTLE 38 (1991).
144. Id.
145. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 52 (3d ed. 2007)
[hereinafter MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE]. For short expositions ofAristotle's ethical theory, see gener-
ally D.S. Hutchinson, Ethics, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ARISTOTLE 195-32 (Jonathan Barnes
ed., 1995); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALrTY? 124-145 (1988) (hereinaf-
ter MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?]; and Mark F. Kightlinger, The Gathering Twilight? Information
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Within th[e] teleological scheme there is a fundamental contrast
between man-as-he-happens-to-be and man-as-he-could-be-if-he-
realized-his-essential-nature. Ethics is the science which is to
enable men to understand how they make the transition from the
former state to the latter. Ethics therefore in this view presupposes
some account of potentiality and act, some account of the essence
of man as a rational animal and above all some account of the
human telos.146
Ethics, in other words, is a teleological science because it studies what a
human being must do to achieve the human telos and thereby realize the
human being's essential nature and good as a rational animal. 14 7
Elaborating on this point, MacIntyre observes:
The precepts which enjoin the various virtues and prohibit the vices
which are their counterparts instruct us how to move from
potentiality to act, how to realize our true nature and to reach our
true end. To defy them will be to be frustrated and incomplete, to
fail to achieve that good of rational happiness which it is peculiarly
ours as a species to pursue.148
Borrowing Broadie's language,149 we could say that to defy the precepts
developed by the science of ethics is to fail to achieve the excellence of our
specific or essential nature as human beings, to fail to function as well as
possible as human beings. Because a being's essential natural goal or telos
is a good,15 0 achieving the human telos is a good-perhaps the overarching
good-for human beings. Failing to pursue and achieve the telos means
failing to pursue and achieve what is good and best for us as human beings.
According to Macintyre, in a teleological ethical theory,
[w]e . . . have a threefold scheme in which human-nature-as-it-
happens-to-be (human nature in its untutored state) is initially
discrepant and discordant with the precepts of ethics and needs to
Privacy on the Internet in the Post-Enlightenment Era, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 353,
357-59 (2006) [Kightlinger, The Gathering Twilight?]. Professor Floyd also has noticed the relevance of
MacIntyre and the Aristotelian tradition for understanding the Carnegie Report. See Timothy W. Floyd,
Moral Vision, Moral Courage, and the Formation of the Lawyer's Professional Identity, 28 Miss. C.L.
REv. 339,344 n.12 (2009).
146. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 52.
147. Id.
148. Id. For an elaboration of the idea that "rational happiness" is the peculiar good or excellence
of our species, see infra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
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be transformed by the instruction of practical reason and experience
into human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos.IsI
As Maclntyre's references to "untutored human nature" and the "instruction
of practical reason and experience" suggest, implicit in a teleological ethical
theory is the call for an educational process that will assist a person in
making the transition from a raw, untutored, happens-to-be state to the
realization and actualization of his or her "essential nature," his or her telos
or end and purpose as a human being.15 2  Moreover, this process is
educational in the very strict sense that it educes-i.e., draws out, and
develops-potentials that are latent in the raw, untutored, happens-to-be
neophyte. Thus, stripped to its essentials, a "teleological framework," as the
phrase is used in this Article, is one that explains and supports a process
such as producing a (new) lawyer'" by resolving the process into three
interconnected stages. Those stages are (1) the "untutored" or "happens-to-
be" state in which we find a person at the beginning of the process; (2) the
particular human end state, goal, or telos that the person must achieve,
actualize, or realize by the end of the process; and (3) the educational
activities and other measures needed to move, change, or transform the
person from the former state to the latter. 154 As MacIntyre notes, "[e]ach of
the three elements of the scheme ... requires reference to the other two if its
status and function are to be intelligible." 5s
At this point in the discussion, I need to introduce a distinction between
"grounded" and "ungrounded" teleological ethical theories. A grounded
theory, as I use the term, is one that provides a substantial defense of a
particular account of the human telos in addition to providing an account of
the other three elements identified above, i.e., untutored human nature,
human nature as it could be if it achieves the human telos, and a process for
151. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 53. For more detailed account of how such
teleological moral reasoning operates, see Alasdair Macintyre, Practical Rationalities as Forms of
Social Structure, in THE MACINTYRE READER 120, 121-24 (Kelvin Knight ed., 1998) [hereinafter Mac-
Intyre, Practical Rationalities]. MacIntyre observes that the teleological
scheme is complicated and added to, but not essentially altered, when it is placed within a
framework of theistic beliefs, whether Christian, as with Aquinas, or Jewish with
Maimonides, or Islamic with Ibn Roschd. The precepts of ethics now have to be understood
not only as teleological injunctions, but also as expressions of divinely ordained law.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 53.
152. Id.
153. For an analysis of how legal education, as described in the Carnegie Report, is constructed on
a teleological framework, see infra Part I.B.
154. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 53-54.
155. Id. at 53.
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transforming the former into the latter. Aristotle provides the archetype of
what I am calling a grounded teleological ethical theory. For Aristotle, a
human being learns how to achieve or realize her human nature and thus to
become fully human in part through ethical education." 6  Aristotle's
account of ethical education includes an argument in support of what he
believes to be the human telos, which he labels eudaimonia.15 7  As
Maclntyre observes, this term presents "difficulty in translation:
blessedness, happiness, prosperity. It is the state of being well and doing
well in being well, of a man's being well-favored himself and in relation to
the divine."15 8  Elsewhere, Maclntyre appears to translate eudaimonia with
the phrase "rational happiness."15 9 Aristotle's ethical theory is grounded in
my sense of the term because it contains a robust defense of his account of
the human telos toward which the educational process is, or should be,
directed.1" An ungrounded teleological ethical theory, by contrast, is one
that omits any substantial defense of the asserted human telos or teloi
toward which the process of ethical education moves. An ungrounded
teleological theory, in other words, identifies a telos or presumes a telos
either for human beings in general or for a particular form of human activity
but it does not defend and seek to justify that telos independently. The telos
156. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs 7-17 (Terrence Irwin trans., 1985)
[NIcoMAcHEAN ETHICS i.4-i.7 1095al5-1098a20]. For a careful examination of what Aristotle means
by eudaimonia, see J. L. Ackrill, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHics 15 (Am6-
lie 0. Rorty ed., 1980).
158. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 148. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 157, at 19
[NICOMACHEAN ETHICS i.8 1098b21-23] ("happy person lives well and does well in action"); see also id.
at 28 [1 101b25-27] ("we never praise happiness, as we praise justice, but count it blessed, as something
better and more godlike."). Aristotle elsewhere appears to deny that the best human life is the practical
life of action and contends instead that "the metaphysical contemplation of [god] . . . furnishes man with
his specific and ultimate telos . . . ." MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 158. See generally
ARISTOTLE, supra note 157, at 284-91 [NICOMACHEAN ETHICS x.7-x.9 1177al 1-1 179b33]. For a dis-
cussion of the competing arguments within Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics for these two views of the
best human life, see Thomas Nagel, Aristotle on Eudaimonia, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 7
(Am6lie 0. Rorty ed., 1980). For a discussion of the tensions in the Nicomachean Ethics between the
contemplative life and the practical life and the significance of those tensions, see Ackrill, supra note
157, at 29-33.
159. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 52. Hutchinson translates eudaimonia as
"success" but he acknowledges that the standard translations are "happiness" and "living well and faring
well[.]" Hutchinson, supra note 145, at 200 n.4, 201. Anthony Kenny appears to accept "happiness" as
a translation for eudaimonia. Anthony Kenny, Happiness, 66 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y 93, 99
(1966). Ackrill responds that "[n]early everything Kenny says about happiness goes to show that the
word 'happiness' is not a proper translation of the word eudaimonia." Ackrill, supra note 157, at 24.
Sarah Broadie observes that, for Aristotle, "human happiness, the central good of a happy human life, is
rational practical excellent activity .... The connection between happiness here and excellent activity is
as close as the word 'is' can convey." BROADIE, ETHIcs wrTH ARISTOTLE, supra note 143, at 41.
160. For a summary of Aristotle's arguments in support of eudaimonia as the telos or purpose of
human life, see Hutchinson, supra note 145, at 199-204.
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is given as a premise and the theory focuses on how one should describe
human nature as it is and, more importantly, how one should educate and
transform human nature as it is to achieve or realize the ungrounded telos
that the theory presumes.16 ' One might say that an ungrounded theory
focuses on parts one and two of a three-part teleological framework and
takes part three-the telos-more or less for granted.
As the remainder of this Part shows, the backbone or organizing
principle of the Carnegie Report is a recurring pattern-a three-part
teleological framework comprising a brief account of the novice law
student's untutored condition, a cursory account of the telos or teloi that the
law student is supposed to achieve or realize by the conclusion of a legal
education, and a more detailed account of what must be done to, with, and
by the student to move her from the former to the latter. Indeed, as
explicated in the Carnegie Report, legal education makes sense, if it makes
sense at all, only as a process designed to move the law student from the
untutored state to the goal state, while the untutored state and the goal state
become fully intelligible only as the starting point and end point of legal
education. 16 2 Unlike Aristotle's account of the science of ethics, however,
the Report presents an ungrounded teleological framework for legal
education.163 The Report does not provide a serious explanation or defense
of the telos or teloi toward which the educational process is expected to
move the student.'" This lacuna in the Report must be addressed if those
behind the current push to reform legal education hope to do more than
construct sand castles.16 s In the following sections, I first show, in some
detail, that the authors16 6 rely at various points in their account of legal
education on a three-part teleological framework and I also show that they
have adopted an ungrounded rather than a grounded teleological standpoint.
I then discuss the fundamental problems that their approach raises but does
not address or resolve.
B. The Carnegie Report Relies Heavily on a Teleological Ethical
Framework
This Part of the Article substantiates the claim that the authors of the
Carnegie Report build their account of and recommendations for legal
161. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 53.
162. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
164. See infra Part llI.B.2(e).
165. For a discussion of this assertion, see infra Part V.C.1-6.
166. In this Article, whenever I refer to "the authors," I am of course referring in shorthand to the
authors of the Carnegie Report.
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education on an ungrounded three-part teleological framework. 6 7
Teleological frameworks recur throughout the Report, first in the discussion
of formation and formative education,'" and then in the discussions of what
the authors call the three apprenticeships. 6 9  And yet the authors'
teleological approach ultimately is not convincing because they rely entirely
on an ungrounded teleological framework even though the logic of their
own argument demands a grounded teleological framework as the "moral
basis"' 0 or "ethical grounding"' 7' of legal education.
1. Formation and Formative Education
For evidence that the authors of the Carnegie Report build their account
of legal education on a three-part teleological framework, we should look
first at their discussion of "formation" and the formative process.172
According to the authors, the Report's "unusual angle of vision" is its
"focus[] on the daily practices of teaching and learning through which
future legal professionals are formed."' 7 3 As the authors observe,
[i]t is common in French, though not in English, to talk about
education as 'formation,' as in la formation medicale or even la
formation humaine. However, changing conditions of professional
life have begun to give the term some educational currency. The
preparation of the clergy has, for its own internal reasons, long been
sensitive to the relation of character to professional legitimacy and
competence. 74
If we follow the clue provided by the analogy to "preparation of the clergy,"
these somewhat cryptic comments imply that the authors see "formation" as
a process of bringing a person's character into a proper relation to
167. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
168. See infra Part Ill.B.1.
169. See infra Part M.B.2.
170. For the authors' call for a "moral basis" for legal professionalism, see infra note 543 and
accompanying text.
171. For the authors' call for "ethical grounding," see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
172. For some of the more than twenty references to "formation" or "formative education," see,
for example, CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2, 3, 12-14, 60, 75, 177-78, 182, 198.
173. Id. at 1-2.
174. Id. at 84. Ile authors could make the same point in the German language. The term for
"formation" in German is Bildung. Bildung translation English, German-English Dictionary, REVERSO,
http*//dictionary.reverso.net/german-english/bildung (last visted Dec. 12, 2012). The related verb, bild-
en, means "to form" but also "to cultivate, improve, educate" while the reflexive form of the verb, sich
bilden, means "to improve one's mind." Bilden translation English, German-English Dictionary,
REvERSO, http://dictionary.reverso.net/german-english/bilden (last visted Dec. 12, 2012). A person is
gebildet if she is cultivated or educated. Gebildet translation English, German-English Dictionary,
REVERSO, http://dictionary.reverso.net/german-english/gebildet (last visted Dec. 12, 2012).
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"professional legitimacy and competence." 75  Formation thus involves the
forming of character. As William Sullivan, the lead author of the Carnegie
Report, states in his companion volume Work and Integrity,'76 character or
"ethos [can be] understood as a cultivated disposition toward good
values."'77  This definition is not quite right because it implies that all
character is good character and that a person of bad character has no
character at all. It might be more accurate to say that a person of bad
character has, in Sullivan's terms, a "disposition" and perhaps even a
"cultivated disposition" to "bad values."' 7 8  A person's character thus
comprises his or her dispositions and, in particular, the cultivated
dispositions toward some set of values or ends.179  Thus, "formation" of
lawyers would involve cultivation of particular dispositions that become
part of the character of the person so formed, dispositions determined or at
least guided by "values" of competence and professional legitimacy.
The authors of the Carnegie Report elsewhere remark that "all forms of
education exert socializing pressures on the students-and faculty-who
take part in them. This is the formative dimension of professional
education."180 In this context, the authors appear to use the term "socialize"
to mean "fit or train for a social environment."18 ' Thus, legal education fits
or trains the character of the law student, or should fit or train the character,
for a social environment.18 2 What social environment? The authors do not
175. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 84. The use of the phrase "professional legitimacy" here
is not only cryptic but also somewhat ironic because the authors repeatedly suggest that professions in
general and the legal profession in particular have been losing "legitimacy" in the eyes of the public.
See, e.g., id. at 14, 29, 59, 128. Thus, "formation" appears to involve, among other things, bringing the
character of the law student into some sort of proper relationship with a rapidly waning professional
legitimacy.
176. According to the Carnegie Report, Work and Integrity is "an essay on the nature and value of
the professions in American life," and it emerged from the Carnegie Foundation's Preparation for the
Professions Program (PPP), of which the Report is a later product. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at
15. Describing the significance of Work and Integrity for the PPP, Carnegie Foundation President Lee
Shulman wrote: "[a]s we envisioned the series of books that will report what we have learned in our
ongoing studies of preparation for the professions, we recognized the need for a opening volume, for a
book that would set the stage for the set of investigations that would follow." Lee S. Shulman, Forward
to WILLIAM SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM IN
AMERICA ix, xii (2d ed. 2005).
177. WILLIAM SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY: THE CRISIS AND PROMISE OF PROFESSIONALISM
IN AMERICA 265 (2d ed. 2005) [hereinafter SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY].
178. See id.
179. See Character, in THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 130 (Robert Audi ed., 2d
ed. 1999) (character is "the comprehensive set of ethical and intellectual dispositions of a person.").
180. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
181. Socialize, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/socialize (last
visited Sept 23, 2012).
182. The reader will notice that I frequently use a formula in this Article such as "according to the
Carnegie Report, law professors do or should do X." This formula is a fair reflection of the approach
found in the Report, which is at once descriptive and prescriptive. As the authors state, their work is "an
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say, but one presumes the answer would be that of the legal profession and
the institutional system within which the profession operates. The authors
comment that formation in their sense of the term has received relatively
little attention from those who write about professional education.'13
Clearly, however, the authors intend to change that.' "We believe if legal
education had as its focus forming legal professionals who are both
competent and responsible to clients and the public, learning legal analysis
attempt to interpret what law schools do and do not do, with a sketch of some of the consequences for
the legal profession, for higher education, and for American society." CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 17. As will become clear, the authors seldom discuss the supposed "consequences" of "what law
schools do and do not do" in neutral terms. Thus, by "describing" the negative or positive consequences
of a particular educational practice the authors at the same time evaluate the practice. According to the
authors, the Carnegie Report "is intended primarily to foster appreciation for what legal education does
at its best." Id. at 19. Encouraging "appreciation" of what legal education does "at its best" is at once a
descriptive and an evaluative endeavor. In general, efforts to develop lists of "best practices" in legal
education combine descriptive and evaluative elements. Somewhat surprisingly, the Stuckey compendi-
um of "best practices," see STUCKEY, supra note 22, at 39-283, does not contain a separate discussion of
what makes a practice "best" or "better" than an alternative practice. Instead, Professor Stuckey and his
co-authors say only that "[t]he principles of best practices described in this document are based on long-
recognized principles of sound educational practices as well as recent research and scholarship about
teaching and learning. Our conclusions are based on the most up-to-date information available." See id.
at 1. One such source of up-to-date information was the Carnegie Report. See id. It would have been
helpful if the authors of the Carnegie Report or Professor Stuckey and his co-authors had provided a
brief theoretical sketch of the kinds of information, research, and scholarship one should examine when
determining not only what legal educators actually do but why certain legal educational practices are
better or best. Professor Stuckey recently has offered some further thoughts about this issue, asserting
that "[tihe superiority of the principles described in Best Practices for Legal Education can be demon-
strated 'according to some standard' and could be objectively verified with different and better metrics."
Roy Stuckey, "Best Practices" Or Not, It Is Time To Re-think Legal Education, 16 CLINICAL L. REV.
307, 317 (2009). The attempt to combine description and evaluation may seem to violate what many
would consider to be a fundamental distinction between descriptive and normative statements, between
the "is" and the "ought." MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 56-57. As Dean Cramton
observed, law professors believe that "[care should be taken to insure that affirmations of value (our
desires concerning what ought to be) do not intrude upon thought and knowledge and fact concerning
what is." Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC.
247, 249 (1978). In fact, the Carnegie Report's tendency to blur or elide the distinction between descrip-
tion and evaluation is itself further evidence that the Report relies heavily on a teleological ethical
framework. As MacIntyre has argued, a teleological ethical theory or framework typically will reject
any simple distinction between description and prescription or "is" and "ought." MACINTYRE, AFTER
VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 59, 84; see also Kightlinger, The Gathering Twilight?, supra note 145, at
359-60. According to a teleological ethical theory, a claim about the human telos or teloi is, in principle,
a claim about human nature and our essential purpose(s) as human beings. Thus, that claim might be
true or false, as might a claim about the actions a person can and should take in particular circumstances
to achieve or realize the human telos or teloi. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 59. See
also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY 134 (1990) [hereinafter
MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL VERSIONS] ("Evaluative judgments are a species of factual judgment con-
cerning the final and formal causes of activity of members of a particular species."). Similarly, a claim
about the telos or teloi of legal education might be true or false just as might be a claim about what legal
education does "at its best," i.e., as it comes closer or closest to its telos.
183. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
184. See id. at 14.
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and practical skills would be more fully significant to both the students and
faculty."'85
When the authors attempt to explain "formative education" with greater
clarity, they implicitly build their account around a three-part teleological
framework.'86  "[T]he goal of formative education must be more than
socialization seen as molding human clay from without. Rather, formative
education must enable students to become self-reflective about and self-
directing in their own development."187  The metaphor that the authors
choose here-molding human clay-contains four elements: human clay in
an unmolded or raw state, a telos or goal toward which human clay is
molded, a mold or form, and an intervening process of molding by someone
who forms the raw material into the final product.' 88 This metaphor plainly
invokes Aristotle's Four Causes. 8 9 Using Aristotle's terminology, we can
say that the human clay of the raw, untutored novice is the matter that
receives and realizes or embodies the form of a legal professional. The
formative educational process actualizes the raw novice's latent potential to
embody the form of a legal professional.190 Moreover, formation is directed
toward a telos: "to initiate novice practitioners to think, to perform, and to
conduct themselves (that is, to act morally and ethically) like
professionals."' 9' The telos, in other words, is not simply to be a
professional but to do what professionals do as professionals.' 2 Of course,
even a law school graduate is still a beginner in the professional ranks.
Thus, it is probably more accurate to say that a formative legal education
forms or transforms'9 3 a novice into a journeyman legal professional who is
qualified to act under experienced supervision.194
185. Id For a detailed discussion of this passage, see infra notes 365-75 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
187. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 85.
188. See id
189. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
190. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
191. See id. Accord STUCKEY ET AL., supra note 22, at 19.
192. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 22.
193. The term "transform" is probably more accurate because the novice is not formless human
clay prior to receiving the form of the journeyman legal professional. Rather, the novice is human clay
in the quite specific form of a student who has matriculated to law school after, among other things,
appropriate undergraduate education. See AM. B. ASS'N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMIssioNs TO
THE BAR, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Standard 502(a) (2011-2012) [hereinafter
ABA STANDARDS], available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal
education/Standards/chapter_5_2012 2013_abastandardsandrules.authcheckdam.pdf. For further
discussion of the raw material of the formative educational process, see infra Part V.C.4.
194. 1 have found only one instance of the word "joumeyman" in the Carnegie Report. CARNEGIE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 60. A standard dictionary defines "journeyman" as "a person who has served
an apprenticeship at a trade or handicraft and is certified to work at it assisting or under another person."
Journeyman, in RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1034-35 (2d ed. 2001). Thus,
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At least initially, the efficient or moving cause of a formative legal
education is the law professor who (trans)forms the raw human clay into a
journeyman.1 95 The identity of the efficient cause requires qualification
(with the phrase "at least initially") because the authors of the Carnegie
Report contend that a key goal of formative education is to "enable students
to become self-reflective about and self-directing in their own
development.",9 6  Thus, if the early phases of formative education succeed,
at some point the student/journeyman will be prepared to take over the
formation process and continue to form herself, i.e., to improve and
augment the degree to which she realizes or embodies the form of the legal
professional and thus the degree to which the form of the legal professional
informs her activity.' 97  She will take responsibility, in other words, for
continuing to achieve the telos of the formative process. Molding a novice
into a journeyman lawyer is more than and different from molding clay into
a pot because the pot cannot and is not expected to continue to mold itself
into a better pot after the potter stops molding it. The law student, by
contrast, is expected to make further progress toward the telos of legal
professional and to be able to make such progress at least to some extent on
her own. 19 8 The telos is not something external to the journeyman as the
form of a pot is external to and imposed on raw clay; rather, the telos
actualizes a potential of the journeyman and becomes, or should become,
internal to her as both her unconscious goal and her intention or plan for
herself. Formation realizes the telos in her and she realizes it-makes it
it seems appropriate to designate as a "journeyman" someone who has finished law school and, perhaps,
passed a bar examination, thereby obtaining certification to practice law, but is not really ready to prac-
tice without the supervision of an experienced attorney. The authors of the Camegie Report do not
explain why they eschewed the term. Perhaps they wished to avoid being forced to replace the apparent-
ly masculine "journeyman" with the neuter neologism "journeyperson." One obvious objection to my
use of the term "journeyman" is that technically a law-school graduate who has passed a bar examination
may "hang out a shingle" and practice on her own without the supervision of a more experienced attor-
ney. It is difficult to believe, however, that anyone would consider such a newly minted solo practitioner
to be a "master" of the craft. As Professor Stolz has observed, "the bar examination no longer even
purports to have any value as a device for assuring the competence of fresh graduates to handle real
clients." Preble Stolz, Clinical Experience in American Legal Education: Why Has It Failed?, in
CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE 54, 61 (Edmund W. Kitch ed., 1970).
Indeed, according to one recent report, real clients have begun refusing to pay large law firms for super-
vised work performed by first- and second-year associates because clients do not wish to cover the cost
of training a junior associate to practice law. See generally Ashby Jones & Joseph Palazzolo, What's A
First-Year Lawyer Worth?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI000142405297
0204774604576631360989675324.html. This suggests that even supervised work by junior lawyers is
not worth much to paying clients, raising the question whether calling such junior lawyers journeymen
may heap more praise on them than they deserve. Id.
195. See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
197. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
198. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 95.
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real-in herself as a potential that she always had and now will actualize. 199
Formation thus transforms and reforms the student, making her a new
person with new goals or ends as part of a new (for her) community of
people, i.e., lawyers who seek to realize those same goals or ends.200
2. The Three Apprenticeships
According to the Carnegie Report, the process through which legal
education forms and transforms novices into journeyman legal professionals
is "apprenticeship." 201
Research suggests that learning happens best when an expert is able
to model performance in such a way that the learner can imitate the
performance while the expert provides feedback to guide the learner
in making the activity his or her own. This describes an expert-
apprentice relationship in its simplest form. Expertise, however, is
always shared among members of a community who have mastered
certain practices. When such communities organize ways of
transmitting this expertise to new members, they create
apprenticeships.202
In this description of apprenticeship, the authors substitute the language of
modeling for the language of forming and formation.2 03 The expert or
199. See id.
200. As sociologist Robert Bellah has observed, traditional views of education relied on this no-
tion of formation as transformation:
[t]raditionally, education was involved in the formation of a new person ideally more
perceptive than when he began, one more aware of the whole of existence, including its tragic
dimension, and more responsive as a human being. Such education involved not only
cognitive skills but a discipline of body, of feeling, of imagination, as well as of mind. Its
aim was to eventuate in a morally and religiously transformed person.
Robert N. Bellah, The New Religious Consciousness and the Secular University, in DAEDALUS, I
AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: TOWARD AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE 110, 111 (1974). Needless to say,
although the authors do draw an analogy between legal education and "preparation of the clergy,"
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 84, the Camegie Report does not claim that legal education will
work a religious transformation on law students, id. But the analogy to religious transformation does
convey something of the potential scope and depth of the formative process in legal education. In addi-
tion, Bellah's remark about religious transformation helps us to see the continuity between the Carnegie
Report's account of modem legal education and descriptions of legal education in the Inns of Court in
England during the early period of the common law. See Calvin Woodard, The Limits ofLegal Realism:
An Historical Perspective, 54 VA. L. REv. 689, 706 (1968) ("law was like the priesthood - a way of life
as well as a vocation.").
201. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25.
202. Id. at 26.
203. Elsewhere, the authors observe that apprenticeship involves "modeling, habituation, experi-
ment, and reflection." Id at 14.
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"master"-another term that the Carnegie Report tends to avoid204
provides a model for the apprentice, a model that the apprentice imitates and
after whom she forms herself. Through apprenticeship, in other words, she
begins to become and form herself into that which the master models. Thus,
one could say that the apprenticeship process is formative insofar as it
molds or forms the apprentice into, and according to the model provided by,
the master. The master in this account already embodies, or should
embody, the relevant form, perhaps not perfectly, but to a far greater extent
than the apprentice. The master models the form for and impresses it upon
(informs) the apprentice. Prior to her apprenticeship, of course, the novice
learner could not have performed the characteristic activities of the master,
and could not have demonstrated even the rudimentary attributes of
mastery.205  Viewed from the standpoint of a three-part teleological
framework, the novice learner is raw or unformed, an "untutored" person as
she "happens-to-be," in MacIntyre's language.206  Through the
apprenticeship process, the apprentice "mak[es] the activity [of the master]
his or her own."207 By appropriating the master's activity, she achieves or
begins to achieve the telos and becomes, if not a master, a journeyman on
the long path to mastery.
Apprenticeship has a long history as a mode of legal education in the
United States.208 During the colonial era,
[t]he road to the bar, for all lawyers, was through some form of
clerkship or apprenticeship. The aspiring lawyer usually entered
204. According to one dictionary, "master" is defined as, among other things, "a worker qualified
to teach apprentices and to carry on a trade independently." Master, in RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S
UNABRIDGED DICTONARY 1183 (2d ed. 2001). An "apprentice" is "one who works for another in order
to learn a trade . . . ." Apprentice, in RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, supra, at
103. In light of these definitions, it would seem appropriate to refer to the teacher of apprentice lawyers
as a "master." The master also may be an expert, of course, but the term "expert" does not automatically
seem to entail a role in or connection to the education of apprentices. The authors acknowledge that to
have achieved "expertise" is to "have mastered certain practices," so they apparently accept that an
"expert" in their sense would be deemed a "master" in the traditional language of apprenticeship.
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26.
205. See id. at 116-17.
206. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 52, 53.
207. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26 (alterations added).
208. See, e.g., Gerard W. Gawalt, Massachusetts Legal Education in Transition, 1766-1840, 17
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 27, 29-36 (1973) (arguing that practitioners in colonial Massachusetts insisted on
apprenticeship as a method of education in order to restrict growth in the number of lawyers). See gen-
erally Charles R. McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in Eighteenth Century Massa-
chusetts, 28 J LEGAL EDUC. 124 (1976-77); Charles R. McManis, The History ofFirst Century American
Legal Education: A Revisionist Perspective, 59 WASH. U. L. Q. 597, 603-06 (1982); STEVENS, supra
note 32, at 3-7; Russell L. Weaver, Landgell's Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VLL. L. REV.
517, 522 n.14 (1991).
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into a contract with an established lawyer. The student paid a fee;
in exchange, the lawyer promised to train him in the law;
sometimes, too, the lawyer would provide food and lodging. . . .
How much the apprentice learned depended greatly on his
master.20
Indeed, beginning in the colonial era, some jurisdictions required aspiring
lawyers to serve apprenticeships before they could be admitted to the bar.210
In theory, apprenticeship in a law office might provide a well-rounded legal
education,21' but in practice apprenticeship received as many brickbats as
bouquets.212 Justice Joseph Story, for example, referred with obvious
frustration to the "common delusion, that the law may be thoroughly
acquired in the immethodical, interrupted and desultory studies of the office
of a practicing counse[]lor." 213
Traditionally, scholars have argued that academic legal education more
214or less replaced law-office apprenticeship during the nineteenth century.
209. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 97-98 (2d ed., 1985).
210. See McKirdy, supra note 208, at 125.
211. See id. at 127 ("Ideally, the legal clerkship system placed the student in an environment of
law where education was a total and many faceted experience."). Professor Woodard reminds us that the
apprenticeship system "produced some of the most civilized and learned lawyers ever to grace the Bar in
both England and this country." Woodard, supra note 200, at 707. The list would include "almost all of
the so-called 'Founding Fathers,' men who were philosophers of law first and lawyers only second." Id.
at 708.
212. See, e.g., Gawalt, supra note 208, at 31-33; McKirdy, supra note 208, at 128.
213. Gawalt, supra note 208, at 42-43 nn. 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing Joseph Sto-
ry's review of David Hoffman's A Course ofLegal Study Respectfully Addressed to the Students ofLaw
in the United States, 6 NORTH AM. REV. 45, 77 (1818)). But cf Gawalt, supra note 208, at 47-48 (ex-
plaining why some students preferred apprenticeship to study in law schools founded in Massachusetts
during the early nineteenth century).
214. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 32, at 7-8 (describing the abolition by states of apprenticeship
requirements during the first half of the nineteenth century), 21-28 (describing the growth of law schools
in the latter half of the nineteenth century); Stolz, Clinical Experience, supra note 194, at 56-57 (arguing
that Theodore W. Dwight, professor then Dean at Columbia Law School from 1858 to 1891, viewed
education in a law school as a replacement for apprenticeship); Anthony Chase, Origins of Modern
Professional Education: The Harvard Case Method Conceived as Clinical Instruction in Law, 5 NOVA
L.J. 323, 330 (1980-1981) (arguing Charles W. Eliot, long-time President of Harvard University, con-
sciously set out to replace the traditional apprenticeship system with a newer model of clinical legal
education); Gawalt, supra note 208, at 42-50 (describing the rise of Harvard Law School and the decline
of apprenticeship in Massachusetts). For a general account of the development of professorships of law
and of early law schools in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see HARNO, supra note 29,
at 21-53. For a discussion of the role of law schools in legal education during the middle part of the
nineteenth century, see WILLIAM R. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF
PROFESSIONAL CULTURES 42-57 (1978). But cf George S. Grossman, Clinical Legal Education:
History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDuC. 162, 163 n.1 (1974) (in the early 1970s "[v]estiges of appren-
ticeship remain in New Jersey, where a law office clerkship following law school graduation is required;
in Pennsylvania, where a preceptor system remains in effect; and in ten other states, where it remains
possible to qualify for the Bar through law office training."). Indeed, seven states still permit a person
without a J.D. to take the bar examination after studying law in a law office. See NAT'L CONFERENCE
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In 1887, Dean Langdell affirmed that, in reforming the educational program
at Harvard Law School, he had sought to replace apprenticeship in a law
office with university-based legal education.2 15 Challenging this view of the
history of legal education, the authors of the Carnegie Report contend that
apprenticeship never really died, and that modern academic legal education
still consists of three apprenticeships: the cognitive, the practical, and that of
identity and purpose. In fact, as the following discussion will suggest,
one of the implicit goals of the Carnegie Report is to make legal educators
reflect on these modem forms of apprenticeship and their demands. 217 Each
of the three apprenticeships, as described by the authors, reflects a three-part
teleological framework and the relationship among the three apprenticeships
also is in certain respects teleological. Unfortunately, the authors fail to
come to grips with the intellectual demands and the implications of their
teleological approach.
a. The Cognitive Apprenticeship
The authors of the Carnegie Report write that
OF BAR EXAMINERS AND AM. BAR ASS'N SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 2011, at 8-9 (Erica Moeser & Claire
Huismann eds., 2011), available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/legaled/publi
cations/20110201 ComGuide.authcheckdam.pdf.
215. See Christopher C. Langdell, Speech to the Harvard Law School Association at the Quarter-
Millennial Celebration of Harvard University (Nov. 5, 1887), reprinted in 3 L. Q. REv. 118, 123-24
(1887) ("I have tried to do my part towards making the teaching and the study of law in [Harvard Law
School] worthy of a university."). But cf Rolf Torstendahl, The Transformation of Professional Educa-
tion in the Nineteenth Century, in THE EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN UNIVERSITY SINCE 1800, 109, 138
(Sheldon Rothblatt & Bj6rn Wittrock eds., 1993) ("since the middle ages universities had provided
society with ... lawyers").
216. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. In a somewhat surprising tribute to the old appren-
ticeship system, the authors observe that:
In centuries past, learning as an apprentice typically meant exposure to the full dimensions of
professional life, not only the intricacies of esoteric knowledge and peculiar skills but also the
values and outlook shared by physicians, lawyers, or ministers. By contrast, today's law
students encounter this once-unifying experience as three differentiated, largely separate
experiences. Students encounter a cognitive or intellectual apprenticeship, a practical
apprenticeship of skill, and the apprenticeship of professional identity and purpose, often
through different faculty with different relationships to the institution. For many students,
neither practical skills nor reflection on professional responsibility figure significantly in their
legal education.
Id. at 79. As discussed in Part ILI.B.2(d), the authors argue that the third apprenticeship can and should
fuse the other two apprenticeships into a coherent experience, thus perhaps approximating the older
unifying apprenticeship.
217. For an earlier call to return to a form of law-school-based apprenticeship, see Jerome Frank,
Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 907, 913 (1933).
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[t]he first apprenticeship, which we call intellectual or
cognitive, focuses the student on the knowledge and way of
thinking of the profession. Of the three, it is the most at home in
the university context because it embodies that institution's great
investment in quality of analytical reasoning, argument, and
research.218
During the cognitive apprenticeship, the apprentice learns, or should learn,
how to "think like a lawyer." 2 19 If thinking like a lawyer is the telos of the
cognitive apprenticeship, what does it mean to think like a lawyer?
According to the authors, "[t]he ability to think like a lawyer emerges as the
ability to translate messy situations into the clarity and precision of legal
procedure and doctrine and then to take strategic action through legal
argument in order to advance a client's cause before a court or in
negotiation.",220
218. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. The authors say very little about the substantive
legal knowledge that an apprentice acquires or should acquire in law school. Id. According to Robert
Stevens, "[a]s the case method has been appreciated more for its ability to teach method than substance,
there is little evidence that law teachers have shown any enthusiasm for new breakthroughs in education-
al technology ... which might at least teach the students the elements of substantive law as painlessly
and efficiently as possible. Some take the strange view that because there is now so much substantive
law, the law schools should seek to teach none at all." Stevens, supra note 5, at 37.
219. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54. Robert Stevens has shown that this justification
for the cognitive apprenticeship-i.e., that it teaches the student to think like a lawyer----emerged at the
end of the nineteenth century. STEVENS, supra note 32, at 55-56. In a 1906 tribute to Harvard's Dean
Langdell and his pedagogical approach, one author said: "The lecturer [i.e., Langdell] was working it
out for himself with them [i.e., the students]. Every step of the reasoning was scrutinized and tested and
re-examined till proved right or wrong." Samuel F. Batchelder, Christopher C. Langdell, 18 GREEN
BAG 437,441 (1906). By 1907, Harvard's Dean Ames would state:
The object arrived at by us at Cambridge is the power of legal reasoning, and we think we
can best get that by putting before students the best models to be found in the history of
English and American law, because we believe that men who are trained, by examining the
opinions of the greatest judges that the English Common Law System has produced, are in a
better position to know what legal reasoning is and are more likely to possess the power of
solving legal problems than they would be by taking up the study of the law of any particular
state.
Discussion of Kale's Paper, in REPORT OF THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION 1025 (1907) (comments of James Barr Ames). By contrast, Dean Rubin refers to the claim
that students are taught to think like lawyers as a "threadbare rationalization ... [for] the common law
curriculum." Edward Rubin, What's Wrong with Langdell's Method, and What to Do About It, 60 VAND.
L. REv. 609, 622 (2007). Rubin adds: "[p]erhaps it [the curriculum] does teach students to think like
nineteenth century common law lawyers but it does not teach them how to think like lawyers in the
contemporary administrative state." Id. Professor Woodard rejects the very notion that there is a type of
thinking that is specific to lawyers as the "cult of the 'legal mind."' See Woodard, supra note 200, at
719.
220. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54.
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Particularly in the first year of law school, but also in years two and
three, law teachers instruct students to think like lawyers primarily through
the "case-dialogue method,"2 2 1 which "constitutes the legal academy's
standardized form of the cognitive apprenticeship." m Perhaps because they
view the case dialogue as legal education's "signature pedagogy,"223 the
authors have little to say about the long tradition within the legal academy
221. Id. at 3. For survey evidence supporting the claim that law professors continue to rely heavi-
ly on the case-dialogue or "Socratic" method as a teaching tool, see Dolin, supra note 97, at 222 n.7
(2007) (summarizing the results presented in Steven I. Friedland, How We Teach: A Survey of Teaching
Techniques in American Law Schools, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 27-31 (1996)). In a 1999 review of
contemporary teaching methods at Harvard Law School, Orin Kerr concluded that "the Socratic method
is simply one teaching technique among many, and that it has both positive and negative aspects depend-
ing on the skill, personality, and purposes of the professor who chooses to use it." Orin S. Kerr, The
Decline of the Socratic Method at Harvard, 78 NEB. L. REV. 113, 134 (1999). Elizabeth Mertz has
remarked that how and to what extent law professors actually use the Socratic, case-dialogue method "is
to date largely unstudied." ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO "THINK
LIKE A LAwYER" 50 (2007). In this connection, it also is worth recalling Professor Arceda's reminder
that the Socratic method and the case method are not the same thing, although they "are well suited to
each other." Phillip E. Areeda, The Socratic Method (SM) (Lecture at Puget Sound, 1/31/90), Outline of
a Lecture given at Puget Sound, in 109 HARv. L. REV. 911, 911 (1996).
222. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 50. For discussions of the early history of the case-
dialogue method, see STEVENS, supra note 32, at 52-57; Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law
School, 23 AM. J. L. HIST. 329, 342-43 (1979) (arguing that the case-dialogue method owes its origins to
Harvard Law School Dean Langdell and to Harvard University President Charles W. Eliot). Chase
suggests that "the notion that teaching a student to think like a lawyer should play a central role in legal
education had a significant, even if elliptical, connection to Continental pedagogy," and in particular to
the educational theories of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. Id. at 343. Josef Redlich, by contrast, declared
that the case method
is an entirely original creation of the American mind in the realm of law, and must be
comprehended and appraised as such. It is indeed particularly noteworthy that this new
creation of instruction in the common law sprang from the thought and individual
characteristics of a single man, Christopher C. Langdell ....
REDLICH, supra note 26, at 9. For a discussion of Langdell's role in making the study of law more
"scientific," see Woodard, supra note 200, at 699-703. Langdell himself suggested that his purpose in
creating the case-dialogue method was to establish the study of law as a science that would deserve a
place in the university. See Langdell, supra note 215, at 123-24. For a fascinating attempt to reconstruct
actual case dialogues that occurred in Langdell's classroom at Harvard, see Bruce A. Kimball, "Warn
Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They are Not to Take as Law ": The Inception of
Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C.C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17 LAW & HIST. REV.
57, 96-98, 102-08, 112-23 (1999). Weaver has shown that learning to "think like a lawyer" is one of
several justifications that have been offered for using the case-dialogue method to teach lawyers. See
Weaver, supra note 208, at 545-61. Robert Stevens has argued that Dean Ames at Harvard Law School
originated the idea that the case-dialogue method teaches students how to think in a certain way. See
Robert Stevens, Legal Education: The Challenge of the Past, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 475, 479 (1985)
[hereinafter Stevens, Challenge]. For a comment by Ames himself on the case-dialogue method, see
Discussion ofKale's Paper, supra note 219, at 1025.
223. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54. A signature pedagogy "serve[s] as primary means of
instruction and socialization for neophytes in a field. . . ." Id. at 23.
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of criticizing the case-dialogue method.224 As they point out, in a case-
dialogue class,
[flor most of the hour, the professor of law is facing the students,
interacting with them one by one through exchange of question and
answer, using the board or other visual displays to support the
verbal exchanges. . . . Again and again in our observations, at the
end of the hour we would be struck by the single-minded focus on
the close reading of texts, analytical reasoning, and a discourse of
rapid exchanges and responses... .225
In the case dialogue,
the relentless stress is on learning the boundaries that keep
extraneous detail out of the legal landscape. This enables students
to practice a disposition to think in a specific way, to value and aim
at both precision and generality in the application of categories to
persons and situations. This is an important distinguishing feature
of legal thought and of the guild of legal professionals. 6
224. For a summary of the critical literature on the Carnegie Report's handling of the case-
dialogue method, see supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. As early as 1892, Professor Tiedeman
raised objections to over-reliance on cases as a teaching tool. See Edward J. Phelps, William A. Keener,
Christopher G. Tiedeman & J. C. Gray, Methods of Legal Education, I YALE L. J. 150, 152-57 (1892).
In 1914, the Redlich Report discussed concerns about the case-dialogue's failure to give students a more
systematic and general understanding of law. REDLICH, supra note 26, at 41-47. In 1916, John Wig-
more offered incisive comments about the strengths and weaknesses of the case-dialogue method for
teaching the various mental processes that law students must master. See generally John H. Wigmore,
Nova Methodus Discendae Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae, 30 HARV. L. REV. 812 (1917). In 1933,
Jerome Frank attacked law schools for relying so heavily on the case method, arguing that the method
reflects Langdell's own limited, library-focused experience as a practitioner. See Frank, Why Not a
Clinical Lawyer-School?, supra note 217, at 908. Frank later observed that the case-dialogue method is
a relatively effective way to train lawyers for appellate-court practice but not well-suited to training for
trial-court practice. See Jerome Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 20,22 (1951)
[hereinafter Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle]. Professor Woodard has argued that "new theories or
schools of thought: 'legal pragmatism,' 'sociological jurisprudence,' 'legal realism,' or 'functionalism' .
. . were begun by legal scholars, not practitioners, in protest against a form of legal education [i.e., the
case method] that had lost touch with reality." Woodard, supra note 200, at 717. For more recent highly
critical discussions of the case dialogue as a pedagogical method, see Rubin, supra note 219, at 612
(describing the case-dialogue method as "a pedagogic fossil, marvelously preserved from a vanished era
by the adamantine rock of a licensed monopoly."); Weaver, supra note 208, at 561-80. For a summary
of the arguments for and against the case dialogue as a teaching method, see MERTZ, supra note 221, at
26-28.
225. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 50.
226. Id. at 54-55. Dean Ames provided a surprisingly similar account of case-dialogue pedagogy
in a 1901 address at the University of Pennsylvania:
If it be the professor's object that his students shall be able to discriminate between the
relevant and the irrelevant facts of a case, to draw just distinctions between things apparently
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By learning through the case dialogue to see and think about messy
real-life situations in precise, general legal categories, the law student
develops a disposition to detach or distance herself from innumerable
details that are "extraneous" to lawyers, if not to the people caught up in
those messy real-life situations.2 27 This disposition of detachment becomes,
or should become, part of the student's lawyerly character.228 A bakery
owner, for example, might see his business collapsing, his livelihood
failing, his family threatened, and his long-time employees applying for
unemployment insurance or welfare because a welshing supplier on whom
the baker had relied for years refused to deliver any more flour to the bakery
unless the baker would pay thirty-five percent more than originally agreed.
The flour supplier might respond that the baker's sob story reflects a
misunderstanding of the deal and that he (the supplier) will be forced out of
the flour market completely-ruining his business and the bakery
owner's-if he cannot raise his prices to reflect market conditions. The
apprentice lawyer is taught that she can and must fit this messy, real-world
situation into categories from the field of contract law such as offer and
acceptance, consideration, performance or breach, mitigation, and
damages. 22 9 Facts that do not assist her in applying these categories are not
relevant to her as a lawyer.23 0 They are extraneous.
As Professor Areeda observed, a key goal of the case dialogue is to
teach novices to "appreciat[e] which of the many facts stated by the court
similar, and to discover true analogies between things apparently dissimilar, in a word, that
they shall be sound legal thinkers, competent to grapple with new problems because of their
experience in mastering old ones, I know of no better course for him to pursue than to travel
with his class through a wisely chosen collection of cases.
JAMEs BARR AMEs, The Vocation of the Law Professor, in LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 354, 364
(1913).
227. Several scholars who have commented on the Carnegie Report have criticized the case-
dialogue method for teaching students to treat clients as abstractions with no extra-legal needs. See, e.g.,
Maria O'Brien Hylton, Creeping Impoverization: Material Conditions, Income Inequality, and ERISA
Pedagogy Early in the 21st Century, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1355, 1361 (2007); John Lande & Jean R.
Sternlight, The Potential Contribution ofADR to an Integrated Curriculum: Preparing Law Students for
Real World Lawyering, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 247, 264 (2010); Karen H. Rothenberg, Recali-
brating the Moral Compass: Expanding "Thinking Like a Lawyer" into "Thinking Like a Leader," 40
U. TOL. L. REv. 411, 411-12 (2009).
228. For a discussion of the concept of "character" as used here, see supra notes 177-79 and
accompanying text.
229. See MERTZ, supra note 221, at 56.
230. Based on classroom observations, Mertz has provided a description of the way that a law
professor encourages or, perhaps, forces students to see a case that appears to be about a botched nose
job as a case that is really about the grounds for appellate review of lower court decisions. See MERTZ,
supra note 221, at 53-54. As Mertz summarizes her results, "stories of human conflict, complete with
their social contexts and moral overtones, are inexorably supplanted by new readings focused on layers
of textual and legal authority." Id. at 56.
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are most relevant to the legal dispute and which arguments were most
critical to the result." 2 31 The Carnegie Report's authors worry, however,
that the result may be a "temporary moral lobotomy" because the apprentice
learns to concentrate on abstract legal analysis to the exclusion of other
concerns. 2 32  According to the authors, "[t]his focus is justified on
pedagogical grounds, with an implied assumption that law school can flip
off the switch of ethical and human concern, teach legal analysis, and later,
when students have mastered the central intellectual skill of thinking like a
lawyer, flip the switch back on."233 By teaching all novice lawyers to think
in essentially the same amoral and abstract way, "the case-dialogue classes
work to enforce homogeneity of viewpoint and reasoning, molding diverse
beginners into a corps of legal apprentices . . . . Through the case
dialogue, "students are ... taught not only how to think but also, from a
legal point of view, what is worth thinking about." 235 Their thinking, one
might say, is formed and directed toward certain ends or purposes that
define legal professionals and give them a shared standpoint.
Although the authors do not appear to recognize that they rely heavily
on a three-part teleological framework, they clearly construct the Carnegie
Report's account of the cognitive apprenticeship around such a framework.
The authors say very little about the untutored novice, the person as she
happens-to-be before entering law school, but they apparently believe that
she thinks in a certain unlawyerly, but all-too-human way.236 She attends to
"extraneous detail."237 Her thinking lacks "precision," 3 meaning
apparently that her ideas about situations are inexact and ill-defined.
Because she gets bogged down in extraneous human details, she does not
and cannot automatically or routinely generalize or abstract from a specific,
messy, complex situation to a set of legal categories encompassing that and
231. Areeda, supra note 221, at 915.
232. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 78.
233. Id. at 141.
234. Id. at 40. Grant Gilmore made a similar point in a much less laudatory way: "[a]t least in
Langdell's version, [case-method teaching] had nothing whatever to do with getting students to think for
themselves; it was, on the contrary, a method of indoctrination through brainwashing." GRANT
GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 13 (1974).
235. CARNEGIE REPORT,supra note 1, at 53.
236. The authors' failure to discuss the novice as-she-happens-to-be is an important gap in the
Carnegie Report's argument. One presumes that an adequate teleological account of legal education
would provide a well-founded account of the novice as-she-happens-to-be in order to explain why a
particular type of educational process will serve to move her towards the telos. Lurking just below the
surface is a hornet's nest of related issues concerning the criteria by which law schools select (or should
select) novices with some raw characteristics rather than others in light of the educational process and
the telos or teloi to be achieved. I return to these issues in Part V.C.4.
237. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
238. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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analogous situations.2 39 Indeed, the novice apparently does not even value
generalization and precise thinking with well-defined categories, or at least
not in the way that a lawyer values these activities.240 The authors do not
explain what the untutored novice values or why, but, based on their
comments, we might surmise that she values and enjoys perceiving and
experiencing real-world situations in all of their rich detail and
complexity. 41 Moreover, she may be moved by legally extraneous but very
human concerns for the people involved in the complex, messy situations
she perceives. Clearly, however, she lacks the ability and disposition to
think like a lawyer.242
Through the educational process of the case dialogue, the law professor
seeks to form the novice's untutored mind by modeling for her a lawyerly
way of thinking.243 The case dialogue thus functions as the all-important
middle part or element of the three-part teleological framework.
In a sense, the dialogue of the case-dialogue method is an
offshoot of the apprentice system, with a master artisan guiding a
roomful of novices through the early stages of learning a craft. As
in a craftsman's studio, the apprentices watch the master artisan's
actions and attempt to emulate them. But in this cognitive
apprenticeship, the fundamental skills are related to memory,
knowledge, comprehension, and interpretation and are impossible to
observe. Only through question and answer can instructors make
their thought processes explicit, observable, and available for
imitation by [the student]. 24
Thus, through case-dialogue Q&A about the legally salient aspects of
disputes between litigants such as Messrs. Hawkins and McGee, as well as
innumerable others, the apprentice realizes how to think with and for the
master and in the process begins to embrace and value a new (for her) and
distinctively legal and lawyerly way of thinking.245 She develops the
239. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54-55.
240. See id.
241. See id. at 54.
242. She apparently has the disposition to learn to think like a lawyer or she would not have de-
cided to attend or remain in law school. See id.
243. See id. at 60-61.
244. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 62-63.
245. Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929). Hawkins is the subject of the famous case-
dialogue exchange between James Hart and Professor Kingsfield at the fictional Harvard Law School in
the opening scenes of The Paper Chase. THE PAPER CHASE (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation
1973). Hawkins appears in many Contract Law casebooks and thus remains part of the common experi-
ence of many apprentice lawyers. See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND DOCTRINE
63-66 (4th ed. 2008); JOHN P. DAWSON, WELLIAM BURNET HARVEY, STANLEY D. HENDERSON &
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disposition to think like a lawyer as the legal way of thinking becomes her
way of thinking, her way of analyzing disputes and, eventually, her way of
arguing for or against particular outcomes in the world.2" As Professor
Areeda observed,
[t]he student sees that [s]he could have asked [her]self those
questions before class; that the kinds of questions the instructor
asked can be self-posed after class. The internalization of that
questioning process is not an illusion. It is the essence of legal
reasoning and the prize of the [Socratic Method]. 24 7
Moreover, the apprentice comes to value this legal, lawyerly way of
thinking as a path to success in the law school classroom and she soon seeks
to improve her own capacity to think in this way. 248 Thus, the process by
which law professors form her way of thinking gradually gives rise to a
process of self-formation. 24 9  Through the cognitive apprenticeship, law
professors prepare the apprentice and she learns to prepare herself for
eventual entry into the "guild of legal professionals." 25 0 The case dialogue,
therefore, serves as the middle part or element in a three-part teleological
process that transforms the apprentice lawyer from a novice to a
journeyman. According to the fictional Professor Kingsfield of Harvard
Law School, the apprentice "come[s] in here with a skull full of mush." 25 1
She leaves as a journeyman legal professional who has begun to think like a
lawyer and value thinking in a lawyerly way. She thus has realized or at
least begun to realize and actualize within herself the telos of the cognitive
apprenticeship-the third part of the three-part teleological framework.2 52
b. The Practical Apprenticeship
According to the Carnegie Report, the second of legal education's three
apprenticeships is practical, and the authors' account of this apprenticeship
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, CONTRACTS: CASES AND COMMENT 2-6 (9th ed. 2008); DAvID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE
A. MARKELL & LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING
DEALS 713-16 (3d ed. 2011). For a discussion of how law professors teach Hawkins in a typical first-
year class and of how their teaching approach affects untutored novices, see CARNEGIE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 48-49, 52-54.
246. See generally Hawkins, 146 A. 641.
247. Areeda, supra note 221, at 922 (emphasis added).
248. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 56 (discussing the way in which "competitive zeal"
motivates students to develop their cognitive abilities in the case-dialogue Q&A).
249. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
250. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 55.
251. THE PAPER CHASE, supra note 254.
252. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 27-28.
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also clearly relies on a three-part teleological framework.2 53 "The students'
second apprenticeship is to the forms of expert practice shared by competent
practitioners. . . . In this second apprenticeship, students learn by taking
part in simulated practice situations, as in case studies, or in actual clinical
experience with real clients." 25 As the authors observe, "[t]he prime
learning task of the novice in the law is to achieve a basic acquaintance with
the common techniques of the lawyer's craft." 255 For example, in a clinical
setting, "novices can begin to learn the rudiments of litigation, or client
counseling, or negotiation by attending to the core elements of the
procedural and conceptual models exemplified in expert practice." 256 More
generally and perhaps more importantly, however, the authors understand
the practical apprenticeship as an educational process aimed at forming
professional judgment: "[law schools, we believe, need to give the teaching
of practice a valued place in the legal curriculum so that formation of the
students' professional judgment is not abandoned to chance."25 7 Indeed, the
authors view legal practice itself as "judgment in action.', 258  Thus, the
253. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
254. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. For an earlier discussion of the legal clinic as a
modern form of apprenticeship, see Frank, Both Ends Against the Middle, supra note 224, at 29. Profes-
sor Grossman observed that during the 1960s, supporters of law school clinics generally defended them
as a means of providing low-cost legal services to the poor and not as a way to educate law students to
practice law. See Grossman, supra note 214, at 174. For a discussion of long-standing complaints that
law schools have never provided adequate practical training for law students, see generally William T.
Vukowich, The Lack of Practical Training in Law Schools: Criticisms, Causes and Programs for
Change, 23 CASE W. RES. L REv. 140 (1971).
255. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 117. A 1992 report to the ABA by Robert MacCrate and
others "delineates in some detail the fimdamental lawyering skills that characterize the day-to-day prac-
tice of law- problem solving, legal analysis and reasoning, legal research, factual investigation, oral and
written communication, client counseling, negotiation, litigation and dispute resolution, and organization
and management of legal work . . . ." Id. at 174. See AM. BAR Ass'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND
PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM 138-141 (1992) [hereinafter
MACCRATE REPORT]. The ABA's accreditation standards for law schools identify a similar list of
lawyering skills that should be taught: "ft]rial and appellate advocacy, alternative methods of dispute
resolution, counseling, interviewing, negotiating, problem solving, factual investigation, organization
and management of legal work, and drafting . . . ." ABA STANDARDS, supra note 193, Interpretation
302-2. For many years, proposals to teach practice skills in law school, through clinical programs or
otherwise, provoked heated debate and opposition. For example, Judge Clark, who served as Dean of
Yale Law School from 1919 to 1939 before being appointed to the Second Circuit, argued that if law
schools heed recommendations to provide practical training, they "may be led to waste their substance in
doing what they cannot do effectively and what if they could would not be pedagogically worth while
[sic]." Charles E. Clark, "Practical" Legal Training An Illusion, 3 J. LEGAL EDUC. 423, 423 (1951).
See Grossman, supra note 214, at 187-91 (summarizing the arguments against teaching skills in law
school).
256. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-11. For a history of the development of clinical legal
education, see generally Grossman, supra note 214.
257. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115. For a discussion of the teleological structure of
what the authors call "formation," see supra Part I.B. 1.
258. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
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practical apprenticeship aims, or should aim, not just at instilling particular
skills or techniques in the apprentice but at forming professional judgment.
What is professional judgment? According to the authors, it is "the
ability to size up a situation well, discerning the salient features relevant not
just to the law but to legal practice, and, most of all, knowing what general
knowledge, principles, and commitments to call on in deciding on a course
of action."2 Thus, exercising professional judgment means grasping a
messy, complex factual situation as a whole of a general type (e.g., a breach
of contract or a defamation sounding in tort), recognizing which rules and
skills to apply, and then taking action as appropriate in the situation here
and now (or then and there). "The new capacity-what the competent
person has that the novice does not-is the ability to judge that when a
situation shows a certain pattern of elements, it is time to draw a particular
conclusion, that one should act in a certain way to achieve the selected
goal." 260 Professional judgment, as the authors define it, apparently is
equivalent to expertise-"the ability to achieve goals dependably without
either working through complex problem solving or devising explicit
plans."261
As William Sullivan has acknowledged, the authors adapted this
account of professional judgment (or expertise) from Aristotle's discussion
of the virtue of phrongsis, which can be translated as "prudence" or
"practical wisdom." 2 62  In the following passage from Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics, Terrence Irwin translates phongsis as "intelligence":
Intelligence ... is about human concerns, about what is open to
deliberation. For we say that deliberating well is the function of the
intelligent person more than anyone else .... The unconditionally
good deliberator is the one whose aim expresses rational calculation
in pursuit of the best good for a human being that is achievable in
action.
259. Id. at 115.
260. Id. at 117. Here the authors use the term "competent person" in much the same way that I
use "journeyman" throughout this Article. For a discussion of my use of the term "journeyman," see
supra note 194.
261. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115.
262. SuLLIvAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 104-05, 254. For a summary of Aristo-
tie's account of phrongsis and its role in practical reason, see MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note
145, at 154; MAcbrYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 145, at 124-45.
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Nor is intelligence about universals only. It must also come to
know particulars, since it is concerned with action and action is
about particulars.263
As Roger Crisp argues, for Aristotle "practical wisdom involves the
virtuous person's commanding himself to perform what is called for in the
circumstances." 264 According to MacIntyre,
First, [phrondsis] enables its possessor to bring sets of particulars
under universal concepts in such a way as to characterize those
particulars in relevant relationship to the good at which the agent is
aiming. So it is a virtue of right characterization as well as of right
action. Secondly, such characterization, like right action, is not
achieved by mere, rule-following. The application of rules may
indeed be and perhaps always is involved in right characterization
as in right action, but knowing which rule to apply in which
situation and being able to apply that rule relevantly are not
themselves rule-governed abilities. Knowing how, when, where,
and in what way to apply rules is one central aspect of
phrongsis/prudentia.265
For the authors of the Carnegie Report, professional judgment consists
in this same capacity that Aristotle described to size up a situation, identify
and apply the correct rules, and act in the correct manner to achieve one's
goals then and there in the particular circumstances.266 Thus, the capacity
that Aristotle viewed as a virtue of all "practically wise" or "unqualifiedly
good" people,267 the authors view as a virtue proper and necessary to
professionals such as lawyers.268 According to MacIntyre, "virtues are
dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular
ways."269 Thus, training in professional or expert judgment will inculcate
the disposition to act in a particular way in particular circumstances as well
as a feeling that it is proper to act in that particular way in those particular
circumstances. To learn professional judgment is to acquire the disposition
263. ARISTOTLE, supra note 157, at 158 [NICOMACHEAN ETHics vi. 1141b9-17].
264. Roger Crisp, Introduction to ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcS xxv (Roger Crisp ed. &
trans., 2000).
265. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, First Principles, Final Ends, and Contemporary Philosophical
Issues, in THE TASKS OF PHILOSOPHY, 164 (2006) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, First Principles].
266. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115.
267. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
268. For a discussion of the weaknesses in the Carnegie Report's account of lawyerly virtues, see
infra Part V.C.3.
269. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 149.
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to act from professional judgment and to value so acting. The authors
acknowledge, of course, that a novice cannot acquire the virtue of
professional (or expert) judgment overnight or even in three years of law
school.270  Rather, law school should provide students with a "solid
foundation and, as they begin their careers in law, useful guidance on what
they need to continue to develop . . . ."271
There appears to be no explanation in the Carnegie Report of the precise
relationship between the two dimensions of the practical apprenticeship, i.e.,
learning the "common techniques of the lawyer's craft"27 and acquiring the
foundations of the virtue of professional judgment. On first glance, it would
seem that a law student could learn a great deal about, for example, specific
drafting, negotiating, and counseling techniques or skills without learning
how to size up a messy, real-world situation, identify the rules and skills
appropriate to that situation, and take proper action to achieve a goal then
and there. Perhaps the authors would respond that learning the techniques
of negotiation or client counseling is the same thing as learning how to use a
particular lawyering skill here and now to achieve an identifiable goal.
Learning to negotiate involves learning when to say a particular thing (or
not) here and now and learning how to respond (or not) here and now to
what one's interlocutor says.7  This capacity to deploy lawyering skills and
techniques to take action here and now to achieve an objective in a
particular situation seems to capture an important aspect of what the authors
mean by practical judgment or expertise. Thus, practical judgment might be
understood as the general capacity to do what one learns to do with much
greater specificity when studying the "common techniques of the lawyer's
craft" during the practical apprenticeship. 274 The relationship between
lawyering skills or techniques and practical judgment would then be a
relationship between particular and general as well as, perhaps, a
relationship between part and whole. If this explanation is correct, then it
makes sense to conjoin learning common lawyering techniques with
learning professional judgment in the practical apprenticeship because as
one learns and practices the former, one also begins to develop the
foundations of the latter.
As in the cognitive apprenticeship, much of the formation of students in
the practical apprenticeship occurs through modeling by teachers who
demonstrate a particular practice and then analyze and explain what they
270. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 142.
271. Idat115.
272. See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
273. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115.
274. See id. at 17.
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have demonstrated. 275 For example, "as trial lawyers ... have long known,
arguments can be written down, then rehearsed, analyzed, criticized, and, in
the process, improved. ... Feedback from more accomplished performers
directs the learner's attention toward improved attempts to reach a goal."276
According to the authors, "[fleatures of expert performance ... can thereby
be made explicit for learners in the form of rules, procedures, protocols, and
organizing metaphors for approaching situations or problems. Cued by
these devices, students can then be coached through imitation and
appropriation of various aspects of expert performance."27 7 Thus, in the
practical apprenticeship, teachers and other "more accomplished
performers" model good practice for students to imitate and appropriate
(make their own) while requiring students to analyze, repeat, and improve
performance.278 As teachers model good practice or expert performance,
they model aspects of professional judgment (assuming the discussion
above described accurately the relationship between practice skills and
professional judgment). Teachers thereby form their novice students into
practitioners-or at least into journeymen-who have not only the kernels
of the key skills comprised in expert legal performance but also the
foundation of the broader capacity to size up a complex situation, identify
the appropriate rules and skills, and take proper action here and now (or
then and there) to achieve a specified goal.
The practical apprenticeship fits comfortably into the account offered
above of a three-part teleological framework. 279  The untutored novice
entering the practical apprenticeship is the same one who enters the
cognitive apprenticeship-the new law student. 280 Thus, like the cognitive
apprenticeship, the practical apprenticeship presumes that a raw, untutored
novice will tend to get bogged down in the "extraneous detail" of messy,
complex real-life situations and that her thinking will lack "precision" and
"generality." 28 1 The novice does not and perhaps cannot see a situation "as
a whole" and as a particular type of legal situation; thus, she will have
difficulty identifying and applying the right rules and selecting the right
course of action to achieve a desired goal.282 Confronted with a complex,
275. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
276. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 98. The Carnegie Report characterizes the process as
"iterative" because it involves repeating and reworking a performance or skill in order to make incre-
mental improvements. Id.
277. Id. at 99.
278. See id. at 98.
279. See supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
280. See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
281. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
282. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115-17.
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real-life legal problem, she would not have an inkling of what to do here
and now, what to do next, and so forth. Even if she did know what to do,
she would lack the skills to do it. Indeed, she likely would lack a
disposition to act in a professional manner and she might not even value
professional judgment or its fruits. At best, she might have a free-floating,
inchoate desire to "help" or to do the "right thing," whatever that might be.
This is the novice law student's nature as-she-happens-to-be, i.e., the first
part of the three-part teleological framework.283 Where the telos of the
cognitive apprenticeship was "thinking like a lawyer," the telos of the
practical apprenticeship is practicing or beginning to practice the virtue of
professional judgment, i.e., the capacity and disposition to size up a
situation, identify the relevant rules and skills, and skillfully adopt a proper
course of action here and now to achieve a goal. 284 This is the third part of
the teleological framework.
The practical apprenticeship itself provides the second part of the
framework: the middle stage or phase during which masters who model
lawyering techniques and practical judgment form, or should form, the
untutored novice into a journeyman with at least a rudimentary capacity and
disposition to practice those techniques and that type of judgment. If we
treat the practical apprenticeship as a process of formation or formative
education, we could say that practical judgment is the form impressed upon
and the potential realized in the human clay of the novice. Moreover,
insofar as the practical apprenticeship is a formative process, the apprentice
acquires, or is expected to acquire, not only the foundation of professional
skill and judgment but also the desire and the ability to improve her own
professional skill and judgment through further experience as a legal
professional. 285 Formation of skill and judgment thus evolves, or should
evolve, into self-formation and the disposition to self-formation. As the
Carnegie Report states, "the essential goal of professional schools must be
to form practitioners who are aware of what it takes to become competent in
their chosen domain and to equip them with the reflective capacity and
motivation to pursue genuine expertise."2 86
283. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
284. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115.
285. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
286. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 173. For an argument that law schools currently fail to
equip students to continue to form themselves through practical experience, see Brent E. Newton,
Preaching What They Don't Practice: Why Law Faculties' Preoccupation with Impractical Scholarship
and Devaluation of Practical Competencies Obstruct Reform in the Legal Academy, 62 S. C. L. REV.
105, 109 (2010).
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c. The Apprenticeship of Identity and Purpose
According to the Carnegie Report, the third apprenticeship is that of
"identity and purpose."287
The third apprenticeship . . . introduces students to the purposes and
attitudes that are guided by the values for which the professional
community is responsible. . . . The essential goal ... is to teach the
skills and inclinations, along with the ethical standards, social roles,
and responsibilities that mark the professional.288
Elsewhere, the authors state that the third apprenticeship places
"theoretical and practical emphasis on inculcation of the identity, values,
and dispositions consonant with the fundamental purposes of the legal
profession." 289 By inculcating the purposes, attitudes, dispositions, ethical
standards, social roles, and responsibilities of the legal profession, the third
apprenticeship helps the apprentice to realize, i.e., to understand and to
make real in herself, what it means to be a lawyer.290  As the authors
observe, "[t]he values that lie at the heart of the apprenticeship of
professionalism and purpose also include conceptions of the personal
meaning that legal work has for practicing attorneys and their sense of
responsibility toward the profession.",291  More importantly perhaps, the
third apprenticeship helps the apprentice to begin to discover what it means
for her to be a lawyer. She begins, in other words, to formulate and
understand her own "professional identity."
Professional identity is, in essence, the individual's answer to
questions such as, Who am I as a member of this profession? What
am I like, and what do I want to be like in my professional role? and
What place do ethical-social values have in my core sense of
professional identity?292
287. CARNEGIE REPORT,supra note 1, at 28.
288. Id. The reference in the quoted passage to teaching "inclinations" underlines again the fact
that, for the authors, formation through the apprenticeship process includes modifying the dispositions of
the apprentice so that she will come to esteem and pursue goals and practices that she did not previously
esteem and pursue. Id.
289. Id. at 194.
290. See id. at 28.
291. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 132.
292. Id. at 135.
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This, then, is why the authors refer to the third apprenticeship as the
apprenticeship of "identity and purpose": 293 the apprentice studies, or should
study, the purposes, attitude, dispositions, standards, roles, and
responsibilities of the legal profession and in the process she should start to
discover and develop her own dispositions and attitudes, her own account of
who she is as a lawyer, and thus her own professional identity.
The Carnegie Report frequently refers to the apprenticeship of identity
and purpose as the "ethical-social" apprenticeship. 294 According to the
Report, the "apprenticeship of professional identity should encompass
issues of both individual and social justice, and it includes the virtues of
integrity, consideration, civility, and other aspects of professionalism." 295
Unfortunately, the authors do not elaborate on these brief remarks about
virtue. They clearly believe the third apprenticeship should inculcate
virtues such as integrity, consideration, and civility that, according to the
authors, are associated with professionalism. They do not, however,
identify any virtues that are particular to lawyers as distinct from the virtues
lawyers have in common with other professionals such as doctors and
members of the clergy. Indeed, the authors do not explain in what sense the
virtues that they mention are virtues, of professionalism or otherwise.296
And they also make no effort to defend a particular catalogue of virtues. 297
I return to these important questions-what are the lawyerly virtues and
why-in Part V.C.3.
According to the authors, in "[m]ost law schools," the ethical-social
apprenticeship occurs in a legal ethics course.298 There, students typically
learn and analyze the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. 299 Although it
clearly is important for apprentice lawyers to study the Model Rules,
[w]hen legal ethics courses focus exclusively on the law of
lawyering, they can convey a sense that attorneys' behavior is
bounded only by sanctions ... and . . . that most practicing lawyers
293. At various points in the Camegie Report, the authors refer to the third apprenticeship as the
apprenticeship of "professional identity" or "professional identity and purpose." See, e.g., id. at 79, 126
(title of Chapter IV), 128, 151.
294. See, e.g., id. at 130, 132, 158, 160, 191.
295. Id. at 132.
296. The Carnegie Report sometimes uses the term "virtue" rather loosely. For example, it refers
to "freedom with equity" as "virtues" and "values." CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 202. The
reader reasonably might ask what the authors believe is the relationship between a value and a virtue.
We might value the virtues, or at least some of them, but does the catalogue of virtues include all so-
called values?
297. For a discussion of competing accounts of the nature of virtue and competing catalogues of
virtues, see MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 181-87.
298. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 148.
299. Id See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES].
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are motivated primarily by self-interest and will refrain from
unethical behavior only when it is in their immediate self-interest to
do so.30
Instead of resting their case on this rather facile criticism30 1 of courses that
focus on the law of lawyering, however, the authors offer a more subtle
objection to such courses rooted in the idea that a formative educational
process forms, or should form, the student's character. 30 2
Such a narrow focus [on the law of lawyering] misses an
important dimension of ethical developmentothe capacity and
inclination to notice moral issues when they are embedded in
complex and ambiguous situations, as they usually are in actual
legal practice. This capacity is critical because ethical challenges
cannot be addressed unless they are noticed and taken seriously.30 3
By focusing on the claim that ethics courses fail to inculcate in apprentices
the inclination to spot ethical problems, the authors arguably understate the
divergence between rules-based ethics courses and formative ethical
education. If Aristotle is correct (as the Carnegie Report's reliance on him
suggests he may be), then the problem with teaching legal ethics through
rules of conduct is not that such teaching appeals only to self-interest or
somehow fails to activate a student's equipment for detecting moral
dilemmas. Rather, the fundamental problem with focusing legal ethics
courses on rules of conduct is that a general rule articulated in advance
normally cannot provide adequate guidance for action in a particular real-
world situation.30 As Sarah Broadie writes, for Aristotle "not even the
wisest moralist can firmly lay down general rules for good or right action,
since only the agent in each case can know then and there what is best.
There is no recipe for 'functioning well."'305  To put Broadie's point in a
300. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 149.
301. The authors fail to state or defend the questionable major premise of this argument, i.e., that
we study rules only to avoid the sanctions attendant on violating those rules. They also fail to defend the
premise that we ordinarily avoid violating rules and incurring sanctions only out of "immediate self-
interest." These premises and the authors' critical conclusions about legal ethics courses merit further
examination.
302. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 149.
303. Id.
304. See BROADIE, ETHICS WITH AISTOTLE, supra note 143, at 60.
305. See id. This criticism of rule-based ethics does not require us to reject a system of ethics
rooted in human rationality. Rather, for Aristotle, functioning well "is functioning in accordance with
right reason or the orthos logos, but no one can say in advance what the orthos logos for a particular
situation would be." See id. Broadie adds: "Aristotle's whole point is that there can be a rational find-
ing that lacks the generality of a rule or what would nowadays be called a 'principle.'" See id. at 118.
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more positive form, the challenge facing formative education in legal ethics
is to give the student the ability, or at least the rudiments of the ability, to
function well, i.e., the disposition and deliberative capacity to identify and
do what is best then and there in the situation in which she finds herself.3m
An education in general rules alone will not suffice to inculcate or
strengthen this disposition and capacity.
After arguing that rules-based legal ethics courses do not provide an
adequate setting for the ethical-social apprenticeship, the authors strongly
suggest that the apprenticeship ideally should occur in "context-based
education." 307  The proper context(s) for such education may "range from
bringing ethical reflection and the concerns of professionalism to bear in the
simulation pedagogy of lawyering courses, to engagement with actual cases
and clients in supervised externships and, most important, in clinical-legal
education."3 08 The authors conclude that
a special value of the pedagogies of the ethical-social
apprenticeship lies in their emphasis on ethical engagement,
particularly responsibility to clients for justice. Through ever-closer
approximations to actual practice, in a range of settings, students
can be helped to develop insight into the full dimensions of the
identity and purposes proper to a lawyer.309
This rational finding would, however, provide guidance to action in a particular, concrete situation here
and now (or then and there). For Aristotle's discussion of this issue, see ARISTOTLE, supra note 157, at
35 [NICOMACHEAN ETHICS ii.2 103b26-1104al l] (where the translator renders orthos logos as "correct
reason").
306. This disposition and deliberative capacity may be equivalent to or at least an aspect of what
the authors describe as professional judgment and Aristotle described as phronsis. See supra notes 257-
71 and accompanying text. We may, therefore, have to recast the authors' account of the second and
third apprenticeships to reflect the fact that professional judgment plays an important and quite similar
role in each of them.
307. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 158.
308. Id. The authors give somewhat short shrift to what may be the most obvious context for the
ethical-social apprenticeship, i.e., the dozens of ordinary doctrinal courses that students take in three
years of law school. They note that "the faculty is influential in conveying ... what qualities are im-
portant for a member of [the] profession." Id. at 156. They also draw attention to calls for faculty mem-
bers to act as "role models for law students' perceptions of lawyering." Id. at 157. The authors offer no
substantive discussion of such ethical role modeling or of the virtues that law faculty might model,
except to suggest that professors can provide models of "how to use power and authority." Id. These
cursory comments beg for more subtle analysis. For a short discussion of faculty members as ethical
role models, see Thomas D. Morgan, Law Faculty as Role Models, in TEACHING AND LEARNING
PROFESSIONALISM: SYMPOSIUM PROCEEDINGS 37 (1997). But cf Cramton, supra note 182, at 259
(questioning whether faculty who "have forsaken the profession that the law student plans to enter" can
serve as role models); Newton, supra note 286, at 147-48 (questioning whether a faculty that "cotwith-
standing its scholarly prowess, does not itself possess even the basic skills required to practice the type
of law about which it teaches and writes" can function as a role model for students).
309. CARNEGIE REPORT, supvs note 1, at 160.
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Thus, apprentices learn, or should learn, professional purposes, ideals, and
ethics that are "proper to a lawyer" while they approximate and, in a sense,
practice the practice of law by assuming responsibility to and for clients or
simulated clients. The authors do not explain which identity or purposes are
"proper to a lawyer" or in what sense that identity and those purposes are
"proper." The authors also do not explain why they believe that assuming
responsibility to clients entails assuming responsibility to clients "for
justice." As will be discussed in Part IV, infra, some would argue that one
person's justice is another person's raw deal, i.e., that justice is in the eye of
the beholder. Moreover, unless one is prepared to take the implausible
position that the client's interests always will be consonant with justice
(however defined), then it would seem the apprentice might learn
(gradually) to take responsibility for clients, and she might learn that she has
some responsibility as a lawyer to promote "justice." But she inevitably
also will learn that these two missions sometimes will lead in different or
even opposite directions. The lawyer who gets her client, the rapist and
murderer, off on a "technicality" has taken responsibility for her client, but
whether she has promoted justice is at least an open question.3o
The third apprenticeship resembles the other two in its three-part
teleological structure.3 1  As the first part of the teleological structure, the
third apprenticeship assumes a raw, untutored novice with, as Professor
Kingsfield suggested, a "skull full of mush"-a person who has little or no
knowledge of what it means to be a lawyer either in general or for her in
particular.312 She also apparently lacks the dispositions and virtues of a
lawyer, at least in their developed forms.313 The third part of the
teleological structure, the goal or telos of the apprenticeship, is a person
possessing at least a basic understanding of and disposition or commitment
to the purposes, ideals, ethics, and responsibilities of the legal profession
and of her role as a professional.314 At the end of the third apprenticeship,
the journeyman lawyer should have a foundation for her professional
identity and an incipient insight into what it will mean for her to be a
lawyer. How does the third apprenticeship form the raw, untutored student?
In other words, what is the second or formative part of the three-part
teleological scheme? The authors admit that there is "no research"
310. The authors recognize this potential conflict in the lawyer's purposes but provide a less than
adequate response to it. For further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 662-68 and accompanying
text.
311. See supra notes 145-57 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
314. See supma note 146 and accompanying text.
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concerning the formative influence that law school might have on a
student's professional identity.31 s
Based on our research, however, we do know that for students to
incorporate the profession's ethical-social values into their own,
they need to encounter appealing representations of professional
ideals, connect in a powerful way with engaging models of ethical
commitment within the profession, and reflect on their emerging
professional identity in relation to those ideals and models.
The authors do not explain who or what would be an "appealing
representation[] of professional ideals" or an "engaging model[] of ethical
commitment." 17 One could perhaps ask students to watch Gregory Peck
play Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird'" or Sidney Poitier play
Thurgood Marshall in Separate But Equal,3 19 or, in a less heroic but perhaps
more realistic vein, Jimmy Stewart play the cagey Paul Biegler in Anatomy
of a Murder.320
According to the authors, one way to encounter an appealing model of
professionalism is through pro bono legal work.3 2 1 "[F]ree legal work for
clients who cannot afford legal services is a vivid enactment of law's
professional identity." 322 The authors do not explain why or how pro bono
315. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 135.
316. Id.; see also id. at 146 ("when students form relationships with professionals who inspire
them, they can internalize new images of what they want to be like more deeply and vividly than they
are likely to do through reading."). If the third apprenticeship relies in part on "eppealing representa-
tions of professional ideals," it seems to follow that there must be a quality of openness and receptivity
in the raw, untutored novice to which these appealing representations can and will appeal. Novices must
have the capacity to be inspired by "professionals who inspire them." Although the authors say nothing
about this topic, such openness, receptivity, or capacity appears to be a key premise of the argument that
the third apprenticeship can form or transform the character of a law student and redirect her toward the
telos or teloi of the legal profession. I will say more about this in Part V.C.4.
317. CARNEGIE REPRT, supra note 1, at 135.
318. To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (Universal International Pictures 1962). Fc a discussion of the
pros and cons of treating Atticus Finch as a role model, see Steven Lubet, Reconstructing Atticus Finch,
97 MIcH. L REV. 1339, 1339 (1998-1999).
319. Separate But Equal, TV GuIDE, http://movies.tvguide.com/separate-but-equal/cast/137142
(last visited Sept. 20, 2012).
320. Anatomy of a Murder, TV GUIDE, http-//movies.tvguide.com/anatomy-of-a-
murder/cast/1 13464 (last visited Sept. 20, 2012). Paul Biegler is entertaining and therefore "appealing"
but whether he is a good role model is less clear.
321. CARNEGIE REPORT,supra note 1, at 138.
322. Id. The authors observe that "recent graduates ranked pro bono work at the bottom of law
school experiences they found useful in their transition to practice. " Id. at 139. A 2011 report by
NALP appears to confirm this observation. NALP, 2010 Survey ofLaw School Experiential Learning
Opportunities and Benefits, 26-27 (2011),
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/20OExperientialLeamingStudy.pdf. The authors assert that students'
negative reaction to pro bono work reflects "how supportive the school's overall culture is of' such
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work enacts professional identity, but one presumes that observing and
participating in pro bono work conveys to the apprentice the principle that
real lawyering requires taking responsibility for a client who needs help
regardless of the lawyer's opportunity for remuneration.3 23 One also
presumes, however, that apprentices eventually must adapt that principle to
the world of remunerated lawyering, since lawyers who survive to tell the
tale generally do not engage fulltime in pro bono work.3 2 4 Unfortunately,
the Carnegie Report says nothing about how pro bono work as an appealing
model for ethical lawyering relates to the daily grind of remunerative legal
work in the real world.325 It seems obvious that apprentices would benefit
from appealing models of how to balance pro bono practice with
remunerative work. Apprentices also would benefit from appealing models
of ethical remunerative lawyering, but the authors do not even
work. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 139. The authors suggest that law faculty should convey
their support for pro bono work by making such work a requirement for graduation. Id. at 184. Why
making pro bono work mandatory will make it seem more useful to students is not clear.
323. Id. at 138-44. The authors elsewhere claim that "[clompassion and concern about injustice
become much more intense when students develop personal connections with those who have experi-
enced hardship or injustice." Id. at 146. If we assume that many people receiving pro bono services
would have experienced some form of hardship, if not injustice, then we could infer that pro bono work
may increase the apprentice's "compassion and concern" for "those who have experienced hardship."
See id. The idea that clinical work might help students to "learn ... responsibility" and "develop ...
compassion for the poor" dates back at least to the early 1970s. See Grossman, supra note 214, at 223.
In 1971, however, a curriculum study commissioned by the AALS cast doubt on the "correlation be-
tween [clinical work] and concern for social justice . . . ." The Carrington Report, reprinted in HERBERT
L. PACKER & THOMAS EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL EDUCATION app. A, at 134 (1972).
324. Recent statistics suggest that sixty-seven percent of attorneys earn their living in private
practice while another eight percent work for businesses and twenty-two percent work for the govern-
ment or in a public defender setting. Ronit Dinovitzer, Bryant G. Garth, Richard Sander, Joyce Sterling
& Gita Z. Wilder, After the JD: First Results ofa National Study of Legal Careers, 27 (2004), available
at http://www.nalpfoundation.org/uploads/50-AJDI.pdf. Many attorneys in these settings engage in
some pro bono work, but clearly most attorneys most of the time support themselves by collecting pay-
ment from someone for their services. Id. at 37. Deborah Rhode discusses similar statistics from a more
critical perspective.
[T]he best available research finds that American lawyers average less than half an hour of
work per week and under half a dollar per day in support of pro bono legal assistance.
Public service programs involving the profession's most affluent members reflect a
particularly dispiriting distance between the bar's idealized image and actual practices.
(O]nly 18 of the nation's 100 most financially successful firms meet the Model Rules'
standard of 50 hours per year of pro bono service. The approximately 50,000 lawyers at
these firms averaged less than 10 minutes per day on pro bono activities. At many of these
firms, the vast majority of charitable assistance comes from associates ....
DEBORAH RHODE, PRO BONO IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE: PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PROFESSIONS 20
(2005).
325. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 138-39.
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acknowledge, let alone discuss, that possibility.326 In any event, it seems
narrow-minded and short-sighted to design the third apprenticeship to treat
remunerative work as inherently dirty or degrading or as an activity driven
solely by self-interest chafing at the limits imposed by ethical rules.327
Remunerative work appears, after all, to be the primary professional activity
of most lawyers most of the time.328
As in the first and second apprenticeships, the master teaching
apprentices in the third apprenticeship does not simply impose a form on the
apprentice from without, molding the apprentice the way a potter might
mold a pot. Rather, the master who models and inculcates professionalism
should encourage apprentices to "reflect on their emerging professional
identity"329 by discussing and encouraging apprentices to talk about
"ethical-social values" and "ethical commitment, 33 0  As apprentices
become reflective about professional identity, they gradually should become
responsible for molding or forming themselves as professionals. Formative
education in the third apprenticeship gradually will or should become self-
formative education, just as it did or should do in the cognitive and practical
apprenticeships.33 1 Thus, the apprenticeship of identity and purpose shows
the same three-part teleological structure as the other apprenticeships: a
master practitioner forms a raw, untutored novice into a reflective
journeyman with the ability to continue to mold herself further.3 32
Moreover, the master accomplishes this objective at least in part by acting
as a model and presenting appealing representations for the apprentice of
the already-formed legal professional, i.e., the lawyer who already
substantially embodies the form and has achieved or made substantial
progress toward the telos.
After this analysis of the third apprenticeship, it is possible to state and
answer a potentially important objection to my argument that the Carnegie
326. See id. (not discussing the possibility). Looking at the three films about lawyers mentioned
above, see supra notes 318-20 and accompanying text, Atticus Finch apparently defended his client pro
bono at the request of a local judge, see Lubet, supra note 318, at 1339. Thurgood Marshall received his
paycheck from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, see Separate But
Equal, supra note 319, and Paul Biegler got cheated out of his fee when his client skipped town without
paying after acquittal, see Anatomy ofa Murder, supra note 320. It is not clear what message(s) these
films convey about the ethical dimension of lawyering for pay.
327. The Carnegie Report's views on lawyering for pay underline the accuracy of a comment
made over thirty years ago by Dean Cramton: a law professor's "attitude toward practitioners is often
touched with an air of superiority and disdain." Cramton, supra note 182, at 259.
328. See Dinovitzer et al., supra note 324, at 27.
329. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 135.
330. Id.
331. See supra notes 187, 249, 285 and accompanying text.
332. See supra note 187-206.
333. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
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Report relies heavily on teleological explanation and rests on a teleological
framework.3 34 According to this objection, a key element of a teleological
explanation for a process such as legal education is the claim that the
process helps the student to actualize her potential and realize her essential
335human nature. But, according to this objection, legal education as
described in the Carnegie Report makes only incidental or superficial
changes in the law student and does not affect the student's essential nature
or even rely on a claim that student has an essential nature.3 Learning to
be a lawyer is like learning to play a role. We would not say that Tom
Hanks became a different person when he learned how to play Forrest
Gump.337 We also would not say a potter essentially transforms a pot by
coloring it blue rather than red or by giving it two small handles instead of
one large one. These changes in coloring and configuration might affect the
uses to which one can put the pot just as legal education might affect the
uses to which one might put a person or the functions that a person can
perform. According to the Carnegie Report, legal education bestows on the
law student various new attributes and useful skills.338  But the Report
makes no assertions about human nature, let alone essential human nature,
and consequently no claim that legal education somehow actualizes or
realizes human nature in the law student. Ergo, the Report does not rely or
rest on a teleological framework.
In response to this objection, I concede that the Carnegie Report does
not expressly discuss human nature or essential human nature.339  By the
same token, however, the Report does not suggest that we treat legal
education as the equivalent of learning to play a role in a film. 340 Rather, as
Part III.B.1 shows, the Report relies heavily on the claim that legal
334. See infra Part ILI.B.
335. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
336. Compare CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, with MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note
145, at 32. Macintyre has argued that modem sociology and several strands of modem philosophy,
including the Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre, find common ground in the claim that the human self
has no essence or essential nature. See MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 32 (the "democ-
ratized self which has no necessary social content and no necessary social identity can ... be anything,
can assume any role or take any point of view, because it is in and for itself nothing.").
337. See FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures 1994).
338. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
339. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
340. See infra Part V.C.6(a) (further discussion of whether we should view lawyering as role-
playing or acting a part) The Carnegie Report does, of course, recognize that lawyers and other profes-
sionals play various roles in our society, see, e.g., supra note 292 and accompanying text, but to my
knowledge the Report nowhere suggests that becoming a lawyer is equivalent to learning to perform a
role or part in a film or play, see infra Part V.C.6(a). Moreover, as suggested in the text, the Report
provides various reasons for concluding that legal education is not the equivalent of learning to play
Forrest Gump. See infra Part V.C.6(a).
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education is formative.34' The Report explains formative education by
invoking Aristotle's Four Causes and implying repeatedly that legal
education, done correctly, will transform the law student's character in
fundamental ways.342 According to the Report, the first apprenticeship,
done correctly, will transform the way the neophyte law student thinks34 3
and the second apprenticeship will develop her judgment, thereby
modifying or attempting to modify where, when, and how she responds to
events in the world.3 " The third apprenticeship will encourage her to
recognize and reflect on her new identity as a lawyer and legal
professional.34 5 Indeed, the Report argues that legal education, done
correctly, will invite her to consider and adopt new answers to the question
"who am I?",346 Thus, it is clearly incorrect to say that legal education, as
analyzed in the Carnegie Report, does no more than teach a law student to
play a new role by making incidental and superficial changes in the student.
Rather, legal education, done correctly, aims at making a fundamental
change in the character and identity of the law student by transforming her
into a journeyman lawyer and legal professional.347
The critic of my position might concede that the Carnegie Report
strongly suggests legal education will make a fundamental transformation in
the identity and character of the law student but deny that the transformation
somehow realizes or actualizes some kind of essential human nature. Even
if we recognize that legal education gives or tries to give the law student a
new identity and character as a journeyman lawyer, we have no reason to
believe this new identity and character will bring her any closer to a telos
rooted in human nature than would a new identity and character as a doctor
or an architect or a plumber or a night watchman. The law student's new
identity as a journeyman lawyer is just an arbitrary endpoint to a particular
educational process, an endpoint that may allow the journeyman to get a
good job and perform the functions of a lawyer in our legal system. But we
should not glorify this endpoint by declaring it a telos rooted in essential
human nature and then describe the process by which a student reaches this
endpoint as teleological in some lofty Aristotelian sense of the term.
At this stage of the debate with my hypothetical critic, I would suggest
that we have reached a kind of uneasy agreement. The critic concedes that,
341. See supra Part M.B.1.
342. See supra notes 187-92 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Part UI.B.2(a).
344. See supra Part IH.B.2(b).
345. See supra Part fi.B.2(c).
346. See supra note 292.
347. See supra note 194.
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according to the Carnegie Report, legal education is a process aimed at
altering the character and identity of the law student and that the endpoint of
the process will be a journeyman lawyer and legal professional.3' Whether
we call that endpoint a telos is ultimately a semantic question but I would
suggest there is no reason not to speak of it as a telos as that word is
ordinarily understood.3 '9 Leaving aside the semantic quarrel, my critic and
I seem to agree that the Report presents a classic three-part teleological
scheme involving the neophyte law student as-she-happens-to-be, an
endpoint or telos, and an educational process to take her from the former to
the latter."s What the Report lacks, according to my critic, is an argument
tying the endpoint or telos to an account of essential human nature, an
argument that would allow us to assert that in learning to be a lawyer the
law student actualizes her potential or some part of her potential as a human
being.35' And here, surprisingly, my critic and I also agree. Indeed, I would
make the point more strongly. The Report does not provide any kind of
argument in defense of the telos of the legal educational process, let alone
an argument that builds on the Report's Aristotelian account of formative
education and ties the purported telos to an account of essential human
nature. 2 In other words, using terminology that I introduce in Part III.A,
the Report provides an ungrounded teleolo ical framework for legal
education rather than a grounded framework. Moreover, as I show in
Parts III.B.2(d) and (e) infra, the Report itself seems to demand a clear
account of the telos of legal education, a clear account of what it means for
a person to be a lawyer and to do what lawyers do, as well as a clear
justification for that telos, but the Report fails to provide any such account
or justification." Indeed, as I show in Part IV.A, despite the Report's own
intentions, it appears to offer reasons to believe that justifying the telos of
legal education is not possible.355 Thus, pace my critic, I argue that the
Carnegie Report does rely and build on a teleological framework but that it
develops the framework in an incomplete, careless, and ultimately
unpersuasive way.
348. See supra note 197.
349. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
350. See supra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
351. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
352. See generally id.; see also supra Part IA.
353. See supra Pat ILA.
354. See infw Part (d) and Part (e). See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
355. See supra Part IV.A.
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d. The Third Apprenticeship Provides a Purpose for the First
and Second
In addition to resembling the cognitive and practical apprenticeships in
teleological structure, the apprenticeship of identity and purpose provides,
or should provide, the resolution to a potential conflict between those two
apprenticeships.s 6 In the cognitive apprenticeship, "the case dialogue
inculcates a narrow and highly abstract range of vision. This, in turn, can
have a corrosive effect on the development of the full range of
understanding necessary for a competent and responsible legal
professional."s? As explained above, the cognitive apprenticeship typically
uses the case-dialogue method to teach law students to abstract from the
messy details of particular, real-life situations and to think "like a lawyer" in
general, well-defined legal categories about such situations. 35 8 By contrast,
the practical apprenticeship is supposed to provide students with the
foundations of professional judgment, the capacity to size up a complex,
messy situation, identify the relevant rule and skills, and adopt a course of
action here and now using a range of lawyering skills to achieve a concrete
objective.s"
The practice of law is, ultimately, a matter of engaged
expertise. Like the experienced physician, the legal professional
must move between the detached stance of theoretical reasoning
and a highly contextual understanding of client, case, and situation.
The habit of moving back and forth between these two different
modes of cognition is learned primarily through experience,
especially the intimate relationships of apprenticeship ....
The basic problem, however, is that before attending law school, students
typically do not acquire and could not have acquired this professional "habit
of moving back and forth." And once they reach law school, the cognitive
and practical apprenticeships tug them in two different, arguably
conflicting, directions between a "detached stance" and a "highly
contextualized understanding."36 ' One apprenticeship pulls the student out
of context while the other pulls the student in; one emphasizes detachment
and disengagement, the other involvement and engagement.
356. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
357. Id. at 77.
358. See supra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 259-71 and accompanying text.
360. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 115.
361. See id.
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In addition to tugging the apprentice back and forth between the
cognitive and the practical, law school tends to favor the cognitive
apprenticeship:
The strengths of academic training lie in its efficiency in the
systematic transmission of ideas and information, along with at
least some guarantee that the knowledge communicated to students
will be reputable and up-to-date. Its weaknesses lie in its relative
abstraction from the actual application of knowledge to practice,
along with its general avoidance of the embedded knowledge of
practice itself.362
Thus, the telos of the cognitive apprenticeship-thinking like a lawyer-not
only appears to operate at cross purposes with, but (at least in the academic
environment) to take priority over, the telos of the practical
apprenticeship-practical skill and professional judgment.6  By the
authors' own account, therefore, legal education seems to pursue
fundamentally conflicting cognitive and 3ractical objectives and to give
priority to the cognitive over the practical.
According to the authors, a key function of the apprenticeship of
identity and purpose is to resolve and overcome this conflict or tension
between the cognitive and practical apprenticeships:
[t]he third element of the framework-professional identity-
joins the first two elements [i.e., legal analysis and practical skill]
and is, we believe, the catalyst for an integrated legal education.
The third element of our framework ... draws to the foreground the
purposes of the profession and the formation of the identity of
lawyers guided by those purposes. We believe if legal education
had as its focus forming legal professionals who are both competent
and responsible to clients and the public, learning legal analysis and
practical skills would be more fully significant to both the students
and faculty.365
How does the third apprenticeship 'join[] the first two" and make them
"more fully significant"?36 This is a key question that the authors do not
362. Id. at 95. See Vukowich, supra note 254, at 141 ("the law schools' main emphasis is on
theoretical studies.").
363. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 95.
364. See supra note 362 and accompanying text.
365. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 14.
366. See id.
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answer.367 I believe it is possible, however, to construct an answer based on
various comments that the authors make about the third apprenticeship.
Thus, in what follows, I argue that the third apprenticeship joins, or should
join, the first two and makes, or should make, them more fully significant
by providing an intelligible context and unifying rationale for them.
According to the authors, "the intentions embodied in the
apprenticeship of professional identity and purpose have to precede and
interpenetrate the learning of formal analytical knowledge in the first
apprenticeship and the development of skilled practice in the second." 368
The intentions of the third apprenticeship do not "precede and
interpenetrate" the first two apprenticeships in the sense that we expect, or
should expect, apprentices to study legal ethics and professionalism before
studying contracts, torts, or legal writing. Nor, apparently, are apprentices
expected to study "contract ethics" as part of contracts and "tort ethics" as
part of torts, although the authors suggest that such a "pervasive" approach
to legal ethics has value for legal education.369  Rather, the third
apprenticeship's intentions precede and interpenetrate, or should precede
and interpenetrate, in the sense that any tolerably complete and adequate
account of the purposes, dispositions, ideals, ethics, and responsibilities of
the legal profession-inculcation of which is the telos of the third
apprenticeship-should include or at least provide the basis for an
explanation and justification of the way(s) that law schools educate and
form new members of the profession. In other words, if legal education is
coherent and does not pursue conflicting aims, then it should be possible to
articulate a rationale rooted in the purposes of the legal profession (as taught
in the third apprenticeship) for studying, and studying in a particular way,
contracts, torts, legal writing, oral argument, and the other subjects and
skills comprised in the cognitive and practical apprenticeships. Thus, the
intentions of the third apprenticeship should "precede and interpenetrate"
the first two apprenticeships in the sense that, before the master/law
professor in one of the first two apprenticeships steps into the classroom,
367. See id. This is a "key" question not according to some independent measure but according to
the authors' own argument. The third apprenticeship is supposed to solve a fundamental problem in
legal education that the authors themselves have identified, namely the problem posed by the apparent
conflict between the goals of the first and second apprenticeships. See supra note 216. If the third
apprenticeship does not and cannot solve this problem in an intelligible and persuasive manner, then
legal education will remain incoherent, tugging the student in conflicting directions without an overarch-
ing, unifying rationale.
368. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 160. For the same point in almost identical words, see
SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRffY, supra note 177, at 253-54.
369. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 151-52. See Grossman, supra note 214, at 172
(pervasive approach to legal ethics dates from early to mid-1960s). For a short discussion of the Carne-
gie Report's comments on ethical education, see supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
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she ought to be able to identify and, ideally, articulate a rationale for what
and how she teaches. Moreover, that rationale should be rooted in the
broader purposes and ideals of the legal profession and should explain how
the information and skills the apprentice will learn in the classroom
contribute to the apprentice's formation as a journeyman legal professional
who shares or ultimately will share the profession's purposes and ideals. A
master who cannot offer such a rationale, if challenged to do so, would have
no good reason-i.e., no reason rooted in the purposes of the legal
profession-for teaching the theoretical/analytical or practical materials that
she teaches.370
The authors shed further light on the role of the third apprenticeship in
unifying the first two when they describe what a legal education would look
like without the third apprenticeship:
[t]o neglect formation in the larger public purposes for which the
profession stands and their meaning for individual practitioners is to
risk educating mere legal technicians for hire in the place of
genuine professionals. Therefore, the goal of professional
education cannot be analytical knowledge alone or, perhaps, even
predominantly. Neither can it be analytical knowledge plus merely
skillful performance.
Instead, analytical knowledge and skillful performance find, or should find,
their intellectual context and rationale-their significance-in the "defining
purposes" of the legal profession.372 If and to the extent that analytical
370. To my knowledge, the authors do not offer any explanation of how the intentions of the third
apprenticeship precede and interpenetrate the first and second apprenticeships, but the explanation of-
fered here seems to be implicit in their account of the third apprenticeship. See supra Part ll.B.2(c).
The authors do comment that "[i]f the final aim of legal education is to foster the development of legal
expertise and sound professional judgment, then educators' awareness of the basic contours of the path
from novice to expert, along with appropriate steps along this way, are very important" CARNEGIE
REPORT, supra note 1, at 116. This comment suggests that one of the objectives of the Carnegie Report
is to make legal educators conscious of what they do and, at least to some degree, why they do it. Id A
unifying explanation of why legal educators do what they do is, I argue, one thing that the third appren-
ticeship should bestow on the first two.
371. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 160. Dean Cramton has pointed out that legal educators
convey two common descriptions of the lawyer's role-the "hired gun" and the "social engineer."
Cramton, supra note 182, at 251. Both descriptions essentially treat lawyers as "legal technicians for
hire," while varying the identity of who does the hiring. Ironically, Professor Woodard argues that since
the 1930s legal scholars themselves have become technicians and applied scientists, partly in reaction to
the perceived abstractness of legal science as taught by the case method. See Woodard, supra note 200,
at 718. If Woodard is correct, we may face the problem of scholar-technicians trying to train apprentice
lawyers to be something other than lawyer-technicians. Woodard himself seems to support the evolution
in our understanding of "the lawyer from a quasi-priestly figure into a social engineer." See Woodward,
supra note 200, at 733.
372. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 160.
2012] 183
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LA WREVIEW
knowledge and practical skill serve a unified, coherent, and defining set of
professional purposes, the apprenticeships in which a student begins to
acquire such knowledge and skill would not need to work at cross-purposes,
legal education would not be incoherent, and the resulting journeyman
lawyer would not be relegated to the role of technician-for-hire.7 Thus,
the third apprenticeship, which teaches the defining purposes of the
profession, should, in doing so, provide a rationale for, and resolve the
tensions and conflicts between, the first and second apprenticeships.374 Or
to put the same point in different terms, the third apprenticeship should
explain, or at least provide the resources to explain, the place or role of the
other two apprenticeships in the larger project of becoming a legal
professional. In this way, the third apprenticeship "joins the first two
apprenticeships" and makes them "more fully significant" to students and
faculty, apprentices and masters.
Before turning to a basic problem raised by this account of the
relationship between the third apprenticeship and the first two, it is
important to note that the account is, again, fundamentally teleological. 7
Each of the first two apprenticeships has a telos: "thinking like a lawyer" in
the case of the cognitive apprenticeship; practical skill and professional
judgment in the case of the practical apprenticeship. These teloi could
lead the apprentice who pursues both in different and potentially conflicting
directions. The third apprenticeship, which inculcates the purposes of
lawyering and the legal profession, should provide a kind of master or
overarching telos, a telos that the other teloi can and should subserve. Thus,
if the question were "to what end should I think like a lawyer?" or "what is
the purpose of thinking like a lawyer?" the answer would be "the end or
purpose of thinking like a lawyer is to perform the functions or services of a
legal professional and thereby to pursue the defining purposes of the legal
profession, which are ... ." As the authors assert,
[t]his kind of teaching, which is sensitive to the breadth of
substantive concerns and the precision of procedural thinking, keeps
reminding students of the broader purpose and mission of the law.
Without this grounding in the larger purpose of what they are
373. See id.
374. See, e.g., id. at 14, 28.
375. See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
376. See supra Part M.A.
377. See supra Part I.B.2(a), ILI.B.2(b).
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studying, the sheer challenge and satisfaction of achieving
intellectual mastery can become a kind of end in itself.378
Thus, the teloi of legal education form a hierarchy in which the ends of the
first two apprenticeships serve the end(s) of the third apprenticeship. As
MacIntyre has observed, "[o]n the [Aristotelian] view human action,
because it is to be explained teleologically, not only can, but must be,
characterized with reference to the hierarchy of goods which provide the
ends of human action."379  In the Carnegie Report, the hierarchy of goods
places the goods or ends of the apprenticeship of identity and purpose
above, and logically or conceptually prior to, the goods or ends of the
cognitive and practical apprenticeships, which thus derive their place or role
and their meaning in the larger project of legal education from the third
apprenticeship. In this way, the telos of the third apprenticeship should
"precede and interpenetrate" the teloi of the first two apprenticeships.so
Indeed, one could argue that the Carnegie Report itself plays, or could play,
a role in the third apprenticeship because the Report takes a first cut at
articulating the rationales for the first two apprenticeships in light of the
defining purposes of the legal profession.si
e. The Lacuna: No Purpose for Legal Profession
Unfortunately, at precisely this crucial point in the argument there is an
important lacuna in the Carnegie Report. The authors fail to explain why
they believe the legal profession has or, indeed, could have defining
purposes.382 And setting aside this thorny question, they also fail to explain
378. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 144.
379. MACMIYRE, AFTER VIRTuE, supra note 145, at 84. For a discussion of the significance of
the hierarchy of goods for Aristotle, see BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARISTOTLE, supra note 143, at 11-12.
380. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 160.
381. To my knowledge, the authors do not attempt to articulate the potentially important role or
function of works such as the Carnegie Report itself in the third apprenticeship.
382. The authors' reference to the "defining purposes" of the legal profession, id., appears to rely
on another teleological analysis or argument drawn from the Aristotelian tradition. Sarah Broadie out-
lines Aristotle's account of how a craft or practice such as law can have its own purpose or aim:
[t]he aiming which is the central notion of the argument is not intending, seeking, or
purposing in a psychological sense. Only human individuals can 'aim' in that sense, and the
aim may vary depending on the motive. But Aristotle's argument attaches aims and ends to
those abstract entities crafts, activities, practices, projects. They cannot have motives, and the
'aim of' each is defined by the end whose achievement is the mark of success for that kind of
craft, activity, etc. The status of health as the end of medicine is the same whatever one's
motive for engaging in the practice of medicine.
BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARISTOTLE, supra note 143, at 16. Clearly, if one rejects the view that the legal
profession or legal education can have an aim or a purpose above and beyond the aims and purposes of
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what they believe the defining purposes of the legal profession are and
why. 3  They do identify several services that the profession provides.
For example, they state that the "important service[]" that law provides is
"to regulate social transactions and secure justice." 85  They do not,
however, explain how or in what sense lawyers regulate "social
transactions" or what "justice" means and how lawyers might "secure" it.386
In a related vein, the authors remark that the "apprenticeship of professional
identity should encompass issues of both individual and social justice, and it
includes the virtues of integrity, consideration, civility, and other aspects of
professionalism."3 87  The authors do not explain, however, what they mean
by "individual and social justice" or how those notions may be related to
one another.3 88 Also, as previously observed, the authors do not tell us why
or how the particular virtues they identify should be considered "aspects of
professionalism," legal professionalism, or otherwise.389
Elsewhere in the Carnegie Report, the authors seem to offer a somewhat
different account of the defining purpose(s) of the legal profession:
for a profession such as law, which is pledged to public service, a
more encompassing center may be essential. That center is the
development of responsibility, both for individual clients and for
individual lawyers or teachers, then Aristotle's position and that adopted by the authors will make little
sense. See id. I expect to pursue this issue in a subsequent article.
383. See Michelle J. Anderson, Legal Education Reform, Diversity, and Access to Justice, 61
RUTGERS L. REv. 1011, 1021 (2009) ("Despite its engagement with values and professional ethics, the
Carnegie Report did not analyze the values or professional ethics of the profession itself."). Leonard
Long also has argued that the Carnegie Report fails to identify the purpose of law school. Leonard J.
Long, Resisting Anti-Intellectualism and Promoting Legal Literacy, 34 S. ILL. U. L. J. 1, 13-16 (2009).
384. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
385. Id. It is not at all clear that an "important service" of the law is the same thing as a "defining
purpose" of the legal profession.
386. Id. As will become clear in the following paragraphs of the text, I am not arguing that the
authors have identified the wrong purposes for the legal profession but that they have catalogued alto-
gether too many purposes and provided no arguments in support of the purposes that they identify.
Thus, the difficult intellectual work remains to be done.
387. Id. at 132.
388. See id. The AALS has adopted a similar view, also without providing further explanation:
[tihe fact that a law professor's income does not depend on serving the interests of private
clients permits a law professor to take positions on issues as to which practicing lawyers may
be more inhibited. With that freedom from economic pressure goes an enhanced obligation
to pursue individual and social justice.
ASSOC. OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, 2008 HANDBOOK 97 (2008) (emphasis added). This statement
implies that "economic pressure" may inhibit a law professor's students from pursuing individual and
social justice when they represent "private clients," a view that seems to reflect some ambivalence to-
ward the for-pay lawyering that most law students will do after law school. See id.
389. See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text
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the law and its values. This is the subject of the pedagogies of the
apprenticeship of professional identity ....
The authors do not explain, however, what "responsibility" for individual
clients, the law, and the law's values might mean. Nor do they explain what
the law's "values" might be, although for reasons discussed below,391 their
decision to refer to the law's values as "values" may be revealing.
Elaborating on a passage quoted above, perhaps they would contend that the
law's values are regulating social transactions and securing individual and
social justice.392 But without further explanation and argument, this
clarification clarifies very little. Indeed, this clarification may point to a
more fundamental problem. What should the lawyer do when her
responsibility for her client conflicts with her responsibility for the law and
for "securing justice"? The authors recognize the "apparent conflict"3 93 or
"tension"394 between the role of "lawyer as zealous advocate for clients"3 95
and lawyer as "social regulator[]" with "obligations to see to the proper
functioning of the institutions of the law." 96 They do not explain, however,
whether or how this "conflict" or "tension" can be resolved.
In what appears to be a third, unrelated attempt to state the "defining
purposes" of the legal profession, the authors declare that
[l]awyer professionalism is still importantly defined with reference
to ideals first annunciated by leaders of the bar in the early part of
the twentieth century-ideals of independent service to the public,
requiring and supporting counsel to clients that would also be
independent of possible benefit to the attorney or law firm.398
It will come as no surprise that the authors fail to explain what they mean by
"independent service to the public."39 Would a lawyer who serves on the
local zoning board be performing independent service to the public? And
does it matter what the lawyer does while serving on the Board-what
positions she takes? Pro-development? Pro-historic conservation? Pro-
390. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 125.
391. See infra notes 462-65 and accompanying text.
392. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
393. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
394. Id. at 83.
395. Id. at 82.
396. Id.
397. For further discussion of the significance of this tension between the roles of lawyer as zeal-
ous advocate and lawyer as social regulator, see infra notes 661-68 and accompanying text.
398. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 127.
399. Id.
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affordable housing? Pro-homeowner autonomy? The notion of
"independent public service" is compatible with a wide variety of
substantive positions. Similarly, if independent service to the public means
supporting clients without regard to possible benefits to attorney or firm,
then a lawyer could serve the public by defending the Nazi Party's desire to
march in Skokie, Illinois, and b defending the efforts of some of Skokie's
citizens to stop the Nazi march. The call for "independent" service to the
public without benefit to self or firm also may reflect the authors' belief that
pro bono work provides a "vivid enactment of law's professional
identity."401 As discussed above, however, the authors do not explain why
402or how pro bono work performs such a lofty function.
When the authors refer to "ideals first annunciated ... in the early part
of the twentieth century," they may be pointing to a phenomenon they call
civic professionalism.4 03 As the authors state,
[t]hat is the challenge of professional preparation for the law:
linking the interests of educators with the needs of practitioners and
the members of the public the profession is pledged to serve-in
other words, participating in civic professionalism. How well the
challenge of linking these interests and needs is met is, in large part,
determined by how clearly civic professionalism is understood[].
The aim of this book is to contribute to that understanding.Y
Unfortunately, the Carnegie Report does not contribute very much to an
understanding of civic professionalism, and as a result, civic
professionalism does not contribute very much to our understanding of the
purpose(s) of the legal profession that should be taught to law students
during the third apprenticeship. The authors clearly believe that "civic
professionalism" has something to do with public service or service in the
public interest.405 In his earlier Carnegie Foundation study, Work and
Integrity, which is cited without discussion in the passage quoted above,
Sullivan describes civic professionalism as "the ideal of social
400. For a very brief account of this legal battle, see Nat'l Socialist Party of Am. v. Vill. of Skok-
ie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).
401. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 138; see supra note 322 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 323-29 and accompanying text.
403. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 127.
404. Id. at 4.
405. Id. at 196 (suggesting students need to be prepared for "active roles as civic professionals,
contributing to the public direction of their areas of the law."). Talcott Parsons observed that "the ideol-
ogy of service . . . long distinguished the professions from the market-oriented business groups ....
Talcott Parsons, Professions, 12 INT'L ENCYC. OF THE Soc. Sci. 536, 541 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
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reciprocity."4% "Social reciprocity" appears to mean reciprocity between a
profession and the public. "The professions are publicly chartered to make
it their primary concern to sustain ... public goods. They are therefore in
an important sense public occupations even when they work outside
government or publicly supported institutions." According to Sullivan,
the "tradition of civic professionalism ... views the professional enterprise
as humanly engaged practices [sic] generating values of great significance
for a modern society."" 8 But exactly what public goods or values of great
significance is it the purpose of the legal profession to generate? This is the
hard question that neither Sullivan nor his co-authors answer with any
clarity. Sullivan suggests that the legal profession is responsible for "such
values as a functional legal system . . . ."0 He also declares that
"[p]rofessionalism became one of the pillars of the Progressive movement
by positing, in the professional career, a design for living that promised to
give individual occupational achievement moral meaning through
responsible participation in a civic life.,Ao Unfortunately, Sullivan's
general statements about the good or value of a functional legal system and
responsible participation in civic life contain no useful details and thus they
provide no content with which to answer our question about the defining
purpose(s) of the legal profession.
Sullivan seems to regard Louis D. Brandeis as a model of the civic
professional. 411 According to Sullivan,
[i]n his celebration of the kind of practical judgment he saw as the
lawyer's best skill, Brandeis was echoing a venerable tradition that
ultimately reached back to Cicero and Aristotle. . . . In Brandeis's
rendering, the aim of legal education and practice was to develop
professionals expert in this capacity for practical judgment. Such
professionals could be trusted to educate their clients and the public
at large to see the ethical and civic dimensions of even routine legal
matters.412
In Sullivan's view, Brandeis believed that the lawyer must serve as a
counselor, and "[a]s counselor, the lawyer was to inject the larger
406. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 5.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 64-65.
409. Id. at 5.
410. Id. at 100.
411. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 101-05.
412. Id. at 105.
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perspective of the public interest as it bore on the matter at hand."'"3  This
description of Brandeis's civic professionalism, assuming it is accurate,4 14
boils down to a recommendation that lawyers incorporate an ethical, civic,
and/or public-interest element into their legal advice and practice.415
Assuming for argument's sake that this is a wise and useful
recommendation, it provides no insight into the content or substance of the
ethical, civic, or public-interest element. Thus, Sullivan's discussion of
Brandeis's civic professionalism provides little help in answering our basic
question about the legal profession's defining purposes.416
The authors offer what may be a final candidate for the telos of
lawyering and the legal profession in the last paragraph of the Carnegie
Report:
[t]he calling of legal educators is a high one: to prepare future
professionals with enough understanding, skill, and judgment to
support the vast and complicated system of the law needed to
sustain the United States as a free society worthy of its citizens'
loyalty; that is, to uphold the vital values of freedom with equity
and extend these values into situations as et unknown but
continuous with the best aspirations of our past.41
413, Id. at 104.
414. John Frank, who examined several difficult episodes in Justice Brandeis's career that came
up during his confirmation process, seems to depict a lawyer who worked hard to separate his private
representations from his advocacy of public positions and not a lawyer who sought to push private cli-
ents toward results that supposedly were in the public interest. See generally John P. Frank, The Legal
Ethics ofLouis D. Brandeis, 17 STAN. L. REv. 683, 683-85, 702 (1965) [hereinafter Frank, Brandeis].
For Brandeis's own views on lawycring in the public interest, which he vigorously supported, see gener-
ally LOuiS D. BRANDEIs, The Opportunity in the Law, in BusiNESs- A PROFESSION 313 (1914).
415. I intend no disrespect to Justice Brandeis or his remarkable legal career. I mean to suggest
only that if Justice Brandeis's career and views are to help us identify and justify the defining purposes
of the legal profession, we will have to examine that career and those views more thoroughly than Sulli-
van does in Work and Integrity. In particular, we would need to reconsider Sullivan's assertion that
Brandeis believed an attorney should function not just as a lawyer for a private interest but a "'lawyer for
[a] situation."' SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRrfY, supra note 177, at 104. Brandeis apparently did
once make a comment to that effect, a comment that John Frank-Sullivan's source-referred to as "one
of the most unfortunate phrases that [Brandeis] ever casually uttered." Frank, Brandeis, supra note 414,
at 702. As Frank observes, "[l]awyers are not retained by situations, and the adversary system assumes
that they faithfully represent one interest at a time." Id. For a defense of acting as a "lawyer for the
situation," see generally David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice ofLaw, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 717, 717-18 (1988). Luban contends that Brandeis advocated a "distinctively liberal public
philosophy," id. at 724, which Luban labels "progressive professionalism," id. at 725. This suggests that
Sullivan's and Luban's support for a Brandeis-style civic professionalism may reflect--or, perhaps,
disguise-a liberal, progressive political agenda. Id
416. 1 will return to the notion of civic professionalism in the discussion of the contractarian
ethical framework in Part IV.B.
417. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 202.
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Here the authors seem to suggest that the telos of lawyering and the legal
profession is to "sustain the United States as a free society worthy of its
citizens' loyalty . . . . Needless to say, the authors do not tell us what
they mean by a "free society," or what characteristics might make some, but
apparently not all, free societies worthy of a citizen's loyalty. They also do
not tell us how a system of law might "sustain" such a society, or how
lawyers can or should "support" that system of law. They imply that
sustaining a free society worthy of loyalty means "uphold[ing] the vital
values of freedom with equity."' 9 It seems to follow that the free societies
worthy of loyalty might be those that uphold equity along with freedom.
Thus, the job of the lawyer apparently would be to support a legal system
that sustains freedom and equity or equality in a manner consistent with
U.S. traditions, or at least "the best aspirations of our past."420 Whatever
might be the substantive merits of this suggested telos for lawyering and the
legal profession, the authors make no effort to explain and defend it, and no
effort to link it to the preceding 200-page critical discussion of legal
education.
My point, of course, is not that there is anything wrong with civic
professionalism or pro bono work or the various other purposes and virtues
of the legal profession that the Carnegie Report and Professor Sullivan
catalog. My point is simply that the Carnegie Report provides no
explanation of how or why civic professionalism, pro bono work,
independent public service, responsibility for clients and the law, regulating
social transactions and securing justice, maintaining a functional legal
system, or supporting the United States as a free society serve as defining
purposes for the legal profession. And the Report provides no explanation
of how these various purposes might relate to one another. The authors'
silence on these key points is important because they argue that the defining
purposes of the legal profession should provide both the core of what is
taught and learned during the third apprenticeship and the unifying rationale
for the first two apprenticeships.42 ' If the legal profession has a coherent set
of defining purposes, legal education in pursuit of those purposes ultimately
is, or at least could be, coherent. If, however, we lack a coherent,
persuasive account of the defining purposes of the legal profession, then we
will not have a coherent subject matter for the third apprenticeship and we
will not have a unifying rationale or, perhaps, any rationale at all aside from




421. See supra Part L.B.2(d).
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be forced back on the model of lawyer as technician-a hired gun for some
kind of client.422
This point can be restated using the terminology of ungrounded and
grounded teleological frameworks. As described by the authors, the
cognitive and practical apprenticeships both appear to be built upon
ungrounded teleological frameworks. Their teloi are simply given.4 24
Unfortunately, their teloi appear to be in conflict. The third apprenticeship
is supposed to provide the coherent, unifying rationale for the first two, in
effect converting their teleological frameworks from ungrounded to
grounded by providing the underlying justification for their teloi.425 But it
turns out that the third apprenticeship itself relies on an ungrounded
teleological framework, because the authors ultimately fail to provide any
justification, any rationale or validation, for the various purposes or teloi
that they seem to identify as defining purposes of the legal profession.
Insofar as the teleological framework of the third apprenticeship remains
ungrounded, the frameworks of the first two also must remain ungrounded
and, by the authors' own account, incoherent. As discussed in Part IV, the
second ethical framework in the Carnegie Report takes this line of argument
a step further by providing grounds for arguing that the teleological
framework of the third apprenticeship must remain ungrounded.426 If true,
this means that the legal profession does not and cannot have a coherent set
of rationally defensible, non-arbitrary defining purposes that provide a
rationale for the way we educate lawyers.
It is important to acknowledge at this stage of the argument that the
problems associated with providing a justification for the telos of the third
apprenticeship-the problems associated with converting the teleological
framework from ungrounded to grounded-are not unique to the field of
legal education.427 As MacIntyre has pointed out, teleological explanatory
schemes have been under assault for several centuries.428 In 1623, Francis
Bacon wrote "[i]nquiry into final causes is sterile, and, like a virgin
consecrated to God, produces nothing."429  In 1651, Thomas Hobbes
announced, albeit somewhat less colorfully, that "there is no such Finis
ultimus, (utmost ayme,) nor Summum Bonum, (greatest Good,) as is spoken
422. See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
423. See supra Parts HI.B.2(a), (b).
424. See supra Parts IH.B.2(a), (b).
425. See supra Parts WI.B.2(a), (b).
426. See infra Part IV.
427. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 53-55.
428. Id.
429. WOODFIELD, supra note 116, at 3 (quoting Francis Bacon's 1623 work De Augmentis Scien-
tiarum).
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of in the Books of the old Morall Philosophers." 4 30 Living at roughly the
same time as Hobbes,
it is [Blaise] Pascal who recognizes that . . . [r]eason does not
comprehend essences or transitions from potentiality to act; these
concepts belong to the despised conceptual scheme of
scholasticism. Hence anti-Aristotelian science sets strict boundaries
to the powers of reason. Reason is calculative; it can assess truths
of fact and mathematical relations but nothing more. In the realm
of practice therefore it can speak only of means. About ends it must
be silent....
Pascal's striking anticipations of Hume . .. point to the way in
which this concept of reason retained its power. Even Kant retains
its negative characteristics; reason for him, as much as for Hume,
discerns no essential natures and no teleological features in the
objective universe available for study by physics. Thus their
disagreements on human nature coexist with striking and important
agreements and what is true of them is true also of Diderot, of
Smith and of Kierkegaard.431
Maclntyre summarizes the result: "the joint effect of the secular rejection of
both Protestant and Catholic theology and the scientific and philosophical
rejection of Aristotelianism was to eliminate any notion of man-as-he-
could-be-if-he-realized-his-telos."432 The breadth and thoroughness of these
early modern and subsequent assaults on teleological explanation suggest
430. THOMAs HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 160 (C. B. MacPherson ed., 1968). In case there is any doubt
that Hobbes rejected Aristotelian thought, one also might cite the following: "And I beleeve that scarce
any thing can be more absurdly said in naturall Philosophy, than that which now is called Aristotles
Metaphysiques; nor more repugnant to Government, than much of that bee hath said in his Politiques;
nor more ignorantly, than a great part of his Ethiques." Id. at 687.
431. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 54. In the same era as Pascal (1623-1662),
Ren6 Descartes (1596-1650) and Baruch Spinoza (1632-1647) also rejected teleological explanation.
See ARTHUR 0. LovEjoY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 124,
156, 188 (1964). According to Lovejoy, Descartes was "the most influential philosopher of the age"
immediately prior to the Enlightenment. Id. at 123. For a careful summary of Immanuel Kant's expul-
sion of teleological explanation from the realms of scientific and metaphysical explanation, see S.
KORNER, KANT 196-211 (1955). See also RICHARD WOLIN, HEIDEGGER'S CHILDREN: HANNAH
ARENDT, KARL LOwlm, HANs JONAS & HERBERT MARCUSE 111-13 (2001) (describing the intellectual
movement from Descartes to Darwin by which teleological explanations disappeared from science).
432. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 54. MacIntyre himself, at least in his earlier
work, rejects as unsupportable one premise of Aristotle's teleological framework, a premise MacIntyre
calls "Aristotle's metaphysical biology." Id. at 163. Andrew Woodfield proposes a relatively benign
explanation for the disappearance from natural science of Aristotle's teleological approach: "The main
reason why Aristotle's doctrine faded out is simply that the new men of science stopped asking teleolog-
ical questions. To them, final causes were scientifically irrelevant." WOODFIELD, supra note 116, at 8.
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quite strongly that the authors of the Carnegie Report walked or stumbled
into a much larger debate when they placed a teleological framework at the
core of their account of legal education.433 If human beings have no
essential ends or teloi, it is not clear how human beings as lawyers could
have such essential ends or teloi. It would be clear, however, why the
authors might avoid attempting to identify and defend such teloi for human
beings or for the subset of human beings who are lawyers: it is hard to
identify and defend something that does not exist. And, as discussed in Part
V.C.2, infra, any search for an adequate account of and justification for the
telos or teloi of legal education-any attempt to convert an ungrounded
teleological framework into a grounded one-will require us to engage in a
more fundamental philosophical discussion of the purposes of human
conduct and human life and the subordinate purposes of lawyering and the
legal profession.
IV. Two COMPETING ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS: EMOTIVISM AND
CONTRACTARIANISM
This Part of the Article carries the argument two steps further. Through
a close reading of key passages in the Carnegie Report, the first section
shows that there is a second, emotivist ethical framework operating at cross-
purposes with the teleological framework that, as shown in Part III, forms
the core of the authors' account of legal education. If the emotivist account
of ethical life is correct, then we must reject the teleological framework and
the account of legal education built on that framework. The second section
of this Part teases out and elaborates a third, contractarian framework that
also seems to lurk in the margins of the Carnegie Report. This contractarian
framework is interesting and potentially important because it appears to
reflect the authors' somewhat half-hearted attempt to provide an ethical
grounding, basis, or purpose for the legal profession, a grounding, basis, or
purpose required but not provided by the teleological framework.
A. The Shadow Ethical Framework: Emotivism
The authors of the Carnegie Report at various points discuss a so-called
"shadow" pedagogy. 435 They describe a shadow pedagogy as one that "is
433. For a discussion of several recent objections to teleological forms of explanation, see
SORABJI, supra note I10, at 163-66, 168-74.
434. See infra Part V.C.2.
435. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24, 56-59.
194 [Vol. 39
TWO AND A HALF ETHICAL THEORIES
not, or is only weakly engaged.""3 6 A shadow pedagogy is communicated
without explicit discussion along with the primary pedagogies, such as the
case dialogue, that dominate legal education.437 All but unrecognized in the
Carnegie Report, and certainly only weakly engaged, is a shadow ethical
theory or framework that seems to haunt the teleological framework
discussed in Part III and, perhaps, to explain why the teleological
framework remains and must remain ungrounded. I will refer to this
shadow ethical framework as "emotivist." Alasdair MacIntyre defines
"emotivism" as "the doctrine that all evaluative judgments and more
specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of preference,
expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in
character.'"38 As MacIntyre elaborates the point, "what emotivism asserts is
in central part that there are and can be no valid rational justification[s] for
any claims that objective and impersonal moral standards exist and hence
that there are no such standards."I" According to the emotivist,
[fjactual judgments are true or false; and in the realm of fact there
are rational criteria by means of which we may secure agreement as
to what is true and what is false. But moral judgments, being
expressions of attitude or feeling, are neither true nor false; and
agreement in moral judgment is not to be secured by any rational
method, for there are none. It is to be secured, if at all, by
producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or attitudes
of those who disagree with one.4
436. Id. at 24. The authors do not explain whether the shadow pedagogy lurks in the shadows of
the primary pedagogy or whether the shadow pedagogy shadows the primary pedagogy in the sense of
following it around, or both. Id.
437. See id. 56-59. According to the authors, two unspoken lessons shadow the case-dialogue
pedagogy as it teaches a student to think like a lawyer. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 24, 56-59.
The first is that thinking like a lawyer can be learned in a classroom and therefore does not require the
presence of actual clients. Id at 57. Thus, the case dialogue tacitly teaches students to view lawyers as
"distanced planners or observers [rather] than as interacting participants in legal actions." Id. The
second unspoken lesson is that thinking like a lawyer requires students to disregard "their sense ofjus-
tice and fairness," id., because "matters ofjustice are secondary to formal correctness," id. at 58.
438. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12. For further discussion of emotivism,
see Mark F. Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending? The Interstate Commerce Commission and the
Emergence ofthe Post-Enlightenment Paradigm, 113 PENN. ST. L. REv. 113, 120-23 (2008) [hereinafter
Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?]. For a classic statement of the emotivist position, see
ALFRED JULES AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH & LoGIc 102-20 (Dover 1952).
439. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 19.
440. Id at 12.
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As Allan Bloom has noted, this position entails a form of nihilism,
assuming nihilism has more than one form."' According to Bloom, the
heart of this position is the claim that
[v]alues are not discovered by reason, and it is fruitless to seek
them, to find the truth or the good life. . . . This alleged fact was
announced by Nietzsche just over a century ago when he said, 'God
is dead.' Good and evil now for the first time appeared as values,
of which there have been a thousand and one, none rationally or
objectively preferable to any other." 2
Thus, one might say that for the emotivist, all values are created equal and
they are created by the preferences, attitudes, and feelings of individuals.
Moreover, for the emotivist, any effort to construct a critique of someone's
values will provoke suspicion and resistance because values are understood
to be personal, subjective, relative, and, therefore, not open to rational
criticism." 3
Precisely this emotivist position seems to shadow the central
teleological framework of the Carnegie Report. I will not try to present all
of the copious evidence for this claim, but I will discuss some key passages
and patterns in the text. In one such passage, the authors state:
[t]he values that lie at the heart of the apprenticeship of
professionalism and purpose . .. include conceptions of the personal
meaning that legal work has for practicing attorneys and their sense
of responsibility toward the profession. However, in legal
education today, most aspects of the ethical-social apprenticeship
are ... contested as to their value and appropriateness.44
441. See BLOOM, supra note 15, at 143.
442. See id For Nietzche's famous discussion of the death of God, see FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE,
Thus Spoke Zarathustra, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 103, 124 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1968)
[hereinafter NIETZSCHE, ZARATHUSTRA]. See also FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 181
(Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1974) ("God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.").
As MacIntyre says, "it was Nietzsche's historic achievement to understand more clearly than any other
philosopher ... not only that what purported to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions of
subjective will, but also the nature of the problems that this posed for moral philosophy." MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 113. For Macintyre's views on the significance of Nietzsche, see,
e.g., id at 113-20. As Macintyre suggests, Nietzsche found the sources of moral judgment in acts of will
while the emotivist finds the sources of moral judgment in preferences, attitudes, and feelings. See id
For the purposes of this Article, however, the key point is that Nietzsche and the emotivists agree on the
purely personal, subjective, and non-rational roots of moral judgments.
443. See Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra note 438, at 122.
444. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 132.
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If one restates this point in the active voice, the authors apparently wish to
remind us that some legal educators contest the value of "most aspects" of
the third apprenticeship and doubt its appropriateness. The authors of the
Carnegie Report have one set of values; those who contest "aspects" of the
third apprenticeship have other values, or value other things. The question
that shadows the Carnegie Report's argument-unstated and unanswered-
is: can this sort of conflict between or among values be resolved or
adjudicated rationally and objectively in a way that somehow would oblige
a person to accept as correct what the authors of the Carnegie Report value
over what unnamed others in legal education incorrectly happen to value?
If values are "contested," can one side win the contest through rational
argument? Or does "once contested" mean "always and irremediably
contested"?
The authors recognize that for many people in the legal academy today,
the answer to this last fundamental question would be "yes": "in the minds
of many faculty, ethical and social values are subjective and indeterminate,"
and thus endlessly contestable." 5  This means that "many faculty"-i.e.,
many of the masters who train apprentice lawyers-are, in effect, emotivists
in MacIntyre's sense." 6 As emotivists, they would reject the view that there
are objective, rationally defensible and justifiable moral truths." 7  They,
therefore, would reject the suggestion that the values reflected or advocated,
albeit somewhat half-heartedly, in the Carnegie Report, or any other set of
values that one could characterize as "professional," are or could be
intrinsically preferable to any other set of values. And a fortiori, these
emotivist faculty members would-or at least should, if they wish to be
intellectually consistent-deny that any set of "professional" values can or
should be taught to law students as objective truths. One could of course
445. Id. at 132-33. It is perhaps worth noting that values could be subjective without being inde-
terminate. In my experience, people who assert that values are subjective often have very determinate
values. For such a person, her values might be indeterminate only in the limited sense that no one else
could validly determine that her values are somehow false or wrong. In such a situation, indeterminacy
of values would function as a shield against criticism but not as a source of uncertainty or self-doubt.
Robert Summers referred to this as "[t]he possessory theory of truth--'my values are right because I
hold them."' Cramton, supra note 182, at 254 n.20 and accompanying text (quoting R. S. Summers,
Mimeographed Materials on Jurisprudence and the Legal Process 4-5 (Cornell Law School (1977)).
446. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTuE, supra note 145, at 22. Many of these faculty members may
not be prepared to admit that they are emotivists. As MacIntyre observes, "to a large degree people now
think, talk and act as sfemotivism were true, no matter what their avowed theoretical standpoint may be.
Emotivism has become embodied in our culture." Id.
447. Dean Cramton has characterized this rejection of objective moral truth as part of the "ordi-
nary religion" that law teachers convey to students in the classroom. See Cramton, supra note 182, at
249-50 ("Since it is apparent that people differ in the values they hold and that there is no rational way to
resolve these differences, a practical person will not waste time worrying about unanswerable ques-
tions.").
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teach values as values--one set of values among many. But to teach one set
of allegedly professional values as somehow true or valid cannot be
justified, at least on emotivist grounds.
As the authors recognize, some emotivists carry the critique one step
further by questioning the motives of those who wish to teach one or
another set of values to law students: "[m]any faculty who doubt the value
of education for professional responsibility in law schools equate efforts to
support students' ethical development with inculcation, which they see as
illegitimate and ineffective. This is further complicated by their belief that
some of their colleagues are pushing ideological agendas."" 9 In other
words, many emotivists would argue that anyone who pretends to teach
ethics is actually teaching her own values, i.e., her subjective preferences,
attitudes, and feelings. Therefore, anyone who teaches ethics must have a
personal agenda, perhaps political or religious, that she wishes to impose on
her students.4" Indeed, according to the authors, "[t]h[e] perception that it
is indoctrination even to ask students to articulate their own normative
positions was surprisingly prevalent on the campuses we visited."4' The
authors do not explain why they find the prevalence of this "perception"
surprising. It is, after all, an obvious corollary of the view that
questioning and criticizing another person's values is illegitimate because
all values ultimately reflect personal preferences. Indeed, it would be
surprising if many self-conscious and self-consistent emotivist law
professors were not somewhat reticent to question a law student about her
values, since such professors probably believe there can be no rational,
impersonal, non-subjective basis for calling a student's values into question
and many such professors apparently also believe that any efforts to teach
values likely stem from questionable ulterior motives.
448. One could, of course, justify teaching a particular set of professional values on purely instru-
mental grounds: espouse and act according to these values or you will lose your license and, perhaps, go
to jail. This sounds, however, suspiciously like the sort of instrumental, self-interested approach to rule-
based legal ethics that the authors wish to reject. See supra notes 298-305 and accompanying text. For
further discussion of the close links between emotivism and instrumentalism, see infra Part V.C.6.
449. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 135. See Cramton, supra note 182, at 256 ("The law
teacher typically avoids explicit discussion of values in order to avoid 'preaching' or 'indoctrination."').
450. As Allan Bloom has argued, "[s]ince values are not rational and not grounded in the natures
of those subject to them, they must be imposed. They must defeat opposing values. Rational persuasion
cannot make them believed, so struggle is necessary." BLoOM, supra note 15, at 201. See MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 12 (agreement on moral questions can be achieved, "if at all, by
producing certain non-rational effects on the emotions or attitudes of those who disagree with one.").
451. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 136.
452. Id. The authors' rhetorical choice of the term "perception" seems subtly to denigrate the
emotivist position. At the same time, however, it seems to adopt or at least to presuppose the fundamen-
tal emotivist contention that evaluative judgments are merely matters of subjective, personal perception
rather than objective, impersonal, rationally ascertainable truth.
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Perhaps in order to deflect attention from the fundamental challenge
posed by the emotivist framework, the authors try to shift the discussion
from the question of whether it is proper to teach values to the question of
whether it is possible to teach values:
[i]n contrast to this kind of skepticism on the part of some
faculty and students about the effectiveness and legitimacy of
efforts to foster ethical development in law school, the legal
profession, as represented by the American Bar Association, has
acknowledged both the potential of law schools to contribute to
professional responsibility and ethics and the importance of these
educational goals.453
By invoking the authority of the ABA to dispel or disparage the concerns
raised by the emotivists about the propriety of teaching values, the authors
tacitly seem to concede that they do not have a rationally persuasive
response to those concerns.454 Instead, they focus on whether in fact law
schools have the "potential" to "contribute to professional responsibility and
ethics," i.e., whether law schools can in fact teach values.455
A key factor mediating the relationship between individuals' ideals
and their actual conduct is their sense of moral identity-the moral
values, goals, and feelings that are central to their sense of who they
are. Like moral judgment, moral identity is not established once
and for all in childhood. It can be transformed quite dramatically in
adulthood when individuals encounter conditions that are conducive
to further growth. A number of studies have shown that moral
identity and ethical commitment can change quite dramatically well
into adulthood .... 456
453. Id. The authors clearly are correct about the general position of the ABA. See, e.g.,
MACCRATE REPORT, supra note 255, at 140-41. Whether the legal profession actually is "represented"
by the ABA is, perhaps, an open question.
454. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 136. The authors' "argument" here is similar to the
one that a child's mother might make when the child asks why she should do what her father told her to
do. Id. The mother might reply "because he's your father." It is worth noting that by wielding the
authority of the ABA to stave off criticism instead of offering a rationally persuasive argument to sup-
port their position, the authors seem to illustrate the forensic approach that Bloom and Macintyre ascribe
to the emotivist, i.e., the authors attempt to override the values and views of people who may disagree
with them and impose their own values and views by invoking the power or dominant position of the
ABA. See supra note 450.
455. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 136.
456. Id. at 134-35. It is noteworthy that in the final two sentences of this quotation, the authors
appear to equate "change" of "moral identity and ethical commitment" with moral or ethical "growth."
The emotivist could, of course, concede that a person's ethical commitments may change without con-
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If "moral identity and ethical commitment can change," then surely it must
be possible for law school to cause or promote such change. 45  And the
evidence appears to support this conclusion:
Overall, . . . the research makes quite clear that higher education
can promote the development of more mature moral thinking, that
specially designed courses in professional responsibility and legal
ethics do support that development, but that unless they make an
explicit effort to do so, law schools do not contribute to greater
sophistication in the moral judgment of most students.458
The problem with this argument should be obvious: it begs the key question
raised by emotivism. The emotivist can and probably would concede that a
person's values can change over time and that outside influences, including
professional training, can change those values. Indeed, many emotivist law
professors would not be so concerned about "indoctrination" if they did not
already believe that a law professor could alter a law student's values
through the educational process. The hard question posed by the
emotivist-the question that shadows the entire discussion of professional
purposes or values and thus shadows the third apprenticeship-is whether in
fact there is or could be any justification for teaching a particular set of
values, given that-by hypothesis-all values ultimately reflect no more
than the personal preferences, attitudes, and feelings of their holders.
The authors of the Carnegie Report often describe their own views in
terms that appear to reflect the emotivist framework. According to the
authors, individuals have a "sense of moral identity-the moral values,
goals, and feelings that are central to their sense of who they are."4 s9 The
authors appear to emphasize the individual's values, the individual's goals
and the individual's feelings, or at least that subset of those feelings that the
individual would characterize as "moral," perhaps in contradistinction to her
aesthetic values, goals, and feelings. This emphasis on the individual's
ceding that such change reflects some kind of "growth" to a demonstrably superior ethical stance or
outlook.
457. See id.
458. Id. at 134. Again, the authors appear to equate change with growth or improvement by
smuggling in the assertion that the student's newly adopted-or imposed-values and ethical outlook
are or may be more "mature" or "sophisticated" than the values and outlook that the student held before
ethical education. As previously noted, see supra note 456, this suggestion that change, or some form of
change, reflects improvement-maturation and greater sophistication-ignores the fundamental chal-
lenge posed by the emotivist claim that all values are created equal. The claim that some value judg-
ments are more mature or sophisticated than others is itself value laden. The consistent emotivist could
acknowledge only that the student's new values and outlook are different, but not that they are more
mature, sophisticated, or in any sense better.
459. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 134.
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moral values, goals, and feelings appears to reflect, or at least jibe with, the
emotivist view that "all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling," because preferences,
attitudes, and feelings are subjective states of individuals." As if to
underline the point that individual subjectivity is what counts in their moral
analysis, the authors focus not on a person's moral identity per se but on a
person's "sense of moral identity." My identity in fact might be that of a
Thomist or a Kantian or a Hedonist, based on what I say and do. But my
"sense" of my identity seems to be entirely subjective, emphasizing my
impressions or feelings about my Thomism, my Kantianism, or my
Hedonism. Indeed, my "sense" of my moral identity could vary
dramatically from my actual moral identity. I could feel that I am a Kantian
but in fact (i.e., in word and deed) be a Thomist or a Hedonist. An
emotivist should welcome the authors' emphasis on the individual's
subjective "sense of moral identity" because that emphasis allows the
authors to avoid a potential dispute with emotivism over whether the moral
judgments and beliefs comprising the individual's actual moral identity
could and should be objectively valid and true rather than silly, false, or
even pernicious.
If we look closely at the moral vocabulary of the Carnegie Report, we
see that the authors repeatedly use the terms "value" and "values" to
characterize moral or ethical beliefs or positions.462  Allan Bloom has
argued that this use of the terms "value" and "values" emerged when
Friedrich Nietzsche, Max Weber, and others rejected the view that reason
could resolve disputes about moral judgments and beliefs.4 63 "The term
'value,"' observes Bloom, "mean[s] the radical subjectivity of all belief
about good and evil . . . .'" One could say that the reduction of moral
truths to personal values is a central tenet of emotivism. As if illustrating
Bloom's point, the authors of the Carnegie Report suggest that students, as
part of the third apprenticeship, should have "experience with people who
exemplify distasteful values."" 5  This statement implies that, for the
460. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12; see supra note 438 and accompany-
ing text.
461. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 134.
462. See id. at 7, 24, 28, 81, 132, 134, 194, 196.
463. BLoOM, supra note 15, at 194-217. Weber famously declared that "ultimate" problems of
value lie beyond the "limits of science." See MAx WEBER, Science As A Vocation, in FROM MAX
WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLoGY 129, 151 (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. and trans., 1946). For a
discussion of Weber's indebtedness to Nietzsche, see Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra
note 438, at 126.
464. BLOOM, supra note 15, at 142.
465. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 157.
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authors, some values are tasteful and others distasteful, but all judgments
about values ultimately must be matters of taste. And of course, de gustibus
non est disputandum, there is no disputing about taste.466 Had the authors
instead observed that students should have experience with people who
exemplify false, invalid, or even unacceptable moral beliefs, the authors at
least implicitly would have placed themselves at odds with emotivism.
The authors might respond that their repeated use of the terms "value"
and "values" is not intended to prejudge the outcome of a debate about
whether one can weigh moral or ethical beliefs through a process of
objective, rational debate and find such beliefs adequate or inadequate, valid
or invalid, rationally justified or not. Rather, their use of the terms "value"
and "values" reflects the undeniable fact that different people have different
moral beliefs.6 One person thinks abortion is a form of murder and thus
immoral. Another does not. One person thinks that the death penalty is
murder and thus immoral. Another does not. The terms "value" and
"values" give us a language in which to describe these moral disagreements.
We could say that one person "values" the life of the person on death row as
highly as the life of a person walking down the street and thus believes that
any intentional taking of that life would be murder. Another person might
not value the life of a person on death row in the same way. This person's
values differ from that person's values. The authors themselves at one point
contrast "individualistic values" such as financial success with other values
such as "social significance" or "social purpose and meaning. "8 By
referring to these competing moral positions as "values," the authors might
say, they do not intend to prejudge the question of whether one position
might be true, valid, or rationally defensible and the other not. They simply
describe a disagreement.
This response has merit. The authors do not commit themselves
irrevocably to an emotivist position simply by using the terms "value" and
"values" to characterize moral and ethical positions or beliefs.
Nevertheless, the emotivist understanding of the terms "value" and "values"
does apparently underlie the views of the "many faculty" who, according to
the authors themselves, believe that "ethical and social values are subjective
and indeterminate . . . ."46 Moreover, if the authors concede-or insist-
that their use of the terms "value" and "values" is purely descriptive, then
they also must admit that the statement "X values A" describes a state of
affairs about X but it does not in and of itself give Y a reason to value A.
466. Trump v. Chicago Tribune Co., 616 F. Supp. 1434, 1438 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
467. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 150.
468. Id.
469. Id. at 133.
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Before Y will value A, Y needs either a reason to value what X values or an
independent reason to value A. If the authors want the reader to value what
the authors value in the field of legal education, the authors owe the reader a
reasoned argument for adopting the particular values that the authors prefer.
The authors do not provide such a reasoned argument or an account of how
one might provide such an argument. 4 70 And again, it should be noted that
according to the authors, "many faculty"-the emotivists-apparently
contend that such a reasoned argument is not possible precisely because
values are subjective and indeterminate.47' Thus, the authors may be able to
parry my suggestion that their repeated use of the terms "value" and
"values" betrays a closet emotivism, but they can do so only at the cost of
recognizing that their account of values is purely descriptive and therefore
of no persuasive force to someone who seeks a sufficient reason, or even a
good reason, to adopt the authors' values.472 As Bloom noted, words such
as "values," whether used by the emotivists or the authors, "are not reasons,
nor were they intended to be reasons. All to the contrary, they were meant
to show that our deep human need to know what we are doing and to be
good cannot be satisfied."4 73
This discussion of emotivism has potentially dire implications for the
central teleological framework of the Carnegie Report. If the emotivist is
correct that all moral judgments reflect nothing more than personal
preferences, attitudes, and feelings, then any set of professional values and
purposes taught to law students during the third apprenticeship also
ultimately will reflect nothing but someone's personal preferences,
attitudes, and feelings.7 As I observed in an earlier discussion of
emotivism,
[o]nce one rejects the view that there is a telos or end that we all
share qua human beings, a telos or end about which we can make
factual claims potentially subject to rational public debate and
resolution, it appears to follow that all accounts of theh human end
are actually accounts of private ends and desires pursued by
particular human beings or groups. 475
470. See generally id.
471. Id. at 133.
472. See supra notes 448-501 and accompanying text for use of the word value and the description
given.
473. BLOOM, supra note 15, at 238.
474. See supra notes 438-43 and accompanying text.
475. Kightlinger, The Gathering Twilight?, supra note 145, at 359.
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This could explain why the authors become so vague when they allude to
the purpose(s) of the legal profession that should form the core of what is
taught in the third, ethical-social apprenticeship. 476 For an emotivist, any
claim about the purpose(s) of the profession will conceal or camouflage an
assertion of the preferences, attitudes, and feelings of a particular person or
group. The third apprenticeship cannot have a moral or ethical core because
morality and ethics are matters of subjective personal preference. There
simply is no moral or ethical core to be had-for legal education, for the
legal profession, or for any other area of life. Moreover, all teleological
ethical accounts of legal education must ultimately be ungrounded
teleological accounts because there can be no persuasive justification for the
telos or teloi for human activities such as legal education. Any such telos or
alleged telos will reflect nothing more than some person's or group's non-
rational preferences, feelings, and attitudes. Thus, emotivism appears to
provide both an account of moral judgments and an account of where and
why other accounts such as the teleological framework should fail. To
avoid emotivism in the context of legal education, one would need a
rationally persuasive account of the foundation or basis for asserting that
there is a coherent, unifying purpose or telos for the legal profession, a
purpose or telos that can be taught to law students.47 As discussed in Part
IV.B, infra, the authors provide hints about such a foundation or basis in the
notion of a contract between society and the legal profession.4 78
Before turning to the authors' discussion of social contracts, however, it
is important to point out that the emotivist framework is not above criticism.
As Alasdair MacIntyre has shown, emotivism in its endemic modem form
arose from the failure of moral theories developed during and after the
Enlightenment to offer an adequate explanation of why human beings
should obey moral precepts.479 A wide range of very clever people-e.g.,
Denis Diderot, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Adam Smith, Jeremy
Bentham, and John Stuart Mill-attempted but failed to solve this
fundamental problem.480  Emotivism emerged from this failure in part
because emotivism purports to explain why the problem cannot be solved.
There is no rational justification for obeying moral precepts or judgments
because moral precepts and judgments reflect nothing more than personal
preference, attitude, and feeling. There is, in other words, no further or
476. See supra notes 383-402 and accompanying text.
477. For further discussion of this point, see infra Part V.C.6(a).
478. See infra note 489 and accompanying text.
479. See Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra note 438, at 119-21.
480. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145 at 40-50 (reviewing the work of Diderot, Hume,
Kant, and Smith), 62-64 (appraising Bentham and Mill).
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additional theoretical justification that philosophers might discover for
obeying moral judgments and precepts.
As noted above, Friedrich Nietzsche was perhaps the first thinker to
recognize and come to grips with the emotivist implications of the failure of
Enlightenment moral theories. 4 8 1 Allan Bloom observed that "[flor
Nietzsche this was an unparalleled catastrophe; it meant the decomposition
of culture and the loss of human aspiration.... In short, Nietzsche with the
utmost gravity told modem man that he was free-falling in the abyss of
nihilism."4 82  If, as Nietzsche teaches, nihilism means or entails that
"everything is permitted," then emotivism implies a moral anarchy in which
the judgments of Mother Theresa, Mohandas Gandhi, and Nelson Mandela
have no more weight or validity than those of the mythical Procrustes and
the very non-mythical Joseph Stalin, Adolph Hitler, and Pol Pot.483 Many
of us will find troubling a moral theory that cannot provide us with good
reasons to reject the view that it is okay to exterminate Kulaks, Jews, and/or
recalcitrant Cambodians.4 Unfortunately, by showing that emotivism
places the moral judgments and beliefs of Nelson Mandela on the same
level or footing as those of Adolph Hitler, we do not disprove emotivism or
stave off the nihilism about which Nietzsche warned. The emotivist would
say that we succeed only in showing that some of us find some of
emotivism's implications (to use the authors' term) "distasteful."4ss As
discussed in Part V.C.6, it will be necessary to develop a more robust
response to emotivism if we wish to provide the Carnegie Report's analysis
and recommendations with a secure intellectual grounding.486
B. A Half-Hearted Response? The Contractarian Framework
If the teleological framework provides the primary organizing structure
for the account of legal education in the Carnegie Report, and the emotivist
framework is the teleological framework's shadow, then the third
framework, which I call contractarian, appears only in the form of a trace or
481. See supra note 442 and accompanying text.
482. BLOOM, supra note 15, at 143.
483. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY OF MORALS 150 (Walter Kaufman trans., 1969).
484. The emotivist might retort that emotivism teaches us that there is no justification other than
mere personal preference for the moral judgments of Messrs. Stalin, Hitler, and Pot. Thus, although
emotivism cannot provide a basis other than personal preference for condemning their judgments, it also
provides no rational basis whatsoever for supporting those judgments. If one finds some solace in the
thought that Hitler's moral judgments about exterminating European Jewry are no more persuasive than
one's own, then one no doubt would be satisfied with this emotivist response.
485. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 157.
486. See infra Part V.C.6.
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perhaps a palimpsest.4 87 According to the contractarian framework, the
legal profession must serve certain purposes and perform certain functions
because of a contract between the profession and society.488 As the authors
state this point:
[p]rofessions operate within an explicit contract with society as
a whole. In exchange for privileges such as monopoly on the ability
to practice in specific fields, professions agree to provide certain
important services. In exchange for the privilege of setting
standards for admission and authorizing practice, professions are
legally obliged to discipline their own ranks for the public welfare.
The basis of these contracts is a set of common goals shared by the
public for which different professions take responsibility. For
example, medicine, nursing, and public health are chartered for the
maintenance and improvement of society's health, just as education
exists to promote the goal of an educated citizenry, law to regulate
social transactions and secure justice, and engineering to develop
technologies for the improvement of life. These are public values,
and the core of professional privilege is based on the professions'
willingness to commit to them.489
This ethical framework is contractarian because it rests on a claim that there
is a contract of some sort between the legal profession and society."* This
contractarian framework is ethical because it rests on a claim that the
contract in question obligates the legal profession to take responsibility for
certain "common goals" or "public values," and in particular that the
profession's task is "to regulate social transactions and secure justice."49
The authors referred to this same task in their brief comments on the
purposes of the legal profession that students should learn during the third
apprenticeship.492 This verbal link between the authors' account of the
contractarian framework and their comments about the purposes of the legal
profession is not accidental.493 As I show in the following discussion, the
contract between the profession and society serves, or purports to serve, as a
"moral basis" or ground for the telos or teloi of the profession found in and
487. See SULUVAN, WORK AND INTEGRrrY, supra note 177, at 54.
488. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
489. Id.
490. See id.
491. Id. at 133.
492. See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
493. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54, 132-33.
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required by the teleological framework. 494  The contractarian framework
thus converts, or purports to convert, the Carnegie Report's ungrounded
teleological framework into a grounded teleological framework and
provides, or purports to provide, a moral basis or ground for the teloi taught
during the third apprenticeship.495 As previously explained, those teloi in
turn are supposed to supply the unifying, coherent rationale for the first and
second apprenticeships.
I refer to the contractarian framework as a trace or palimpsest because
the authors say very little about it in the Carnegie Report.49 7 The only other
comment about the contractarian framework that I have found provides
some indication of what they mean when they claim that the legal
profession has a contract with society that somehow obligates the profession
(as one would expect from a contract) to perform certain services or
functions in exchange for certain privileges. According to the authors,
the social contract between the profession and society [is] embodied
in the terms of licensing and the code of ethics by which the
profession declares its intent to regulate its own life in order to
maintain the trust and cooperation of the public. But codes and
contracts, as every lawyer knows, rely, in the end, on the good faith
of the parties.498
Thus, when the authors refer to the "social contract," they seem to be
alluding to our state-imposed system of licenses to practice law as well as to
ethical requirements for practitioners drawn up by lawyers and administered
by lawyers on behalf of and at the behest of the state.499 I am licensed to
practice law in the District of Columbia and I am subject to the District's
rules of legal ethics as well as to the requirements imposed on lawyers by
any state in which I might happen to practice. The authors apparently
would describe as contractual my relationship(s) and the relationship(s) of
other lawyers with our respective state bars and with society as a whole.500
494. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 54. For further discussion of Sulli-
van's use of the phrase "moral basis," see infra note 543 and accompanying text.
495. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28-30.
496. See supra notes 365-75 and accompanying text.
497. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
498. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30. As discussed infra at notes 559-63, every lawyer
also knows that contracts generally rely on the presence of a legal regime for their enforcement, a legal
regime that is conspicuously absent in the case of the alleged social contract between the legal profession
and society.
499. Compare SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 181, at 54.
500. See id. at 63.
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It is tempting to react to this contractarian argument the way Justice
Holmes reacted to an argument proposed by the plaintiffs in error in a 1915
case, saying "it [i]s hard to believe that the proposition was seriously
made."s'o Despite the paucity of references in the Carnegie Report to the
supposed social contract between the legal profession and society, however,
there is persuasive evidence from another source that the authors take the
contractarian argument seriously. In Work and Integrity, the companion
volume to the Carnegie Report,so2 William Sullivan explicitly refers to and
comments on the alleged social contract or social compact at least fourteen
times.50 3 It is, of course, impossible to be certain why Sullivan discusses the
social contract so frequently in the Carnegie Foundation study that he wrote
alone and so infrequently in the related study that he co-authored. Perhaps
it is because his co-authors in the Carnegie Report found arguments based
on the alleged social contract unpersuasive. After all, one of the co-authors
of the Report, Judith Welch Wegner, is an attorney and law professor who
undoubtedly would have some familiarity with contract law and contract
arguments.s" Perhaps she found that arguments based on a social contract
were not credible. On the other hand, the Carnegie Report does expressly
mention the contractarian argument at least twice. 50 Perhaps the co-authors
of the Report believed that Sullivan had dealt sufficiently with the topic in
Work and Integrity-the first of the Carnegie Foundation's "series of
reports on professional education"'5 -and, therefore, the co-authors chose
not to rehash the points that Sullivan already had made. The latter view
seems the more persuasive because it takes seriously the references to a
social contract in the Report instead of treating them as editing or
proofreading mistakes. Thus, it makes sense to consider whether Sullivan's
comments in Work and Integrity about the social contract clarify and,
perhaps, substantiate the brief remarks found in the Carnegie Report.' 7o
As an initial point, it seems clear that the basic account of the social
contract in Work and Integrity is the same as that found in the Carnegie
Report. In the former, Sullivan writes:
501. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
502. For a discussion of the relationship between the Carnegie Report and Work and Integrity, see
supra note 176.
503. SuLLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRTY, supra note 177, at 2, 3, 23, 29, 37, 39, 40, 54, 63, 68, 96,
196, 279, 289.
504. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at ix-x. Professor Wegner's legal specialties are land
use, property law, legislation, and local government. Judith Welch Wegner, UNIV. OF N.C. SCHOOL OF
LAw, http://www.law.unc.edu/faculty/directory/wegneijudithwelch/ (last visited September 15, 2012).
505. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21, 30.
506. Id. at 15.
507. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21, 30; SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY,
supra note 177, at 2, 3, 23, 29, 37, 39, 40, 54, 63, 68, 96, 196, 279, 289.
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[1]aw and medicine, in particular, have long been prestigious
occupations, and lawyers and doctors have long served as
community leaders as well as experts in their specialized domains.
But they have held such positions of honor on the basis of a social
contract with the public they serve.
This contract is at the core of professionalism. Not only
medicine and law but fields such as engineering, architecture,
accounting, the clergy, nursing, and teaching operate within explicit
legal regulation. In exchange, professions have received authority
to control entry into their domains and key aspects of how they do
their work.sos
Under the supposed social contract, therefore, members of the profession
suffer the quid of "explicit legal regulation" in exchange for the quo of
prestige, honor, and control over entry into and practice of the profession. 509
Legal professionals "are legally obliged to maintain standards, even to
discipline their own ranks, for the public welfare."5 0  According to
Sullivan, "[p]rofessions are collegial organizations that carry a grant of
public privilege and responsibility in exchange for accountability to the
public.",51  Although one might quarrel with Sullivan's characterization of
this arrangement as a "contract,"51 social or otherwise, his basic description
of the factual situation seems uncontroversial-lawyers do enjoy a certain
social status and power in U.S. society513 and lawyers are subject to various
ethical and professional obligations.514
508. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 2.
509. Id. Sullivan also indicates at one point that the social contract reflects or incorporates not
only statutory obligations imposed on the profession but also terms or obligations imposed by "custom."
Id. at 4, 23. Sullivan makes nothing of this potentially important point, which I expect to discuss in a
later publication.
510. Id. at 4.
511. Id. at 63. In a review of the literature on legal professionalism between 1925 and 1960,
Solomon observes that some have described the privileges the bar enjoys "as a bargain between the bar
and the state in which the bar is granted professional autonomy in exchange for dissociating itself from
the commercial market and from partisan politics." Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The
Concept of Legal Professionalism, 1925-1960, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL PROFESSION 144, 153 (Robert L. Nelson, David M.
Trubek & Rayman L. Solomon eds., 1992). This seems to be a rather different social contract from the
one described by Sullivan, who does not mention the public's alleged interest in dissociating the bar
from partisan politics. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 98. Indeed, Sullivan's
comments in support of civic professionalism appear to advocate a more partisan, "progressive" political
stance for the bar. See infra note 528 and accompanying text.
512. For comments on this issue, see infra note 547.
513. It is not entirely clear how one would substantiate such an obvious point. If we assume that
wages are a proxy for status and power, we could show that, in May 2010, the mean wage for all occupa-
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Sullivan's argument becomes tendentious, however, when he seeks to
expand the scope of the quid that lawyers allegedly exchange for the quo of
prestige and self-regulation beyond the well-established ethical and
professional obligations imposed on lawyers by state bars:
[t]he core of professionalism is that by functioning as lawyer,
engineer, doctor, accountant, architect, teacher, or nurse, an
individual carries on a public undertaking and affirms public values.
With this identity comes a certain public status and authority, as is
granted by custom and the profession's social contract; but
professionalism also means duties to the public. Chief among these
duties is the demand that a professional work in such a way that the
tions in the United States-$45,676-was only about forty percent of the mean wage for law-
yers- $112,110. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Full-Time Civilian Workers: Mean and Median Hour-
ly, Weekly, and Annual Earnings and Mean Weekly and Annual Hours, in NATIONAL COMPENSATION
SURVEY: OCCUPATIONAL EARNINGS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2010 3-1 tbl.3 (May 2011), available at
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ncswage2010.pdf. If we assume that political office is a proxy for status and
power, we can point out that, at the time this was written, the U.S. President, Vice President, and Secre-
tary of State are lawyers. President Barack Obama, THE WHITE HOUSE,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/president-obama (last visited October 8, 2012) (President
Obama was the first African-American president of the Harvard Law Review); Vice President Joe Biden,
THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/vice-president-biden (last visited Octo-
ber 8, 2012) (Vice President Biden attended Syracuse Law School); Hillary Rodham Clinton, THE
WHrTE HousE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/aboutlfirst-ladies/hillaryclinton (last visited October 8, 2012)
(Secretary of State Clinton attended Yale Law School). Indeed, more than half of U.S. Presidents have
been lawyers. See Marcia S. Krieger, A Twenty-First Century Ethos for the Legal Profession: Why
Bother, 86 DENV. U. L. REv. 865, 875 (2009). In addition, the current Majority and Minority Leaders of
the U.S. Senate are lawyers. About Harry Reid, Biography, SENATOR HARRY REID,
http://www.reid.senate.gov/aboutlindex.cfn (last visited October 8, 2012) (Senate Majority Leader Reid
attended George Washington University School of Law); Mitch McConnell: Biography, U.S. SENATE
REPUBLICAN LEADER MITCH MCCONNELL
http://www.mcconnell.senate.gov/public/index.cftn?p-Biography (last visited October 8, 2012) (Senate
Minority Leader McConnell attended University of Kentucky College of Law). Closer to my home, the
Governor of Kentucky and two of the last three mayors of Lexington, Kentucky, were or are lawyers.
About Governor Steve Beshear, OFFICE OF KENTUCKY GOVERNOR STEVE BESHEAR,
http://govemor.ky.gov/about/Pages/default.aspx (last visited October 8, 2012) (Kentucky Governor
Beshear attended University of Kentucky College of Law); Jim Newberry, attorney, former Lexington
mayor, joins GC as General Counsel and Special Assistant to the President, GEORGETOWN COLLEGE
(May 24, 2012), http://www.georgetowncollege.edulnews/2012/05/jim-newberry-attomey-former-
lexington-mayor-joins-gc-as-general-counsel-and-special-assistant-to-the-president/ (Lexington Mayor
Newberry attended University of Kentucky College of Law); Katherine Yeakel, Leading Lexington,
TRANSYLVANIA UNIVERSITY MAGAZINE, 12, 13, Spring 2003, available at
http://www.transy.edu/magazine/pdf/spring03.pdf (Lexington Mayor Isaac attended University of Ken-
tucky College of Law). The relatively high status of lawyers in U.S. society is not new. As far back as
1831, Alexis de Tocqueville famously observed that in the United States, "lawyers ... form the highest
political class and the most cultivated portion of society. . .. If I were asked where I place the American
aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation that. . . it occupies the judicial bench and the bar." ALEXIS
DE TOCQUEVLLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 288 (1960).
514. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 299, Preamble 9.
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outcome of the work contributes to the public value for which the
profession stands.s"s
Here, Sullivan seems to be suggesting that the social contract obligates the
lawyer not only to develop and comply with standards of professional
responsibility that protect the public from misbehavior by lawyers but also
to pursue a "public undertaking" in which the lawyer affirms "public
values" and, in particular, "the public value for which the profession
stands." 16  In a similar vein, Sullivan elsewhere describes the "social
compact [as] one requiring that, in exchange for their elevated status and a
regulated market for their services that ensures a good livelihood,
professionals demonstrate civic responsibility and even community
leadership." 17 Sullivan's position is consistent with the statement quoted
above from the Carnegie Report that the legal profession agrees by contract
to pursue one of society's "common goals," namely "to regulate social
transactions and secure justice." 18 Indeed, in Work and Integrity Sullivan
identifies "civil regulation and social justice" as among the "key public
values" for which "[tihe professions have become responsible."s" He does
not specifically assert that lawyers are responsible for civil regulation and
social justice but it seems likely that that was his point. Under a contract
with society, lawyers pursue civil regulation and social justice while doctors
pursue health and teachers pursue education.
By adding responsibility for civil regulation and social justice to the list
of quids that lawyers allegedly exchange for the quo of social status and
self-regulatory power, Sullivan raises important and difficult questions that
he and his co-authors do not attempt to address. As remarked above, no one
would deny that lawyers are subject to rules of legal ethics and professional
responsibility.5 20 One only need point to the various codes of professional
responsibility5 2' and the many disciplinary cases5 22 applying those codes to
515. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 23.
516. See id.
517. Id. at 68. Rayman Solomon has provided a somewhat less tendentious description of the quid
that lawyers offer- "the bar provides competence and access to legal services to the public, but refrains
from partisan politics, and avoids the excesses of the market." Solomon, supra note 511, at 171. Provid-
ing competence and access to legal services appear to be much less ambitious commitments than assum-
ing responsibility for civil regulation and social justice. See id.
518. See supra note 489 and accompanying text.
519. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 4.
520. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30; see, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 299, Preamble
9.
521. See, e.g., D.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2006), available at
http1/www.dcbar.org/forlawyers/ethics/legal ethics/rules-of professional conduct/amended rules/ind
ex.cfin.
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support this claim. To my knowledge, however, there are no equivalent
codes or cases that require attorneys to assume responsibility for civil
regulation and social justice.523 Many attorneys do, of course, assume
responsibility for civil regulation by, for example, drafting contracts, wills,
and deeds, creating partnerships and corporations, and filing civil litigation.
And many attorneys also pursue, or say they pursue, some version of social
justice.5 24  But Sullivan and his co-authors cite no evidence that attorneys
perform these many functions and services because they are or believe
themselves to be obligated to do so by a social contract-the key claim of
the contractarian framework.5 2 5
Sullivan's own account of professionalism betrays his uncertainty about
the claim that lawyers today have in fact assumed some kind of contractual
obligation to take responsibility for social justice or any other public
value.526  As he remarks, the view that membership in a profession ma
entail "public responsibility" emerged within the last 120 years or so.s
Sullivan links professionalism and public responsibility under the rubric of
civic professionalism, an idea or ideal that developed during the Progressive
era.528 Sullivan observes that the 1890s were "professionalism's heroic age,
when it came forward as a new American moral ideal."529 Sullivan also
appears, however, to agree with the results of a study by Steven Brint who
found, among other things, that "there has been a long-term movement
away from an earlier conception of professionalism as 'social trusteeship,"'
i.e., away from the conception of civic professionalism that Sullivan
522. See, e.g., Opinions of the D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Committee, D.C. BAR,
http://www.dcbar.org/for lawyers/ethics/legal ethics/opinions.cfm (last visited September 15, 2012).
523. The Preamble to the Model Rules states that "[a] lawyer is a representative of clients, an
officer of the legal system and a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice."
MODEL RULEs, supra note 299, Preamble 9. It is noteworthy, however, that this descriptive language
occurs in the Preamble and not among the operative provisions of the Model Rules as a requirement. See
generally id.
524. Michael S. Greco, President-Elect, A.B.A. Remarks to the Fellows of the Alabama Law
Foundation Annual Dinner at Capital City Club, Montgomery, Ala. (Jan. 28, 2005), in 66 ALA. LAW.
183, 183 (2005) ("The ideal of true social justice is one that lawyers strive for each day.").
525. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21, 30.
526. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 3-4.
527. Id. at 3.
528. Id. at 98 ("Professionals and their aspirations would be central to Progressivism. In the
ensuing debates and struggles, some influential members of the new professional class would develop a
conception of professionalism . . . designed to complement and strengthen a new civic politics. We will
call this development civic professionalism."). According to one student of the period, "the Progressive
movement ... extended from about 1900 to 1914. . . ." RIcHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM:
FROM BRYAN TO F. D. R. 3 (1955). For a discussion of "civic professionalism" as a source of profes-
sional purposes, see supra notes 404-15 and accompanying text.
529. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 85 (emphasis added). Solomon de-
scribed "the last quarter of the nineteenth century, as ... the 'take-off period of professionalization in
the United States." Solomon, supra note 511, at 150.
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supports.530  Thus, by Sullivan's own account, the 1890s and early 1900s
represented the high point of civic professionalism, which went downhill
from then on.5 '
Sullivan does not even discuss evidence suggesting that many lawyers
did not share the civic professional ideal by the first decade of the twentieth
century, i.e., immediately after "professionalism's heroic age."S32 For
example, in a 1906 address to the Legal Education Section of the ABA,
William Draper Lewis, the first full-time Dean at the University of
Pennsylvania Law School, stated that,
our failure as a profession to perform what I have designated our
public duties is due principally, not to external conditions, but to a
total absence of any idea that there exists any obligation on the part
of the Bar toward the community. As a profession we lack any idea
of responsibility which cannot be classified as a duty toward a
court, a client, or a fellow-lawyer. Lawyers have as a rule a real
sense of a duty toward clients, but little or no sense whatever of any
duty toward the community as a whole for the better administration
ofjustice.533
If Lewis described his era correctly, then in the final years of
professionalism's allegedly heroic age, most lawyers had no inkling that the
bar might bear any civic duties or responsibilities. 534 To summarize, then,
the contractarian view of the legal professional's obligation to pursue civic
or public values is a bit over 120 years old and it has been in steep decline
530. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 9. Rayman Solomon seems to confirm
Brint's conclusion that there has been a long-term movement away from some earlier professional ide-
als. In a review of writings and speeches by bar leaders from 1925 to 1960, he found that "bar elites
enunciated the extreme urgency of reestablishing conformance with the norms of professionalism to
justify their privileges." Solomon, supra note 511, at 171-72. It would not have been necessary to
"reestablish[] conformance" if the profession had continued to adhere to the earlier norms. See id. This
leaves open the question whether the profession ever actually adhered to the earlier norms and whether
those earlier norms were ever anything more than the mindset of a particular group of lawyers at a par-
ticular point in history.
531. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 85.
532. See id.
533. William Draper Lewis, Legal Education and the Failure of the Bar to Perform Its Duties, 54
AM. L. REG. 629, 636 (1906). As should be clear from the passage quoted, Lewis was calling for a new
emphasis on the lawyer's public duties and responsibilities. See id. But in so doing, he expressly
acknowledged that the profession of his time did not generally recognize such duties and responsibilities.
See id. (noting "the almost total absence of any conception that we have any duties of this character...
."). Foreshadowing the argument found one hundred years later in the Carnegie Report, Lewis ascribes
the profession's failure to recognize its supposed public duties to "defects in our legal education." Id.
534. See Auerbach, supra note 31, at 601. Auerbach has shown that the bar's understanding of
itself-or lack of understanding of itself--as a public profession did not change significantly by the
early 1920s. See id. ("Lawyers still belonged to a profession in search of itself.").
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for much, if not all, of that time. One might be forgiven for asking how
long and significant the period was during which the contractarian view and
the related ideal of civic professionalism actually flourished.
Sullivan appears to recognize that today the contractarian framework is,
if not dead, then moribund and in need of resurrection or resuscitation:
At a moment when the unregulated cash nexus of the market
threatens to implode upon the social order it should serve, the
reinvigoration and institutionalization of the ideals of integrity of
function and public responsibility that professionalism represents
would fill an essential need.
We need a new professionalism adequate to the changed
circumstances of American life. The first step toward this
reinvention of professionalism, however, requires that
professionalism be understood as a public good, a social value, and
not the ideology of some special interest.sas
As if to underline the point that he is calling for a "reinvention" of
professionalism and for something "new," Sullivan repeatedly refers to his
account of the link between professionalism and public goods as an
"ideal."3 For example, he observes that
[t]hrough its inherent logic, civic professionalism proposes an
ideal of self that complements today's social imperative to achieve
a positive outcome to interdependence. . . . Positive
interdependence demands of the individual a high degree of self-
awareness and a major effort to developing one's powers. But it
then demands more. The goal of self-actualization itself must be
transcended (or perhaps better, reoriented) by integrating individual
goals with those of the larger community. The logical fulfillment of
this process is a kind of character for whom what happens to these
535. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRrrY, supra note 177, at 159-60. Sullivan's attack on the "un-
regulated cash nexus of the market" suggests the same discomfort with, if not disdain for, the legal
marketplace that we saw in the discussion of pro bono work as a "vivid enactment of law's professional
identity." See id; see also supra note 322 and accompanying text. Again, it must be observed that a
proposal for reforming legal education is unlikely to succeed if it stems from disdain for the kind of
remunerative work that most lawyers do most of the time.
536. See, e.g., SULLIVAN, WoRK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at I1, 18 (professionalism as an
"ideal of living"), 51, 159.
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larger commitments is as important as what happens to the self, or
DO O537more so.53
Thus, civic professionalism is not only an ideal but an ideal involving the
transformation of human character and, apparently, the transcendence (or
reorientation) of self-interest.s3 s By placing civic professionalism in the
realm of the ideal, if not the realm of fantasy, Sullivan implicitly recognizes
that a lawyer does not have a real obligation-contractual or otherwise-to
take responsibility here and now for such public goods as civil regulation
and social justice. Ideally, a lawyer might assume responsibility for such
"larger commitments" but nothing obligates her to do so. Thus, even if
there were a brief shining moment during which the legal profession entered
a social contract exchanging a commitment to ethical conduct for social
status and self-regulatory power, that social contract either no longer
imposes or never did impose the "ideal" requirement that lawyers pursue a
higher civic purpose or commitment such as social justice.13 9 Perhaps in the
ideal world of the "new professionalism," lawyers would be obligated to
pursue a higher civic purpose, but as Sullivan acknowledges, lawyers do not
live in an ideal world but rather in the market-oriented "cash nexus" of the
old professionalism.i Consequently, it is not surprising that, near the end
of Work and Integrity, Sullivan calls on "professional communities . . . to
recharter their professional social contract."5 41 Sullivan and his co-authors
might wish there were a social contract under which the legal profession
promises to take responsibility for civic goods, but they are forced to
recognize that any such contract would have to be drafted or redrafted and,
one assumes, offered (again?) to members of the profession for their assent
or rejection.
In light of the questions that Sullivan himself seems to raise or suggest
about the Carnegie Report's contractarian ethical framework, it may seem
like beating a dead horse to mention other significant criticisms. It is,
however, important to recall the reason why the contractarian ethical
framework matters to the larger argument of the Carnegie Report and thus
to the analysis presented in this Article. The contractarian framework
apparently is supposed to provide the foundation or basis for claims about
the purpose(s) of the legal profession, the purpose(s) that masters should
537. Id. at 289-90.
5 3 8. Id.
539. See id. (describing the idea of civic professionalism as an "ideal").
540. Id. at 159.
541. Id. at 279.
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inculcate into apprentice lawyers during the third apprenticeship.542  As
Sullivan observes, "in the United States the professions had to struggle for
status in a distinctly American way. They bargained for honor, guaranteed
by legally enforced privileges, in exchange for service and community
trusteeship. This social contract became the moral basis of professionalism
in America, giving American professions a civic orientation."5 43
The social contract, therefore, provides the "moral basis" that the legal
profession needs to sustain and justify its existence.5" The profession must
teach that moral basis to the next generation of professionals and rely on
that moral basis to provide the objective, impersonal rationale or
justification for a coherent, unified program of legal education. If there is
no such social contract, then apparently there is no moral or ethical basis for
legal professionalism, or at least there is no basis to be found in the
Carnegie Report and its sister text, Work and Integrity.54 5 It would follow
that there is no unified, coherent content for the third apprenticeship to teach
and no objective, impersonal rationale for a coherent program of legal
education. In light of the central role that the contractarian framework
apparently plays in the Carnegie Report, it is important to identify, at least
briefly, other salient questions that that framework raises but does not
answer. 546
The first question that the contractarian framework raises but fails to
answer is obvious. Assuming there were a social contract, what would be
its terms? No one is likely to disagree that attorneys obligate themselves to
abide by rules of professional conduct-ethical rules-when they become
members of a bar.547 Beyond that set of requirements, however, what
obligations does the social contract impose? The apparent answer in the
Carnegie Report is that attorneys bear some important responsibility for
civil regulation and social justice.48 Accepting that answer for the sake of
542. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
543. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 54.
544. Id.
545. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1. See generally SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY,
supra note 177.
546. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
547. See generally MODEL RuLEs, supra note 299. It is, of course, open to question whether the
rules of legal ethics to which one becomes subject upon joining the bar reflect contractual obligations.
One might equally well view those ethical rules as conditions on a license to practice law or simply as
legal requirements imposed on bar members by the state. One ordinarily would not refer to speed-limit
laws or laws against driving while intoxicated as contractual obligations to which one assents when
obtaining or renewing a driver's license. Despite these concerns, I assume arguendo in the text that one
can describe a lawyer's obligation to obey the rules of professional ethics as contractual.
548. See supra note 519 and accompanying text. I say this answer is "apparent" because Sullivan
and his co-authors provide a grab bag of possible purposes--including civil regulation and social jus-
tice-for the legal profession in the Carnegie Report. See supra notes 385-402 and accompanying text.
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argument, the obvious next question is what the authors mean by "civil
regulation" and "social justice." 54 9 The authors do not tell us. 550 A contract
that imposes broad, vague obligations of this sort is one with which it is
likely to be either too easy or too hard to comply-too easy because one can
always claim that one has taken some degree of responsibility for civil
regulation and social justice and too hard because one will always be
vulnerable to the charge that one has not done enough or that one somehow
has failed to meet one's responsibilities. According to standard contract-
law doctrine, the terms of a contract generally mean what "a reasonable
person in the position of the other party" would take them to mean.ss5 So
what would a reasonable person in the position of a lawyer agreeing to the
social contract mean by "civil regulation" and "social justice"?552 Needless
to say, the authors remain silent on this crucial point.5 They thus fail to
provide or attempt to provide any content for the obligations that the social
contract allegedly imposes on the legal profession. The contractarian
framework remains an empty bottle into which the authors and the reader
may pour whatever wine they may wish. 554 Moreover, as a leading treatise
on contract law states, "even if the parties intend to contract, if the content
of their agreement is unduly uncertain no contract is formed. . . . The
traditional rule is that if the agreement is not reasonably certain as to its
material terms there is a fatal indefiniteness and the agreement is void."555
One finds, however, no contractarian arguments supporting these other alleged purposes in the Carnegie
Report or Work and Integrity. And the mere fact that the authors themselves cannot seem to decide what
purposes the social contract obligates the legal profession to pursue suggests that the terms of the sup-
posed contract are hopelessly uncertain.
549. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 4.
550. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1. See generally SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY,
supra note 177.
551. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 24 (6th ed. 2009) ("objective
manifestations of intent of the party should generally be viewed from the vantage point of a reasonable
person in the position of the other party.").
552. SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 4
553. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1. See generally SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY,
supra note 177.
554. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21. The emotivist might inteiject that a lawyer is free
to interpolate her personal values or preferences-if any--regarding social justice into the social con-
tract. See Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra note 438 at 12-23; see also AYER, supra
note 438, at 103-20 (for further discussion of emotivism). Thus the social contract would obligate the
lawyer to do whatever she believes or feels to be just. If the authors truly mean to say that the social
contract obligates a lawyer to follow her own personal values and preferences, then it would seem that
something has gone badly wrong with the contractarian argument. The authors probably would be wise
not to call on the emotivists for assistance here.
555. See PERILLO, supra note 551, at 43-44 (citation omitted).
2012] 217
OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
By this traditional standard, the alleged social contract described by the
authors probably would be void as a matter of law. 5 6
A second fundamental problem with the contractarian framework is one
that tends to infect many forms of contractarian theory. The authors of the
Carnegie Report are hardly the first thinkers to claim that some kind of
social contract establishes a set of rights and obligations for persons subject
to that contract.557 Among the most famous early exponents of social-
contract theories were John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.558 Each of
their theories is subject to a potentially damaging objection. As Seyla
Benhabib has observed, "[s]ince the publication of C.B. Macpherson's The
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, it has been a familiar
argument that the models of political obligation and authority put forward
by contractarian thinkers presuppose the institutions of a liberal market
society."55 9 To oversimplify the point somewhat, if there is no pre-existing
social and legal system, then there is no binding contract because a contract
binds only if a social and legal system says it binds. 6 o It seems to follow
that a social contract cannot create, or explain the genesis, of a social and
legal system. The contractarian framework in the Carnegie Report is not
subject to this specific objection because that framework does not purport to
provide the foundation and explanation for political society as a whole.s6'
The contractarian framework is, however, subject to a related objection: if
we assume there is a social contract between the legal profession and
society, what law renders that contract binding? Again, no one ordinarily
would deny that state law makes the rules of professional conduct binding
on attorneys, although some might deny that the relevant state law is the law
of contract.56 2 But what law makes binding the contract that allegedly gives
the legal profession special responsibility for civil regulation and social
justice? If there is a binding contract, it should be possible to identify a
556. See id; see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1; SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra
note 177.
557. See generally Ernest Barker, Introduction to SOCIAL CONTRACT: ESSAYS BY LOCKE, HUME,
AND ROUSSEAU vii (1960).
558. See John Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Origin, Extent and End of Civil Government,
in SOCIAL CONTRACT 1, 56-57 (1960) (1690); Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, in SOCIAL
CONTRACT 167, 179-82 (1960) (1762).
559. Seyla Benhabib, Obligation, Contract and Exchange: On the Significance ofHegel's Ab-
stract Right, in THE STATE AND CIVIL SOCIETY 159, 159 (Z. A. Pelczynski ed., 1984).
560. See id. As the authors of a leading casebook on international law observe, "[a] contract is
valid and enforceable because some national legal system says so." BARRY E. CARTER & ALLEN S.
WEINER, INTERNATONAL LAW 637 (6th ed. 2011). See also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 291-307 (1986) (rules of contract law presuppose a theory of entitle-
ments and, in particular, a theory of alienable rights to property).
561. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
562. See supra note 547.
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body of law that makes that contract binding. Otherwise, the contract-if it
exists at all-would be nothing more than a non-binding, unenforceable
promise or exchange of promises. No law, no contract.
Finally, assuming that there is a contract, that we can identify its terms
with some specificity, and that it is binding under some recognizable body
of law, there remains at least one more significant problem. Sullivan and (I
assume) his co-authors wish to claim that the social contract provides the
"moral basis" for legal professionalism and this claim is crucial to the
overall argument of the Carnegie Report.s" Compliance with a legally
binding contract is, however, a legal obligation, not a moral obligation.565
As one standard introductory text on contract law states,
[t]he most common basis for enforcing promises in the United
States involves the concept of consideration. There is consideration
for a promise if that promise was made for something as a part of a
bargain or deal. . . . The underlying principle is that the promise is
being enforced because the promisee paid a price for that promise.
... [c]ourts in the United States will enforce a promise if it is made
as a part of a bargained exchange for another promise or for the
performance or forbearance of an act.5e
The authors of the Carnegie Report claim that the legal profession promised
to assume certain responsibilities in exchange for status and self-regulatory
authority.56 That was the bargain and the bargain is, by hypothesis,
enforceable. It is enforceable, however, because by hypothesis some body
of law says certain bargains are enforceable and not because the parties are
morally bound to or by the terms of those bargains. In theory, the
contractarian framework might provide a legal and contractual basis for the
563. The authors could, of course, claim that the social contract is binding under some kind of
"higher law," divine, natural, or perhaps dictated by reason itself. Although I am personally sympathetic
to such claims, I suspect that the authors will not persuade most people to recognize the alleged social
contract by invoking a higher law that renders the contract binding. It is generally unwise to support a
questionable claim with an even more questionable claim.
564. See supra note 543 and accompanying text.
565. For a similar argument, see Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra note 438, at
172-73.
566. CLAUDE D. ROHWER & ANTHONY M. SKROCKI, CONTRACTS IN A NUTSHELL 5 (7th ed.
2010); see also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACrS 3 (4' ed. 2004) ("the law of contracts is confined
to promises that the law will enforce. It is therefore concerned primarily with exchanges because ...
courts have generally been unwilling to enforce a promise unless the promisee has given the promisor
something in return for it.").
567. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21; see also SULLIVAN, WORK AND INtEGRITY,
supra note 177, at 4.
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legal profession's supposed obligation to assume responsibility for civil
regulation and social justice but the contractarian framework does not and
cannot provide a "moral" basis. The contractarian framework cannot
account for the "moralness" of the alleged moral basis. One might say that
the contractarian ethical framework, insofar as it relies upon an actual
contract, cannot be ethical.
One can make the same point in a different way by appealing to basic
contract-law doctrine.570 According to Professor Perillo, when assessing the
validity of a contract,
[a]s a general rule the courts do not review the adequacy of the
consideration. The parties make their own bargains. . . . Courts . .
. have believed that it would be an unwarranted interference with
freedom of contract if they were to relieve an adult party from a bad
exchange.57
Courts generally do not, in other words, consider whether what X agrees in
the contract to do for Y is an adequate price to pay for what Y agrees to do
for X.572 Courts generally allow a party to decide what the other party's
goods and services are worth and whether a deal would be worthwhile.
5 73
Thus, assuming there were a contract between the legal profession and
society, the contract would reflect a deal in which society apparently
thought it made sense to grant certain privileges in exchange for a
commitment by lawyers to take responsibility for civil regulation and social
justice. At the same time, lawyers thought it made sense to take the
privileges in exchange for the commitment. In other words, society thinks
the value of the commitment is equal to or greater than the value of the
privileges or society would not have made the bargain exchanging the latter
for the former. By contrast, the lawyers-with stereotypical mercenary
zeal-placed a higher value on the privileges they would receive than on the
commitment they would assume.5  That would be the reason-the only
568. According to the Restatement, "[a] contract is a promise or set of promises for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979). A contract creates a legal duty, not a moral duty,
and breach of a contract creates a legal remedy. See id.
569. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1 at 21.




574. Although the authors do not seem to notice, their argument entails that the exchange value or
market value of civil regulation and social justice is roughly equivalent to that of social status and power
plus self-regulation. One would have thought civil regulation and social justice might hold a higher
value.
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reason-they were prepared to exchange the latter for the former. The legal
profession's supposed commitment to assume responsibility for civil
regulation and social justice would simply be a fact about a deal. The
commitment would not acquire or generate any intrinsic moral value just
because it resulted from a deal with society or with anyone else. If the
authors of the Carnegie Report wish to claim that the supposed commitment
to civil regulation and social justice has an intrinsic value or moral worth
and that the commitment provides a moral basis for legal professionalism,
the authors must look outside the realm of contract law and enforceable
bargains to defend that claim. 575  As Professor Perillo indicated, the law
does not ask or take into account what the lawyers' supposed commitment
is really worth independent of the bargain in which the lawyers exchanged
the commitment.576 From a legal perspective, the commitment is worth
what was paid for it. Moreover, if the authors could discover the intrinsic
value or moral worth of taking responsibility for civil regulation and social
justice, it seems quite possible that the alleged contractual basis for taking
such responsibility would become superfluous to the argument. One could
simply skip over the contractarian theory entirely and rely on the intrinsic
value or moral worth of the legal profession's supposed responsibilities.
As anyone who has taught or studied contract law knows, or should
know, there are certain categories of cases in which a U.S. court will
enforce a contract that did not result from a bargained exchange of
consideration. For example, courts sometimes will enforce a contract or
quasi-contract based on a theory of reliance17 8 or a theory of unjust
enrichment.5 79  There are even a small number of cases that scholars
generally group together under the heading of "moral consideration."580  It
575. Charles Fried famously has argued that obligation to keep promises provides "the moral basis
of contract law." CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION I
(1981). If we assume for the sake of argument that Fried is correct, then it appears that the authors of the
Carnegie Report could skip over the social contract argument and jump straight to a claim that lawyers
have a moral obligation to keep their supposed promise to pursue civil regulation and social justice. We
would not need a contractual obligation to support the alleged moral obligation if we can identify a
moral obligation as the basis for the contractual obligation.
576. See PERILLO, supra note 551, at 154.
577. See id. at 206-07. Students of contract law will also recall that the courts will sometimes
refuse to enforce a contract for reasons of public policy. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 566, at 312. In
some cases, such policies are "grounded on moral values, as are the policies against impairment of
family relationships and against gambling." Id at 318. Clearly, the fact that courts may refuse to en-
force a small category of immoral contracts does not imply that all other types of contract give rise to
moral obligations.
578. For a short introduction to the notion of reliance and the related legal concept of promissory
estoppel, see PERILLO, supra note 551, at 218-22.
579. For a short discussion of unjust enrichment and the available remedies, see id. at 541-47.
580. For short discussions of the law concerning enforcement of promises on the basis of moral
obligation, see id. at 207-208; FARNSWORTH, supra note 566, at 57-63.
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is beyond the scope of this Article to try to reconstruct the Carnegie
Report's contractarian framework based on one of the many intellectual
byways in the law of contracts. Suffice it to say that these alternative bases
for contractual obligation do not transform a legal obligation into a moral
obligation."' They simply provide a basis other than bargained
consideration for imposing a legal obligation on one of the parties to the
alleged contract.12 In the Carnegie Report, the authors appear to be trying
to do precisely the opposite.ss3 They seek to transform an allegedly
bargained contractual obligation-an exchange of valuable consideration
between parties-into a morally binding obligation or at least an obligation
with moral significance.ss4 The authors owe us an explanation of the
theoretical basis for that transformation.
The preceding argument could be reformulated as an emotivist criticism
of the contractarian framework.58 5  An emotivist can concede that people
enter into contracts to pursue their own preferences and values. An
emotivist also can and presumably must concede the empirical point that
legal systems enforce many such contracts under various theories.8 The
emotivist should deny, however, that there is any objective "moral"
obligation to abide by a contract. For the emotivist, moral judgments reflect
personal preferences, attitudes, and feelings.8 Some people may have a
personal preference for keeping promises and fulfilling bargains. For those
people, abiding by a contract-social or otherwise-might plausibly be
described as morally correct.589  For people who do not hold such
preferences, alleged values such as keeping promises, fulfilling bargains,
and abiding by contracts may have no force. For the emotivist, it is not
accurate to say that it would be morally right for such people to comply
with a contract.590  Compliance could well be legally obligatory, but it
would not be morally obligatory.59' The emotivist might abide by the
contract because the emotivist's preferences impel her to avoid the negative
581. See PERILLO,supra note 551, at 207-208, 218-22, 541-47.
582. See id.
583. See supra note 543 and accompanying text.
584. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 54.
585. See Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra note 438, at 120-23; see also AYER,
supra note 438, at 102-20 (for further discussion of emotivism).
586. See supra notes 438-40 and accompanying text (defining emotivism as "the doctrine that all
evaluative judgments and more specifically all moral judgments are nothing but expressions of prefer-
ence, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are moral or evaluative in character.").
587. See supra notes 438-40 and accompanying text.
588. See supra note 443 and accompanying text.
589. See supra note 446-47 and accompanying text.
590. See supra note 438-47 and accompanying text.
591. See Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra note 438, at 172-73.
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consequences she might suffer if she breaches the contract. 59 2 Thus, viewed
from the emotivist perspective as well, the authors of the Carnegie Report
have failed to provide a moral basis for legal professionalism, even if we
assume they have succeeded in providing a legal basis. Indeed, if the
emotivist is correct that moral judgment reflects nothing more than personal
preference, the emotivist can offer a plausible account of why the
contractarian argument must fail to provide a distinctively moral basis for
legal professionalism. The authors have tried to use contract law, or at least
contract jargon, to elevate a legally enforceable bargain based solely on the
preferences of the parties to the status of an obligation that is somehow
more than legal and more than a matter of preference.5 93 But as the
emotivist (allegedly) has shown, such obligations do not exist.594
In addition to butting heads with emotivism, the contractarian
framework also seems to contradict the Carnegie Report's teleological
framework on a crucial point.9 The teleological framework depends upon
a claim that human beings have an essential nature, a purpose or telos, that
defines and distinguishes them from other species as human beings.
Under a teleological framework, human ends or goods such as civil
regulation and social justice would derive their meaning or significance at
least in part from their intelligible relationship to this highest, defining
human purpose or good. 97  If the teleological framework is correct, the
human telos or purpose is a given, a fact or state of affairs that we can
discover and about which we can make true or false statements.598 The telos
is not chosen, created, or somehow constructed by human beings.5 99 For the
contractarian framework, by contrast, the defining purposes of the legal
profession (e.g., civil regulation and social justice) are just a choice and a
construct, the result of an alleged bargain between society and the legal
592. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145 at 11-12. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
famously wrote, "[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it, - and nothing else." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). The emotivist will keep the contract if she prefers performing to paying
in the particular circumstances. See id; see also MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12.
For a discussion of what Holmes may have meant by his famous remark and how it has been interpreted
or misinterpreted, see Joseph M. Perillo, Misreading Oliver Wendell Holmes on Efficient Breach and
Tortious Interference, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1085 (2000).
593. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
594. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145 at 11-12; see also AYER, supra note 438, at
102-20; Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra note 438, at 120-23.
595. See supra Part L.B (discussing the Carnegie Report's teleological framework).
596. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
597. See supra notes 379-81 and accompanying text. For further discussion of the hierarchy of
goods, see infra notes 671-72 and accompanying text.
598. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
599. See supra note 182.
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profession.soo Thus, even if the contractarian framework otherwise
provided an airtight rationale for the alleged purposes or teloi of the legal
profession, that rationale arguably would undercut the very teleological
framework that lies at the core of the Carnegie Report's account of legal
education. To the extent that the "moral basis" of legal professionalism is
contractarian, it cannot be teleological in any meaningful and traditional
sense.
If I am correct that the contractarian ethical framework fails to provide a
"moral basis" for legal professionalism, then the consequences for the
central argument of the Carnegie Report are dire.60 ' The authors needed a
moral basis for a particular account of legal professionalism in order to fill
an important gap in their argument. Specifically, they needed an objective,
impersonal rationale or justification for teaching a particular set of
professional purposes to apprentices during the third apprenticeship. If
there is no such objective, impersonal justification or rationale, then
teaching any particular set of professional purposes will be an intellectually
arbitrary act, an imposition by non-rational means of new "professional"
values on students who may hold different values. Moreover, if there is no
objective moral basis for the professional purposes that masters teach to
apprentices, then there is no objective moral basis for the third
apprenticeship's supposedly overarching and unifying account of the
purposes or teloi of the first and second apprenticeships. But the teloi of the
first and second apprenticeships appear to be in conflict with one another
and apparently will remain in conflict without an overarching set of
purposes that can somehow mediate and overcome the conflict.602 Thus,
without the "moral basis" that the contractarian framework supposedly
provides, the system of legal education described and advocated by the
Carnegie Report remains fundamentally incoherent-an undertaking
without a consistent, objective justification or rationale that literally
operates at cross-purposes with itself. The authors still need what they
would call a moral basis for legal professionalism and what I would call an
adequate justification for the telos or teloi of the third apprenticeship-a
telos or set of teloi that must, in turn, allow us to articulate an overarching
and unifying account of the teloi of the first and second apprenticeship.
600. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
601. See supra note 543 and accompanying text.
602. See supra notes 356-75 and accompanying text.
603. See SULLIVAN, WORK AND INTEGRITY, supra note 177, at 54.
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V. GETING SERIOUS ABOUT THE TELEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
As I remarked at the beginning of this Article, the Carnegie Report
questions whether legal education today is "serious" about the goal of
providing law students with a combination of analytical ability, practical
skill, and "solid ethical grounding."a Parts III and IV examined the
arguments offered in the Carnegie Report and showed that the authors
themselves have been less than entirely serious about providing a "solid
ethical grounding" for their own account of legal education and the
recommendations that they make. Part III showed that the authors build the
Carnegie Report around an ungrounded teleological ethical framework
when, by the logic of their own argument, what they require is a grounded
teleological framework. Moreover, as Part IV showed, the authors appear
to acknowledge, and in certain respects to presume or rely upon, two other
non-teleological ethical frameworks that are not compatible with one
another or with the teleological framework. The authors do not appear to
recognize, however, that the "ethical grounding" of their own position is not
only not solid but arguably not even coherent.os Perhaps the moral of this
story is that people who live in ethical glass houses should be careful about
throwing around accusations that others are not serious about ethics.
The question, then, is where to go from here. This Part of the Article
provides recommendations on the steps that must be taken if we wish to
pursue the approach and the objectives of the Carnegie Report. Part V.A
addresses the threshold question why we should build on the Carnegie
Report at all. Why not just jettison the authors' work and start from scratch
to develop a new theoretical framework for reforming legal education? Part
V.B briefly discusses a second, more fundamental threshold issue, namely
why we should be concerned about providing a theoretical grounding at all
for legal education reform. Can we not just get on with legal education and
reform as law schools obviously did before the Carnegie Foundation offered
the Report to an eager public? Why engage in navel-gazing when what we
need, apparently, is action? Part V.C provides a "propaedeutic punch list"
of foundational issues and questions that must be addressed in order to carry
forward the work of the Carnegie Report within the teleological framework
on which the Report relies.
604. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
605. See CARNEGIE REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 5, at 4.
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A. Why Build on the Carnegie Report?
One way of assessing Parts III and IV of this Article is to conclude that
they have made mincemeat of the case presented in the Carnegie Report and
thus have provided us with more than adequate grounds to pitch that work
in the recycling bin (because all ideas for reforming legal education must be
recycled every few decades) and start over. For at least three reasons,
however, starting over would be a mistake. First, as shown in Part II, by
triggering widespread, serious academic debate as well as action by law
schools, the ABA, the AALS, and major state bar associations, the Carnegie
Report has exercised and continues to exercise a significant influence on
practical and theoretical work on legal educational reform. 606 Indeed, as I
concluded in Part II, it probably is fair to say that the Report and the work it
has provoked are the state of the art in the field just as the reports on legal
education issued previously by the Carnegie Foundation represented the
state of the art in their respective eras.o7 It is, of course, possible that legal
academics, the ABA and the rest have foolishly wasted their time
attempting to build on the Carnegie Report. Perhaps the Report is no more
than a passing fad or fashion, the scholarly equivalent of a Hula-Hoop or
poodle skirt. Intellectual humility urges, however, that we treat the
attention paid to the Report with respect. 8 At a minimum, we should place
the burden on those who would jettison the Report to come up with a better
alternative or at least to provide a conclusive argument that the Report itself
is wrong not just on matters of detail but on the fundamental questions it
addresses.
If we shift the burden of proof to those who favor jettisoning the
Carnegie Report, then for the time being any serious discussion of legal
education and its challenges should continue to build on the Report. Indeed,
given the current state of debate about reforming legal education, a person
who refuses to begin with the Report effectively will place herself on the
606. See supra Part II (noting there the broad impact of the Carnegie Report and how it justifies
careful study).
607. See supra notes 23-32 and accompanying text. The other leading publication that might
share "state of the art" honors with the Carnegie Report is Best Practices, which itself relies heavily on
the Carnegie Report. See supra note 22.
608. Humility is, of course, a virtue in the Christian tradition but, as MacIntyre has observed, it is
not a virtue that all ethical traditions endorse. See MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 177
(arguing Aristotle probably would have viewed humility as a vice rather than a virtue). Humility does
not seem to be a cardinal virtue of lawyers, academic or otherwise, and humility is conspicuously absent
from the lists of lawyerly virtues provided by the Carnegie Report and other interested parties. See infra
note 683. Humility also may not be a virtue of the self-conscious emotivist, since she believes that her
preferences determine what is good. See id. For the emotivist, each person seems to be the hero of her
own moral narrative.
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margins of the debate or, perhaps, outside the debate entirely.60 But
starting with the Report does not mean accepting it as gospel. As this
Article has shown, the Report has many important flaws.61 0 Thus, starting
with the Report will mean building on it by, among other things, identifying
the problems that the authors have failed to solve-particularly the
foundational problems-and attempting to solve them. If solution proves
impossible, the next step would be to recast the argument of the Report in a
way that somehow avoids the problems that cannot be solved. Thus, the
approach that I favor would treat the Report respectfully as the latest
important development in an ongoing tradition of debate about the nature of
legal education extending at least as far back as the founding of the first
U.S. law school in Litchfield, Connecticut, by Tapping Reeve,61' through
the innovations of Langdell at Harvard,612 to the Carnegie Foundation
reports in the early part of the twentieth century, to the MacCrate Report in
1992.613 Because this tradition of debate is ongoing, however, we know
already that the Carnegie Report will be a way station and not a terminus.6' 4
We know that the Report eventually will be superseded in some manner by
the results of the very debate it has provoked. Superseding the Report will
and does, however, require participating in that debate and thus treating the
Report as a starting point or focal point rather than starting afresh."
Someone might object to this first reason for building on the Carnegie
Report that it is really just a disguised argument from authority, in this
instance the authority of other academics, the ABA, and assorted groups
who have adopted the Report as their starting point for legal educational
reform. 1 Since I accused the authors of relying on an argument from
authority in the Report itself,61" it would be hypocritical of me-as well as
fallacious-to rely here on an appeal to authority. I am not, however,
relying on authority to support the accuracy of the Report as a whole or the
truth of any particular proposition(s) in the Report. Rather, I am using a
generalization about what people in the field of legal educational reform are
discussing, i.e., the Report, as a rationale for joining in that discussion
609. See supra notes 35-73 and accompanying text (describing the current state of debate).
610. See, e.g., supra Parts 111.B, IV.A, IV.B.
611. See Karen S. Beck, One Step At a Time: The Research Value of Law Student Notebooks, 91
LAw LIBR. J. 29, 33 (1999) (describing the first U.S. law school); see also STEvENS, supra note 32, at 1.
612. For references on Langdell, see supra note 222.
613. See supra note 255 (for reference to this debate).
614. See supra note 255.
615. I will show in a subsequent article that this respectful approach to the tradition of debate
about legal education, including to the Carnegie Report as the latest iteration of that tradition, is also
consistent with the teleological framework on which the authors constructed the Report.
616. See supra notes 23-75 and accompanying text.
617. See supra notes 453-56 and accompanying text.
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instead of seeking to start a new, separate discussion.1 Moreover, this
rationale for joining the discussion does not foreclose the possibility that we
ultimately might prove mistaken the very people-including me-who
thought it useful to start with and build on the Report. We could prove
them wrong if, for example, we could show that the arguments in the Report
pose fundamental problems that we cannot solve. Indeed, if we cannot
solve the fundamental intellectual problems posed by the Report, we may
well have met the burden of proof mentioned above and thus justified a
decision not to erect any future discussions of legal educational reform on
the foundations laid by the Report.
Although I do not wish to rely on the authority of those who have
focused on the Carnegie Report as support for the accuracy of any
propositions in that work, I also do not mean to suggest that I believe the
key propositions in the Report might be false.1 On the contrary, I believe
that a second reason not to jettison the Report and start afresh is that it
provides a fundamentally accurate description and explanation of modem
legal education and the issues currently facing legal educators.6 20 By
jettisoning the Report, we would be throwing a very large baby out with the
bathwater. What baby? A few snapshots of the infant will suffice to
convey her appearance. It is difficult to believe that anyone currently
involved in legal education would challenge the Carnegie Report's basic
claims that (1) legal education has at least three important components:
cognitive, practical, and ethical;621 (2) the educational process has not
integrated those components very successfully; 622 and (3) the cognitive
component tends to receive the greatest attention in law school.2 It also is
618. See supra note 255.
619. See supra notes 34-72 and accompanying text.
620. The Camegie Report's analysis of legal education is based in part upon empirical observa-
tions that the authors gathered over two years at sixteen law schools across North America. See
CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 15-16. I see no good reason to reject the authors' observations and
the resulting description.
621. See id. at 13-14. The Camegie Report's account of the three components of legal education
dovetails very well with Talcott Parsons's classic account of the three sociological "criteria" that distin-
guish a profession from other types of occupational roles or groups: (1) "formal technical tmaining" that
"lead[s] to ... mastery of a generalized cultural tradition"; (2) "skills" in the use of the tradition; and (3)
"institutional means of making sure that such competence will be put to socially responsible uses."
Parsons, supra note 405, at 536. According to the Carnegie Report, law school provides or should
provide apprentices with a formative education that combines cognitive discipline and substantive
knowledge, skills training, and an overarching ethical framework. Through this formative education,
apprentices should become qualified to serve as journeyman members of a profession that satisfies the
three sociological criteria that Parsons specified. The fact that the Carnegie Report's account of legal
education fits so neatly into Parsons's discussion of professions lends credibility to the Report's account.
622. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13-14.
623. See id at 60-63. I do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to challenge the details of the
authors' description of legal education. For example, as discussed above, some of the secondary litera-
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difficult to believe that anyone would seriously dispute the Carnegie
Report's claim that legal education plays a formative role in the lives of
future lawyers by altering, or at least attempting to alter: the way they think
and what they think about, the way they make practical judgments, and the
standards and objectives by which they guide and assess their own actions
as well as the actions of others.624 In addition, I suspect that there may not
be very much disagreement with the Carnegie Report's proposal that we
view the formative work of legal education as a kind of apprenticeship, a
process in which masters of a sort transform novices into apprentices and
then into journeymen. 625 At a minimum, we clearly should test and explore
the hypothesis that legal education consists of and should be treated as a set
of interlocking apprenticeships. 6 26
Recognizing, of course, that some people might disagree, I propose that
we take these basic elements-formation, apprenticeship, and the three
components of legal education-at least provisionally627 as givens or facts
requiring investigation and further explanation. Along with the authors, I
believe that these givens, these explananda, support and perhaps demand a
teleological explanation-an account based on a teleological framework.62 8
In other words, the teleological framework discussed in Part HI appears to
be woven into the givens, the facts on the ground, of legal education. When
we look closely, the facts appear to us as facts about a teleological process.
In the words of Professor Moravscik, the telos is an "element[] of reality"
ture on the Camegie Report has criticized the authors' single-minded focus on the case dialogue as a
pedagogical method. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text. One could correct the details of the
Carnegie Report's description and explanation of the case dialogue and its significance without jettison-
ing the Report as a whole. Indeed, correcting the details of the Carnegie Report would seem to be a core
function of a vibrant scholarly process. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
624. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 2-4. 1 do not wish to exclude the possibility of
debate about whether and how legal education should form future lawyers. I suggest only that any
dispassionate observer would acknowledge the formative potential and impact of legal education. In-
deed, even those emotivists who object to efforts to (re)form the values of future lawyers recognize that
professional education may have a formative effect on students. See supra notes 449-58 and accompa-
nying text.
625. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-27.
626. See id.
627. I add the qualifier "at least provisionally" because I recognize that we might have to return to
and reconsider the Carnegie Report's basic observations about legal education if we discover that we
cannot offer a coherent account of those observations. In other words, if a teleological account cannot
be made to work, we may have to return to the things themselves-i.e., to the actual world of legal
education-to determine whether the givens that seemed to demand a teleological account may not have
been given at all. As MacIntyre observes, "[wihat each observer takes himself or herself to perceive is
identified and has to be identified by theory-laden concepts." MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note
145, at 79. If we ultimately decide to reject concepts that are laden with a teleological theory, then what
we take ourselves to perceive when we reexamine the world of legal education may "look" quite differ-
ent. See id.
628. See supra Part III.
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and the relationships described in the teleological explanation are
"ontological." 629 This means that once we acknowledge even provisionally
the accuracy of the Report's description of legal education, we inevitably
will have to wrestle with the problems presented by the teleological
framework through which the authors present that description and its
implications.6 30  The teleological framework is not an arbitrary, heuristic
construction imposed on a neutral set of facts, but rather a central element
of a more or less coherent whole-a-state-of-affairs-revealed-from-a-
theoretical-perspective-that the Carnegie Report attempts to present or
exhibit and explain.631 If we wish to understand that coherent whole, it
makes sense to work within the parameters of the Carnegie Report to
attempt to solve the problems that the Report poses before concluding that
we must start again from scratch. We may eventually have to jettison the
Carnegie Report, but we have not yet reached a stage where doing so would
make sense.
A third reason to build on the Carnegie Report instead of beginning
anew may be the paucity of good alternatives. The question what makes an
intellectual account of anything a good or better account is not easy to
answer.6 2 At a minimum, we can assume that a good alternative to the
Carnegie Report would have to display all or most of the virtues of the
Report as a descriptive and analytical work while avoiding the pitfalls of
theory into which the Report may have fallen. I do not have any grounds
for denying that such an alternative account is possible. Indeed, I briefly
discuss two possible alternative accounts in Parts V.B and V.C.6 and argue
that they do not provide us with adequate grounds to desert the Carnegie
Report. I do contend, however, that until someone comes forward with a
sufficiently robust alternative, the Report will remain the only serious game
in town. At this moment in the tradition of debate about legal education to
which I alluded above,633 the Carnegie Report is the focal point.634 And the
629. See Moravcsik, supra note 110, at 7-10; supra note 128 and accompanying text.
630. See supra notes 167-86.
631. See id.
632. Maclntyre has devoted considerable attention to this issue. See MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL
VERSIONS, supra note 182, at 116-26. Building on the insights of Thomas Kuhn and others, he has
attempted to show how Thomas Aquinas could seek to reconcile the ethical positions of Aristotle and St.
Augustine and at the same time claim that his (Aquinas's) reconciliation was rationally superior to either
of those earlier positions. See, e.g., id. For Macintyre's views on Kuhn and Kuhn's interlocutors, see
ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science, in
THE TAsKs OF PHILOSOPHY 3, 15-23 (2006).
633. See supra notes 611-13 and accompanying text.
634. There is much more to be said about the relationship within a teleological framework be-
tween a tradition of debate and a practice such as legal education or lawyering in general. I plan to
discuss this topic in a future article.
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Report's status as a focal point is both a cause and an effect of the decision
that academics, the ABA, the AALS, and state bar organizations have made
to focus attention on it.635 There simply are no other recent accounts of
legal education that show the same breadth and depth of analysis.636 The
Carnegie Report is, therefore, the best available starting point, despite the
questions raised about it in Parts III and V.6 37
B. Why Provide Any Type of Ethical Grounding?
Section A presents a plausible explanation of why we should start with
and focus on the Carnegie Report as the best currently available theoretical
or intellectual basis for reforming legal education. Section A fails,
however, to address a more fundamental question: why do we need an
theoretical or intellectual basis at all? Why not just move forward with the
effort to reform legal education and stop wasting time with Sudoku puzzles
about teleological ethical frameworks and pretentious palaver about the
emotivists and contractarians? Why not simply get on with it? If we ask
"get on with what, precisely?" the answer might be "get on with what
works." This argument sounds suspiciously like something a very naive
pragmatist might say, and it would be facile to point out that Pragmatism is
itself a complex theoretical position, not a safe haven for people who wish
to eschew theory in favor of action.63 8 If we try to take the anti-theoretical
position seriously on its own ternis, we must ask what is meant by the
proposal to "get on with what works." It would seem that in order to
develop an approach to legal education that works, one needs to know what
end(s) one seeks to achieve. A screw driver works well if one seeks to drive
a screw, but the same screw driver will not work well if one uses it to take a
cat's temperature or clean a baby's ear. Thus, before we can discuss or do
what works in the field of legal education, we need to reach some
conclusions-at least tentative conclusions-about what we want to
accomplish. We need, in other words, to determine at least provisionally
the telos or teloi of legal education. Thus, the anti-theoretical, "do what
works" approach also seems to presuppose something like a teleological
framework of the sort found in the Carnegie Report. 639 At a minimum, the
people who urge us to "do what works" owe us an explanation-
635. For a discussion about using the Report as a focal point, see supra note 35-73 and accompa-
nying text.
636. See supra note 35-73 and accompanying text.
637. See supra Parts III, IV.
638. For a brief critical account of Pragmatism as a philosophical position, see H. S. Thayer,
Pragmatism, in A CRYTICAL HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 437 (Daniel J. O'Connor ed., 1967).
639. See supra notes 167-86.
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teleological or otherwise-of what ends they plan to accomplish and why
they plan to accomplish those particular ends. Everyone agrees, I hope, that
we should adopt an approach to legal education that works rather than one
that does not work. But until we figure out what we want legal education to
work for, what ends we want it to achieve or realize, it makes little sense to
focus exclusively on what works and what does not work.
There is a second problem with the seductive suggestion that we should
stop navel-gazing and get on with reforming legal education. If the
proposal to "get on with it" really is meant to support action in the absence
of any substantial theoretical or intellectual basis for such action, then the
proposal is anti-intellectual in the worst sense.6o The proposal apparently
would have us abandon the attempt to provide a persuasive account of why
we do what we do when educating lawyers and fall back on an
unaccountable activism. Thus, when a parent who pays law school tuition
or a legislator who appropriates funds for a state law school asks why we
are changing the curriculum or the pedagogical process in a particular way
or why we are not changing the curriculum or the pedagogical process, we
would have no substantial account to offer of our actions. We also would
have no account to offer when a law student asks why we do things this way
rather than that way, or why we are changing the way we do things. Indeed,
under the "do what works" approach, we legal educators would do what we
do or change what we do even though we know that we have no substantial
account of the "why" and we believe that we would be wasting our time
with navel-gazing by attempting to develop such an account. It would not
be surprising if parents, legislators, and students found this sort of
unaccountable legal education and educational reform very unsatisfying.
Such unaccountable action would not "work" for them. Although parents,
legislators, and students might not support endless navel-gazing in place of
action, they certainly will, and should, insist that legal academics who
expect payment for their intellectual labor engage in the intellectual labor of
developing a persuasive theoretical account of what law school seeks to
accomplish as a prelude to doing what works.6"' We must, therefore, resist
640. It is, perhaps, not surprising that in a study of American anti-intellectualism, Richard Hof-
stadter devotes a highly critical chapter to John Dewey's pragmatic philosophy of education and its
practical impact. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANT-INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE 359-90
(1963). Proposals to act pragmatically often seem to accompany anti-intellectual views or skepticism
about the value of intellectual activity. See id.
641. Dean Smith has shown that legal scholars depend far more than academics in other disci-
plines on student tuition payments to fund their scholarly activities. Steven R. Smith, Gresham's Law in
Legal Education, 17 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 171, 206 (2008). It would be ironic if legal scholars
concluded that there is no need to use some of the student tuition money that funds faculty scholarship to
develop a persuasive scholarly account of how and why we educate law students in a particular way.
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the seductive suggestion that we can or should avoid theoretical work of the
sort that the Carnegie Report undertakes and inspires.
A final, more subtle version of the "get on with it" argument might
concede that we need some kind of theoretical ground for legal education
and education reform but deny that we need to locate the ground in an
ethical theory. Why not simply avoid notoriously sticky questions about
ethics and ethical theory (or what some call meta-ethical theory) by
providing some sort of non-ethical theoretical grounding? The best answer
to this argument is that legal education clearly is a moral and ethical
enterprise in several senses.2 First, and most obviously, it includes an
explicit ethical component in the form of required training in legal ethics."
Second, legal education clearly involves teaching the apprentice to think
and act differently and to see herself as a different person with a new and
different calling.6" It is not clear how we could offer a justification for re-
forming another person and reorienting her life that did not involve a large
dose of theorizing about why it is good and better for a person to think this
way rather than that way, to behave this way rather than that, and to pursue
these ends rather than those. Such theorizing inevitably will involve
fundamental ethical questions and thus will be ethical theorizing. Finally,
as the Carnegie Report observes, the word "ethics" "comes from the Greek
ethos, meaning 'custom,' which is the same meaning of the Latin mos,
mores, which is the root of 'morals."' 645 The Report adds: "[b]oth words
refer to the daily habits and behaviors through which the spirit of a
particular community is expressed and lived out. In this broad sense,
professional education is 'ethical' through and through.", 6  Thus, any
theory that seeks to provide a ground for the professional education that
lawyers receive will be at least in part an ethical theory.
C. Propaedeutic Punch List
Drawing on the arguments in Parts I11 and IV, this Part of the Article
identifies and briefly discusses the most significant foundational problems
642. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 193, Standard 302(a)(5).
643. See id. ("A law school shall require that each student receive substantial instruction in . . .(5)
the history, goals, structure, values, rules and responsibilities of the legal profession and its members.");
id, Interpretation 302-9 ("The substantial instruction ... required by Standard 302(a)(5) includes in-
struction in matters such as the law of lawyering and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct of the
American Bar Association.").
644. Think Like a Lawyer: The Socratic Method Makes Better Lawyers, UNIV. OF LAVERNE,
COLLEGE OF LAW, http://law.laverne.edu/prospective-students/in-brief/think-like-a-lawyer-the-socratic-
method-makes-better-lawyers/ (last visited October 1, 2012).
645. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30.
646. Id. at 30-31.
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that the teleological framework of the Carnegie Report raises but does not
resolve.6 7 I refer to these foundational issues as propaedeutic because an
adequate resolution of them is a necessary preliminary to and condition of
real substantive progress in the debate about legal educational reform that
the Carnegie Report has provoked." 8 To leave these issues unexamined and
unaddressed is to risk constructing a castle-or perhaps a shiny new law
school-on sand. A strong intellectual rain could wash away the foundation
of legal education leaving nothing but the rickety, unaccountable practices,
if any, built on that foundation. I refer to this list of outstanding
foundational issues as a "punch list" because it identifies work that needs to
be done, not work that I pretend to do in this Article. This list will have
served its purpose if it ensures that I, and perhaps others, get-to borrow
again the language of the Carnegie Report-"serious" about these
foundational issues." 9
1. What Is the Telos of the Legal Profession?
At the risk of restating the obvious, a teleological account of anything
requires at least a provisional account of the relevant telos.650  Thus, an
account of legal education built on a teleological framework must include a
persuasive account of the telos or teloi of legal education. If we assume, as
seems reasonable, that the purpose or telos of legal education is, as the
Carnegie Report's title suggests, educating lawyers, then we should ask
what we educate someone to be and do when we educate someone to be a
lawyer.65 ' The question then becomes what is the telos of the lawyer or of
647. For a discussion of the Carnegie Report's teleological framework, see supra Part I.
648. See supra note 14 (describing the use of "propaedeutic"); see also supra notes 35-73 for a
discussion of the debate about legal educational reform prevoked by the Camegie Report.
649. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
650. The account of the telos may be provisional in the sense that the account could and likely
would evolve as we reflect further on the telos and the processes by which we expect to achieve it. As
MacIntyre has observed, "when a tradition is in good order it is always partially constituted by an argu-
ment about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose."
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 222. Thus, identifying a telos that serves as the "point
and purpose" of the legal profession will not exclude further debate within the profession about the telos.
See id.
651. According to the Carnegie Report, "[a]mid the useful varieties of mission and emphasis
among American law schools, the formation of competent and committed professionals deserves and
needs to be the common, unifying purpose." CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 13. But cf Peter W.
Martin, "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1, 26
(1985) (Letter from Professor Owen M. Fiss to Dean Paul D. Carrington states as follows: "Law profes-
sors are not paid to train lawyers, but to study law and to teach their students what they happen to dis-
cover."). Writing in 1970, Robert Stevens described legal education as "a profession whose literature (or
its absence) suggests that law professors are either remarkably vague or largely inarticulate about the
skills which law schools currently purport to develop, and, indeed, about the purposes for which such
schools exist" Stevens, supra note 5, at 37. Although we may have made some progress since 1970 on
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lawyering and the legal profession? Without an account of the telos of
lawyering and the legal profession, we may be unable to specify what it
means to be a lawyer, i.e., what a lawyer is and what a lawyer does as a
lawyer. If we cannot specify what it means to be a lawyer and to engage in
lawyering, then according to the Carnegie Report, we will not have a
content for the ethical apprenticeship.652 We can teach apprentice lawyers
the ethical rules that they must not break, but we cannot tell them what it
means for them and for us to be lawyers, or what the purpose(s), aim(s), and
end(s) of lawyering are. We leave our apprentices with no coherent account
of the calling that we invite and encourage them to adopt or the life that we
expect them to lead in that calling. Indeed, we may convey as our shadow
pedagogy that there is no such coherent account of their calling or their
future lives in it.
If a persuasive account of the telos or teloi of lawyering and the legal
profession is a necessary condition for the third apprenticeship, then such an
account also is a necessary condition for the first and second
apprenticeships, at least insofar as those apprenticeships work to achieve a
common and coherent objective.6 53 The cognitive apprenticeship teaches
the apprentice to think like a lawyer by distancing herself from the messy
human details of a situation in order to analyze and organize it in abstract
legal categories.6 4 The practical apprenticeship, by contrast, teaches the
apprentice to intervene here and now (or then and there) in a specific, messy
human situation and deploy specific legal skills to achieve a specific
result. 5s The capacity to intervene in a specific situation to achieve a
desirable result the authors call practical or professional judgment.s 6
Unfortunately, learning to think like a lawyer and learning to exercise
practical judgment may pull the apprentice in two quite different directions.
To ensure that these two types of learning, these two apprenticeships, pull
the apprentice in a single direction toward a single objective, we require a
coherent account of that objective, an account that seeks to unify the
cognitive and practical dimensions of lawyering.s? We need, in other
words, an account of the overarching objective(s) of legal education rooted
in an account of the telos or teloi of lawyering and the legal profession.
identifying the skills that law schools purport to develop, see supra note 255, we still seem to have
trouble articulating the purpose of legal education.
652. CARNEGME REPORT, supra note 1, at 144-45.
653. For a discussion of this issue, see supra Part Lll.B.2(d); see also CARNEGIE REPORT, supra
note 1, at 27-33.
654. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
655. See supra notes 254-56 and accompanying text.
656. For a discussion of professional judgment, see supra notes 257-71 and accompanying text.
657. See supra notes 218-20,254-56 and accompanying text.
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This means that an account of the telos or teloi of lawyering and the legal
profession is a necessary preliminary to and condition of an account of legal
education such as the one found in the Carnegie Report that recognizes and
seeks to enhance the three apprenticeships while fitting them together into a
coherent whole.ss
The Carnegie Report never directly addresses or acknowledges the
importance of the question what is the telos of lawyering and the legal
profession. The Report identifies various services or functions that the legal
profession performs and various goals the profession apparently seeks to
achieve such as regulating social transactions and securing individual and
social justice.659 The Report's suggestions in this area may prove useful.
Indeed, it would be surprising if any of the professional goals and services
that the Report identifies were to prove inconsistent with the telos of
lawyering and the legal profession. The problem, in other words, is not that
the Carnegie Report offers false clues about the telos. Rather, the problem
is that the Carnegie Report does not provide a coherent and reasonably
thorough (provisional) account of the telos (or teloi). Intellectual humility
suggests that we should begin with the clues in the Carnegie Report and,
perhaps, Work and Integrity about the various functions of the legal
profession and, if possible, use them to construct a coherent account of the
telos or teloi of the profession. We should begin, in other words, with the
premise that the authors of the Carnegie Report have seen or held the trunk,
the tail, and the leg, but they have not beheld the entire living elephant.
This approach would build on the Carnegie Report and follow the path that
it marks out to a destination that it does not reach.
In addition to offering clues and off-hand remarks about the legal
profession's functions and services, the Carnegie Report imposes at least
one important demand or requirement that any adequate account of the telos
of lawyering and the legal profession will have to meet in order to remain
within the Report's framework. An adequate account of the telos will have
to provide the basis for a coherent account of legal education as the
formative process by which a novice becomes a lawyer and a member of the
profession. In particular, an account of the telos will have to provide the
basis for an explanation of the purpose(s) of the cognitive apprenticeship
and the purpose(s) of the practical apprenticeship. Moreover, the
explanation of those various purposes will have to demonstrate that they
cohere with one another, thus allowing us to show that the first and second
apprenticeships do not impose fundamentally conflicting demands or goals
658. See supra note 182.
659. See supra notes 385-415 and accompanying text.
236 [Vol. 39
TWO AND A HALF ETHICAL THEORIES
on students. Indeed, an adequate account of the telos of lawyering and the
legal profession should allow us to demonstrate that the cognitive and
practical apprenticeships push and pull the apprentice toward a unitary
objective animated by a coherent purpose or set of purposes. If we follow
the reasoning of the Carnegie Report, we must reject as inadequate any
account of the telos of lawyering and the legal profession that does not
provide a telos for legal education and thereby supply a unifying account of
and for the first two and, indeed, all three apprenticeships.6" Of course, an
adequate account of the telos of lawyering and the legal profession must do
more than guide legal education, but from the standpoint of people working
on legal education reform, it is clear that an adequate account of the telos of
lawyering and the legal profession must at the very least provide the
requisite guidance for legal education (as demanded by the Carnegie
Report).
Although the Carnegie Report is less explicit about the point, there
appears to be at least one other task that an adequate account of the telos of
lawyering and the legal profession will have to be able to perform. As I
observed above,"' the authors see an "apparent conflict" 662 or "tension' 3
between the role of "the lawyer as zealous advocate for clients" and the
lawyer as "social regulator[]" with "obligations to see to the proper
functioning of the institutions of the law."66 5 They do not take a position on
whether the conflict or tension is real or apparent.66 Indeed, they comment
that
there is a . . . controversial issue within the broad scope of the
apprenticeship of professionalism and purpose: Does the
responsibility to pursue substantive justice in individual cases and
to consider the broader impact of one's actions conflict with
advocacy on behalf of one's client? This is a matter of considerable
debate. In the view of many attorneys and law school faculty, the
only justice that can be known with certainty is procedural justice,
and the adversary system ensures the greatest possible justice in the
660. See supra Part Il.B.2(d).
661. See supra notes 393-96 and accompanying text.
662. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 82.
663. Id. at 83.
664. Id. at 82.
665. Id.
666. Id. at 82-83.
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long run if lawyers on each side promote their clients' interests in
the narrow sense. Others disagree."7
Instead of attempting to resolve this controversy, however, the authors state
that "[s]tudents at least need to be made aware, not only of the various sorts
of lawyer they might become but also of the various kinds of approaches
they can take toward lawyering itself.'" 8 In other words, the authors seem
to recommend that we punt this basic dispute over the nature and purpose of
lawyering to the apprentice and let her handle it-or fumble it-on her own.
On the contrary, I would suggest that any adequate account of the telos of
the legal profession cannot evade this controversy about whether there is a
real tension or merely an apparent tension between the model of lawyer as
zealous advocate for a particular client and the model of lawyer as social
regulator and/or civic professional. If these two models of lawyering are
both valid and the conflict or tension between them is real rather than
apparent, then it may be impossible to develop a single, coherent account of
the telos or teloi of lawyering and the legal profession that can serve as the
subject matter of the third apprenticeship and the unifying theme of the first
and second apprenticeships. No coherent telos or teloi may mean no
teleological framework; no teleological framework would mean, as I have
suggested, no plausible account of legal education and educational reform
based on the Carnegie Report.
2. How Can We Ground the Telos After Jettisoning the Contrac-
tarian Argument?
Although it is difficult to imagine anyone objecting in principle to the
more-or-less tautological assertion that an adequate teleological account of
legal education (or anything else) requires and presupposes an adequate
(provisional) account of the relevant telos, any claim of the sort "X is the
telos of the legal profession" likely will meet an objection that we can
summarize in two words: "prove it." Anyone can purport to identify a telos
for lawyering and the legal profession, but how can one show that any
particular telos so identified is the proper telos? How might one show that a
particular account of the telos of lawyering and the legal profession
somehow binds and is valid for all members of the profession, including in
particular those members of the profession who might disagree with that
account of the telos? To borrow an example from the previous section, how
667. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 131. For a critical discussion of David Luban's account
of "client counseling," which leans heavily toward the view that a lawyer should pursue substantive
justice rather than the client's interests, see infra notes 772-75 and accompanying text.
668. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 132.
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might one show that pursuing substantive justice is the true telos of a lawyer
(assuming it is) to a person who believes (allegedly incorrectly) that the
telos of lawyering and the legal profession is pursuing the client's interests
as the client understands them? How might someone demonstrate to me
that a purported telos is my telos as a lawyer even if I do not particularly
like that telos or wish to pursue and achieve it? Is such a showing possible
or must we concede in advance that any account of the telos of lawyering
and the legal profession can never be more than an account of a purported
telos, i.e., an account of what one or some people believe may be the telos
but not an account of what we plausibly can claim is the proper telos
binding on and valid for all lawyers as lawyers? Indeed, is the Carnegie
Report's own failure to identify the telos of lawyering and the legal
profession not a symptom of a deeper problem, namely that either there is
no telos or, if there is a telos, we cannot demonstrate to everyone's, or
perhaps anyone's, satisfaction what it might be?
Part IV.B argued that the contractarian framework serves as the
Carnegie Report's rather half-hearted attempt to provide a moral basis or
ground for lawyering and the legal profession. Thus, the contractarian
framework appears to be the Report's response to the challenge to "prove"
that a particular telos might bind members of the legal profession whether
they like it or not. The contractarian framework attempts to explain the
obligation that lawyers supposedly have as lawyers and professionals to
pursue certain goods or teloi by showing that the obligation results from a
social contract between the profession and society.669  The Carnegie
Report's invocation of the contractarian framework, half-hearted or not,
registers the fact that the authors of the Report recognize they have to
provide a persuasive account not only of what the proper telos of the legal
profession is but of why the asserted telos is the proper telos and therefore is
binding on, and valid for, all members of the profession, including, one
presumes, those who would contest the Report's vague account of the telos.
Because Part IV.B shows at considerable length that the contractarian
framework, at least as presented by Sullivan and his co-authors, does not
withstand serious scrutiny, we continue to need an argument that will do the
work that the authors apparently intended the contractarian framework to
do. 7o We need, in other words, a persuasive justification for the statement
"X is the telos of the legal profession" that will respond to a skeptic's or
unbeliever's challenge to "prove it." Consequently, the propaedeutic punch
669. See supra note 489 and accompanying text.
670. See supra Part IV.B.
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list must include a demand for an argument that replaces the contractarian
framework.
I plan to discuss this issue at length in a subsequent article, so I do not
wish to pull a half-baked loaf out of the intellectual oven here.
Nevertheless, it may be helpful for some readers to see possible paths that
the argument could take. As discussed above, a teleological account of
human action typically includes an account of a hierarchy of goods or
ends.' One might begin with an account of the highest good or end for
human beings as such and then proceed with accounts of relevant
subordinate goods or ends. The accounts of the subordinate goods or ends
would show, at least in part, how the subordinate goods or ends help human
beings to realize or achieve their highest good or end as human beings.
Under such a framework, therefore, an account of the good(s) or purpose(s)
of the legal profession would presuppose and rely upon an account of the
highest good or purpose of human beings and, perhaps, upon accounts of
other intermediate goods and purposes in the hierarchy. For example, to
understand the good(s) or purpose(s) of the legal profession we might
require an account of the good(s) or purpose(s) of law and the legal system.
That account may presuppose an account of the good(s) or purpose(s) of our
political community and, possibly, of political community per se. That
account may derive in turn from our account of the highest good or end of
human beings, our account of the essential human telos. Any argument or
justification for such an account of a hierarchy of goods for human beings
rooted in the highest good or telos likely would start with the work of
Aristotle and his examination of eudaimonia.672 From there, one might
proceed as MacIntyre does through the work of Thomas Aquinas.6 73
Alternatively, one might attempt to move through a different channel of the
Aristotelian tradition by way of Hegel and his commentators or even,
perhaps, by way of Martin Heidegger, avoiding of course the latter's
intellectual swan dive into the empty pool of Nazism.
Someone might object to this second item on the punch list that it would
require us to do the impossible as a precondition for proceeding with debate
about the reform of legal education based on the Carnegie Report and thus it
would effectively block all further such debate.674 What is the impossible
precondition for further debate? The requirement that we develop a
671. See supra notes 379-81 and accompanying text.
672. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
673. For an example of MacIntyre's Thomist approach, see MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL
VERSIONS, supra note 182, at 196-215 (offering a Thomist response to the genealogical arguments of
Nietzsche and Foucault).
674. See supra notes 428-33 and accompanying text for discussion of this debate.
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persuasive justification for our account of the telos of lawyering and the
legal profession, an account rooted (perhaps) in a persuasive justification for
an account of the human telos. If more than 2000 years of debate about
teleological explanation and the human telos has shown anything, it has
shown that we cannot expect anyone now or in the near term to develop an
argument in support of a particular telos for lawyering and the legal
profession that somehow will be binding on and valid for all lawyers,
including those who reject the telos and/or the argument for it. In other
words, we cannot expect to develop on demand a grounded teleological
account that will suffice as a substitute for the patently inadequate
contractarian framework discussed in Part IV.B.67 s But if we cannot
develop the relevant kind of grounded teleological account, then we
apparently cannot proceed with the debate about legal education reform
based on the Carnegie Report. Or if we do proceed with the debate, we lay
ourselves open to the objections leveled in Part V.B against those who
recommended that we drop the theorizing and "get on with it."676
I agree that it would be absurd to argue that debate about legal
educational reform based on the Carnegie Report should await the result of
what might be a very long debate about how to justify an account of the
telos of lawyering and the legal profession, let alone a never-ending debate
about whether we have succeeded in justifying an account of the highest
human good or telos. As a non-absurd alternative, I would propose that we
take advantage of the division of academic labor. A small number of
scholars should wrestle with the problem of grounding the teleological
account or framework for legal education while another likely larger group
of scholars can continue to work on issues related to educational reform.
People in the former group should keep apprised of the results presented by
people in the latter group to ensure that work on the grounding problem
does not lead to a grounded framework or account that is badly out of synch
with the best current thinking on the specifics of legal education and
educational reform. More importantly, people in the latter group-those
who focus on the specifics of legal education and educational reform-
should keep apprised of the results presented by people in the former group,
for at least two reasons. First, without those results, all proposals for and
conclusions about legal education and its reform must remain ungrounded,
therefore tentative and hypothetical. Second, the results of work on
grounding the teleological framework ultimately will form an important part
675. See supra Part IV.B (for a discussion on the inadequate contractarian framework of the Car-
negie Report).
676. See supra Part V.B.
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of the content of the third apprenticeship, which at the very least should
provide students with the best available thinking about the rationale for the
telos or teloi of lawyering and the legal profession.67 7
Unfortunately, we might have to live for a considerable period of time
with a situation in which several competing accounts of the telos or teloi of
lawyering and the legal profession grounded in several competing, more-or-
less persuasive justifications support (or fail to support) various competing
concrete proposals for legal educational reform. We also may have to learn
how to get on with the business of forming journeyman lawyers along the
lines recommended by the Carnegie Report in an intellectual environment
that contains competing accounts of, and justifications for, the telos or teloi
of lawyering and the legal profession.678  A critic might observe that a
situation comprising potentially endless theoretical debate plus getting on
with our practical business would hardly be novel. Indeed, that situation
would look suspiciously like the status quo. What would be novel, perhaps,
is a clearer understanding of our situation and our ongoing debate about the
telos or teloi of lawyering and the legal profession as part of a larger
intellectual project defined at least in part by the teleological framework
outlined in the Carnegie Report. Perhaps the debate would not prove to be
endless if it were conducted in the light of this larger intellectual purpose.7
3. Formation and Character-What Are the Lawyerly Virtues?
At a few points in the Carnegie Report, the authors identify various
virtues that, they claim, are the virtues of lawyers or, perhaps, of
professionals in general. 68 0 One such virtue is professional judgment-the
telos of the second apprenticeship.' Other virtues that the authors list
include integrity, consideration, and civility. 682 At no point in the text do
677. See CARNEGtE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
678. See supra Part III.B.2.
679. This suggestion that academic and professional debate about the telos of lawyering and the
legal profession might itself reflect and seek to realize certain defining purposes or achieve certain goods
(such as strengthening the foundations of the Carnegie Report) presupposes a teleological understanding
of academic and professional debate. Within a teleological framework, the goods we achieve through
academic and professional debate, goods such as truth, rational consensus or, perhaps, self-
understanding, would find their place in a hierarchy of goods just as would the goods of lawyering and
the legal profession. MACINTYRE, First Principles, supra note 265, at 169-78. It is beyond the scope
of this Article to outline and defend a teleological account of academic and professional debate. For
some initial reflections on the topic, see id. For a short discussion of the questions that the Carnegie
Report implicitly raises about the role of scholarship in the broader mission of the law professor, see
infra notes 738-48 and accompanying text.
680. See supra notes 257-71 (virtue of professional judgment), 295 (virtues of integrity, considera-
tion, and civility).
681. For a discussion of professional judgment, see supra notes 257-71 and accompanying text.
682. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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the authors draw together their seemingly off-hand comments about
virtue(s) into a general discussion covering, among other things, what the
lawyerly virtues are, 8 how we know those virtues are the lawyerly virtues,
and what steps (if any) we do, can, and/or should take to inculcate those
virtues in apprentice lawyers during the formative process. The absence of
such a general discussion is significant because, as MacIntyre contends, an
account of the virtues is generally a key element of a teleological ethical
theory in the Aristotelian tradition:
For what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life
lived at its best, and the exercise of the virtues is a necessary and
central part of such a life, not a mere preparatory exercise to secure
such a life. We thus cannot characterize the good for man
adequately without already having made reference to the virtues.
And within an Aristotelian framework the suggestion therefore that
there might be some means to achieve the good for man without the
exercise of the virtues makes no sense.6
The Greek work generally translated as "virtue" is aret6, which also bears
the more general meaning "excellence."a 5  Thus, as MacIntyre suggests,
within the Aristotelian tradition, to live a good life and achieve or realize
the human good or telos is, at least in part, to exercise and realize the
various excellences or virtues that make a human being a true human
being.8 An account of the human telos will be, at least in part, an account
of the actively virtuous or excellent human life.6 7 Moreover, as Maclntyre
observes, in the science of ethics, "[t]he precepts which enjoin the various
683. Professor Stolz, for example, suggested that "there has emerged an ethic of the profession, by
no means universally honored, but nonetheless a widely-shared tradition of independence, courage and
honesty." Stolz, Clinical Experience, supra note 194, at 76. Not to be outdone, the MacCrate Report
declares that "[i]n his or her actions on behalf of a client, a lawyer should embrace 'those qualities of
truth-speaking, of a high sense of honor, of granite discretion, of the strictest observance of fiduciary
responsibility that have, throughout the centuries, been compendiously described as 'moral character."'
MAcCRATE REPORT, supra note 255, at 213-14 (quoting Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232,
247 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). No doubt it would be gratifying if independence, courage,
honesty or truth-speaking, honor, granite discretion, and fiduciary responsibility were among the profes-
sional virtues of lawyers, but until we have a persuasive account of lawyerly virtue, we cannot know
what virtues will find a place in the catalog. For a recent discussion of lawyerly virtue, see Robert F.
Blomquist, The Pragmatically Virtuous Lawyer, 15 WIDENER L. REv. 93, 108-57 (2009) (proposing a
catalogue of "ten pragmatic lawyerly virtues"). Unfortunately, Professor Blomquist does not discuss the
Carnegie Report or the central role of the virtues in a formative legal education. See id.
684. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 149.
685. See Virtue, in ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICs 385, glossary at 430-31 (Terrence Irwin
trans., 1985).
686. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE,supra note 145, at 149.
687. Id.
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virtues and prohibit the vices which are their counterparts instruct us how to
move from potentiality to act, how to realize our true nature and to reach
our true end.'" 8  The precepts of ethics, in other words, teach us how to
actualize our potential to be virtuous or excellent, how to realize in action
the virtues or excellences of a human being, and thus how to behave and
live virtuously and excellently. As MacIntyre suggests, a teleological
ethical theory without a discussion of the virtues and their realization
"makes no sense.'" 9
The Carnegie Report does not, of course, purport to provide a full-
blown ethical theory, Aristotelian or otherwise, so one would not expect it
to contain a complete account of the role of the virtues in a good and truly
human life. Nevertheless, the absence of any substantial discussion of
lawyerly virtue(s) in the Report is troubling. If we assume that MacIntyre's
analysis of the role of the virtues in a teleological ethical theory is
essentially correct, then a complete account of the human telos, the good
human life, must include an account of the virtues or excellences intrinsic to
that life.6' Acting virtuously is, or at least is part of, living the good and
truly human life and achieving the human telos.69' By analogy, an account
of the telos or teloi of lawyering and the legal profession almost certainly
should include an account of the virtues or excellences of lawyering and
legal professionalism, whatever those virtues or excellences may be.692
Lawyering virtuously or excellently almost certainly is, or at least is part of,
achieving the telos or teloi of lawyering and the legal profession. Thus, just
as the punch list includes a demand for an account of the telos or teloi of
lawyering and the legal profession, so the punch list also includes a demand
for an account of the virtues of lawyering. Indeed, meeting the first demand
arguably requires meeting the second demand.
It is worth remarking that there also is a very practical reason for
insisting on an account of the lawyerly virtues as a precondition for further
progress on reforming legal education along the lines laid out in the
Carnegie Report. According to the Report itself, a fundamental purpose or
688. Id. at 52. For further discussion of this passage, see supra note 148 and accompanying text
689. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 148-49.
690. See id.
691. For a discussion of the role of acting or behaving excellently or virtuously in a teleological
framework, see supra notes 144-149 and accompanying text
692. 1 add the qualifier "almost certainly" because until we have an account of the telos or teloi of
lawyering and the legal profession and an account of the virtues of lawyering, we really cannot specify
with certainty what the relationship is between the telos or teloi and the virtues. In light of the relation-
ship that Aristotle discovered between the human telos and the human virtues, however, it seems reason-
able to proceed on the assumption that the relationship between the telos or felo! of lawyering and the
virtues of lawyering will be the same or at least analogous.
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telos of the second and third apprenticeships is inculcating virtues in novice
and apprentice lawyers.9 The second apprenticeship inculcates the virtue
of practical or professional judgment.69 The third apprenticeship
apparently inculcates other professional and lawyerly virtues.6 s But how
can we use these apprenticeships today or modify these apprenticeships in
the future to inculcate specific virtues in apprentice lawyers if we do not
know what virtues we wish to inculcate? Attempting to inculcate virtues
without first developing a catalog of virtues is tantamount to attempting to
teach children about the Revolutionary War without first learning something
about the Boston Tea Party, the Continental Congress, and the winter at
Valley Forge. One could make the same point using the terminology of
formation and formative education. How can we form the characters of
apprentice lawyers if we do not have a reasonably complete696 list of the
virtues with which we hope to inform those characters? The virtues are key
elements of the form to be realized in the law student through a formative
education. This means that a reasonably complete list of the virtues is not
just an intellectual or theoretical requirement for a plausible teleological
account of legal education but also a basic practical requirement for the
educational process.
4. What Is the Raw, Unformed Character of the Novice Lawyer?
The first three items on the punch list relate to the telos or teloi of legal
education and the foundation for that telos or those teloi. They deal, in
other words, with what, according to the Carnegie Report, we want the
novice or apprentice lawyer to become or achieve and why. If we turn,
however, to the other end of the teleological continuum, we find another
significant gap in the Report. As MacIntyre observes, a teleological account
or framework involves three elements: an account of the telos, an account of
the process for achieving the telos, and an account of the person as-he-or-
she-happens-to-be prior to embarking on the formative educational process
to achieve the telos.69' The Carnegie Report is all but silent on the subject
693. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28.
694. See supra Part m.B.2(b).
695. See supra Part IU.B.2(c).
696. I suggest the list of virtues should be "reasonably complete" because I do not believe we need
to insist on a final or exclusive list of virtues as a precondition to formative education. Clearly, the list
of virtues could evolve as part of the debate about the telos of lawyering and the legal profession. If,
however, the formative educational process tolerates a list of lawyerly virtues that we know is grossly
incomplete, then formative education will proceed with full knowledge of the fact that we lack an ade-
quate grasp of the form that we seek to inculcate. In such circumstances, if we happen to form lawyers
who show lawyerly virtue or excellence it would be by accident rather than by design. Indeed, we may
be fortunate to form lawyers at all.
697. See supra notes 145-155 and accompanying text.
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of the novice law student as-she-happens-to-be when entering law school.
In Part III, I constructed a somewhat imprecise account of the novice as-
she-happens-to-be at the outset of the three apprenticeships by reasoning
negatively, i.e., by subtracting from the apprentice and the journeyman
those characteristics that the apprenticeship process supposedly inculcates
in them. Using this approach, we found the novice to be a not-yet-fully-
mature person who cannot and will not abstract from messy concrete
situations, cannot exercise lawyering skills or practical judgment, and does
not know or even appreciate what it means to be a lawyer let alone how to
be a good or excellent lawyer.
There is, however, an obvious difference between reasoning backwards
from the telos of legal education to an account of what the novice is
presumed to be and actually studying the novice herself to figure out what
she is. The former deals in presumptions while the latter seeks to deal in
observable facts. Following the Carnegie Report, if we are to understand
legal education as a formative process, then we need to know not only the
telos, which is a key element of the form itself, but we also need to know
something about the raw matter on to which we plan to impress and in
which we plan to realize the form. If nothing else, we need to know what
characteristics the novice-the raw matter-already possesses and what
characteristics the novice lacks in order to know in what respects and to
what extent the novice requires formation. We also need to know whether
and to what extent the raw matter of the novice may limit our ability to form
her. It is one thing to form a screw driver out of tempered steel. It is quite
another thing to form a screw driver out of whipped cream or latex. A
whipped cream screw driver might be an interesting object for a cook, but it
probably will not help a carpenter to drive a screw. To carry the analogy
one step further, we cannot know whether the novice lawyer is steel or
whipped cream unless we study her as-she-happens-to-be and develop an
account of her as the matter of a formative process, an account that is not
entirely derivative of our account of the telos that we hope she eventually
will achieve.
The need for an account of the novice as-she-happens-to-be opens up a
range of potentially difficult problems, two of which I will mention here.
First, the novice lawyer-the new law student-is not simply a random blob
of raw material that wanders into a law school off the street. Rather, the
typical novice law student is the product of a careful selection process, a
process that imposes very strict limits on the sorts of raw material that can
enter law school. But this obvious fact raises an important question: are the
698. See, e.g., supra notes 226,237-51 and accompanying text.
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criteria by which we select the novice the correct criteria for identifying the
kind of raw material best suited to go through the teleological process of
legal education and achieve the telos or teloi? To answer this question, we
would have to identify the telos or teloi of legal education, including the
virtues of lawyering and legal professionalism, and then we would have to
look back at the process by which we select law students to determine
whether we are choosing the right raw material to undertake the formative
process leading to that telos or those teloi. It may, of course, be the case
that the current selection criteria, which typically focus on such issues as the
novice's grade point average in college and her performance on the Law
School Aptitude Test, are appropriate.6 99  But it could equally well be the
case that those criteria are not appropriate when viewed in the light of the
teleological framework outlined in the Carnegie Report.700 For example, it
might be the case that the current selection criteria are appropriate for
selecting a person who will excel in the first apprenticeship but not a person
who might excel in the second and third apprenticeships. The authors of the
Carnegie Report did not mention or address these questions about what the
raw material of the legal educational process actually is and what it could or
should be, but we must consider and at least provisionally resolve these
questions before we can claim that we have founded legal education on an
intellectually defensible teleological framework.701
Someone might respond to this argument that we do not need to worry
about the selection criteria for law students because the teleological
formative process will and should work on anyone who meets the basic
intellectual requirements for admission to law school. The problem with
699. In an online document advising potential law students about how to choose an appropriate
law school, the Law School Admissions Council (LSAC) states: "Most schools publish a grid that
indicates the number of applicants with LSAT scores and GPAs like yours who were admitted in the
most recent admission year. This gives you a general sense of your competitiveness as that school."
Assess Yourself Realistically, LSAC, http://www.Isac.org/JD/Choose/assess-yourself-realistically.asp
(last visited Sept. 14, 2012).
700. See supra Part I.B (discussing the Carnegie Report's teleological framework).
701. Once one acknowledges that the novice as-she-happens-to-be presents important unresolved
questions, a new problem comes into focus. The novice herself is the result of a long educational pro-
cess. If law schools were to adopt reforms that modify the ways in which they choose the raw material
admitted into their formative process, law schools inevitably would convey-whether intentionally or
not-information about those reforms to undergraduate educational institutions that "feed" students into
legal education. In turn, those undergraduate institutions may change the way they form the raw materi-
al for law schools. Thus, efforts to change the selection criteria for the raw material admitted to legal
education may create a feedback loop that leads to corresponding changes in the telos or teloi of under-
graduate education and related changes in the raw material available to law schools. Law professors
have been complaining for decades about the quality of education students receive before coming to law
school. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, On What Is Wrong with So-Called Legal Education, 35 COLUM. L.
REv. 651, 659 (1935). As Llewellym wrote in 1935, "the more we see of that, the less we like it. They
come unprepared. We know it. But about it, we do nothing." Id.
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this response is clear: in advance of any data, we have no reason to believe
it is true. Moreover, we have reasons derived from the Carnegie Report and
Aristotle to suspect it might be false. As noted above, the authors of the
Report appear to assume that the novice law student-the raw material-
will arrive at law school with a character, a set of dispositions, that responds
appropriately to what the authors consider to be positive or appropriate
models of lawyering.702 This assumption underlies the authors' statement
that "for students to incorporate the profession's ethical-social values into
their own, they need to encounter appealing representations of professional
ideals . . .. 3 But what if the "appealing representations" do not appeal to
all potential law students? What if some potential law students find the
"appealing representations" unappealing? Should a law school reject those
law students because the relevant appealing representations do not appeal to
them? A person who is immune or impervious to the appeal of an appealing
representation of professional ideals might respond badly or not at all to the
second apprenticeship's efforts to inculcate the rudiments of professional
judgment. She also might resist the third apprenticeship's efforts to
(re)form her character and (re)orient her to pursue new (for her)
professional purposes and values. If the authors cannot assure us that the
appealing representations of lawyering will appeal to any potential law
student, then the authors must acknowledge that there is a legitimate
question whether we should configure the law school admissions process, if
possible, to admit only students who find "appealing representations"
appealing, i.e., students who have the proper untutored dispositions and
character to embark on and benefit from a formative legal education
designed to mold their characters to pursue the purposes of the legal
profession as embodied in appealing representations.
This argument that formative education presupposes a particular
character or set of dispositions in the learner has deep roots in Aristotle's
own teleological ethical theory.70 As Aristotle wrote,
we need to have been brought up in fine habits if we are to be
adequate students of what is fine and just, and of political questions
generally. For the origin we begin from is the belief that something
is true, and if this is apparent enough to us, we will not, at this
stage, need the reason why it is true in addition; but if we have this
702. See supra note 316 and accompanying text.
703. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 135.
704. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 157, at 6 [NICOMAcHEAN ETHics i:5 1095 b 4-9].
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good upbringing, we have the origins to begin from, or can easily
acquire them.
Analyzing this passage, Broadie comments that for Aristotle, "we do need.
. . to have been brought up in good ways of feeling and acting ... . We
must have sound values, because our actual values afford the only possible
ethical starting points, and unless they are sound the starting points will be
false." 7  MacIntyre elaborates this point:
The vicious argue unsoundly from false premises about the good. .
. . Only the virtuous are able to argue soundly to those conclusions
which are their actions . . . . In their initial training it was the
acquisition of virtuous habits which enable the virtuous to perform
those actions in reflection upon which they first formulated, even if
initially in skeletal form, those principles of action which define
human excellence, the various virtues and indeed the good and the
best itself. Moreover, in so doing they became able to engage in
theoretical enquiry about practice, as well as in practical enquiries,
deliberations ... which they, lacking the virtues, would not be able
707to engage in.
Thus, it seems clear that for Aristotle, ethical deliberation and ethical
training presuppose a student with a good upbringing and proper
dispositions-virtuous habits or, in Broadie's terms, "sound values." A
person without such habits or values likely will reason from and act upon
false ethical premises in pursuit of vicious, i.e., non-virtuous, ends. By
analogy, a novice law student who lacks virtuous habits and proper
dispositions or values instilled by a proper upbringing likely would respond
badly or fail to respond at all to a formative ethical education of the sort
found in the third apprenticeship. Appealing representations of lawyerly
virtue might not appeal to such a person-not because of a defect in the
representations but because of a lack in her. I have discussed this point at
length not to argue that Aristotle is correct but to underline the need for a
more serious examination of the character of the raw material-the novice
705. Id.
706. BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARISTOTLE, supra note 143, at 22. The fact that ethical education
and reasoning must begin from and build on the well-raised student's dispositions does not mean those
dispositions are beyond criticism or correction. As Broadie observes, "[t]he value data of ethics, like the
perceptual data from which natural science starts, can be modified and corrected, but only against each
other and in the light of deductions for which some of them must serve as premisses." Id. (emphasis in
original).
707. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 145, at 136.
708. BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARTISTOTLE, supra note 143, at 22.
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law student as-she-happens-to-be-and a concomitant examination of the
process by which we select the novices whom we admit to law school.
Without an examination of the character of the novice as-she-happens-to-be
and of the process by which we admit her to law school, we will have an
inadequate understanding of the starting point of the formative educational
process that the Carnegie Report describes and advocates.
A closely related issue that the authors of the Carnegie Report ignore
concerns not the characteristics of the novice as-she-happens-to-be but the
formative process through which legal educators seek to realize the telos in
her.70 Once we have identified the telos or teloi of legal education and we
have an adequate, evidence-based account of the novice as-she-happens-to-
be, we can inquire what kind of formative process is adequate or proper or
best to move the novice from the raw starting point to the telos or teloi.
Moreover, if our account of the novice as-she-happens-to-be varies (as it
probably will) with our choice of the criteria by which we select novices for
legal education, then our account of the adequate, proper, and/or best
formative process for moving the novice to her telos or teloi could well vary
along with our account of the novice. It only makes sense that the process
by which one forms raw material will vary according to the material one has
selected. Building a roof out of asphalt shingles will require a very different
process from building a roof out of wood shingles or clay tiles. Building a
lawyer out of one kind of novice may require a different process from
building a lawyer out of another kind of novice. Of course, it may turn out
that roughly the same kind of formative process will work on all types of
novices (assuming the novices have the necessary intellectual abilities and
habits of character), but we have no reason to assume in advance that that
will be the case and no reason for neglecting to gather and analyze evidence
about the adequacy of various possible kinds of formative processes in
transforming various kinds of novices.
5. What Are the Virtues or Excellences of the Law Professor?
The Carnegie Report argues at considerable length that we should view
the formative process of legal education as an apprenticeship or set of
apprenticeships.1 o If we accept this view as a basis for future progress on
educational reform, then we not only have to examine in greater detail the
key elements of the apprenticeship process-as argued in Parts V.C.1
through 4-but we also have to recognize that, at least conceptually, the
709. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
710. See id. at 25-27; see also supra Part D.B.2 (discussing the concept of apprenticeship in
detail).
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apprentice is part of a dyad with a master whose function or telos is to guide
and form the apprentice. The Carnegie Report itself avoids using the term
"master," but as argued above, the very statement that the law student is an
apprentice seems to entail the conclusion that the person who teaches the
student, typically the law professor, is or should be a master.71' This
conclusion raises a host of questions that I have sought to summarize for
purposes of this punch list as "what are the virtues or excellences of the law
professor?" To put the same question in slightly different terms, what sorts
of characteristics or excellences must a law professor have in order to serve,
and, if possible, serve well, as a master in a formative apprenticeship
process of the sort outlined in the Report? 712 The Report does not raise or
attempt to answer this question, and thus, the account of apprenticeship that
it offers remains incomplete.
The Carnegie Report's authors may have assumed that the masters in
the apprenticeship process are and should be exactly the people or kind(s) of
people who currently serve as members of law faculties. Clearly, if we can
describe the current process of legal education as an apprenticeship
(however deficient it may be in practice), then it must be the case that, in the
absence of any alternatives, today's law professors serve as the masters. 714
But whether these law professors have the proper characteristics-the
proper virtues or excellences-to serve as masters is simply not clear. Dean
Langdell himself argued that his new case-dialogue method demanded a
particular and novel kind of mastery in an educator. 1 In 1887, he declared
that "[w]hat qualifies a person . . . to teach law, is not experience in the
work of a lawyer's office, not experience in dealing with men, not
experience in the trial or argument of causes, not experience, in short, in
using law, but experience in learning law... ". Nearly ninety years later,
Professor Grossman observed that "Dean Langdell's emphasis on 'learning
law' as opposed to 'using law' has left traditional law teachers ill-equipped
to design or supervise clinical programs. With Langdell's ideas, teachers
with practice experience have been shunned by law schools."717 By the
1970s, in other words, the typical law professor may not have been qualified
to serve as a master in the Carnegie Report's second apprenticeship, or
711. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
712. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
713. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
714. The list of masters also would have to include adjunct faculty who, in my experience, often
are practitioners invited to teach a single course. The list also might have to include people who direct
externship programs outside the law school.
715. See Langdell, supra note 215, at 124.
716. Id.
717. Grossman, supra note 214, at 182.
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perhaps, the third.718 The Report seems to reflect this same concern about
the qualifications of the professoriate in the twenty-first century. The
authors observe that
[i]ntellectual mastery alone is, indeed, always a possible pathology
of schooling-one that can subtly subvert the best efforts of
professional schools by displacing the goal of learning the
profession with a more self-contained academic aim of technical
virtuosity, detached from attention to the ends of legal training.
This danger is intensified by the fact that students who go on to
become the next generation of law school faculty are drawn from
the subset of students who achieve the very highest levels of
technical, intellectual mastery.
The implication of this observation, an implication the authors do not draw
or explore, is that the widespread, Langdellian approach to selecting law
professors from those who achieve "the very highest levels of technical,
intellectual mastery" in law school may be pathological or may at least
nourish a pathology that threatens professional education. Aside from these
isolated and somewhat cryptic remarks about law professors, however, the
Carnegie Report provides no basis for assuming, let alone concluding, that
today's professoriate does or does not have the proper characteristics to
serve as masters, because the Report does not delve into the question of
what characteristics a master must have to perform the functions assigned to
her by the teleological formative process.7 0 The Report simply avoids the
issue.
One can, of course, speculate about why the Carnegie Report fails to
delve into obvious questions about the virtues or excellences of mastery in
the field of legal education. No doubt the authors could have ensured that
many of today's legal educators would either ignore or lambaste the Report
if the authors had claimed that such educators lack the proper characteristics
to serve as masters. The authors also may have concluded that, as a tactical
matter, it makes more sense to focus attention on questions about the
educational process-the mission of the Carnegie Foundation-than to take
718. As Dean Cramton observes, law professors "have forsaken the profession that the law student
plans to enter; and their attitude toward practitioners is often touched with an air of superiority and
disdain." Cramton, supra note 182, at 259. If law professors have forsaken the profession (an "if' that
requires careful examination), then it would be at least odd if not clearly inappropriate for those same
professors to model and form the apprentice lawyer's identity as a member of the profession.
719. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 144. For further discussion of the narrow criteria that
law schools use to select new doctrinal faculty members, see Newton, supra note 286, at 126-39.
720. See generally CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1.
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on the vested interests of the legal professoriate in continuing to get paid to
do what they already do.721 No doubt the authors also realized that even
readers without a vested interest in the status quo might wonder about the
merits of a study of legal education that concluded the typical law professor
is not qualified to do her job, a job she and (as Professor Grossman
suggests) people like her have been doing in much the same way since
Langdell revolutionized Harvard Law School in 1870.72 Even if we agree
that legal education needs reforming, a reform proposal that includes
cashiering the current professoriate would have seemed far too extreme to
serve as the basis for a serious debate.
While recognizing the interests and concerns that discussion of the
professoriate's qualifications will provoke, I suggest that some such
discussion is a requirement for further progress in elaborating and, perhaps,
implementing the educational program that the Carnegie Report outlines.
Law students cannot serve as apprentices unless their professors can serve
as masters. Professors can serve as masters only if they are qualified to do
so. Thus, as a condition of further progress along the Carnegie Report's
path, it will be necessary to look into the characteristics--the virtues or
excellences-that equip a person to serve and serve well as a master of
apprentice lawyers.724 More specifically, if we accept the framework of the
three apprenticeships, it will be necessary to ask what might be the virtues
or excellences of someone who teaches apprentices to think like lawyers, of
someone who teaches apprentices the skills of lawyering and the related
virtue of practical judgment, and of someone who guides apprentices to
understand and adopt the social and ethical purpose(s) and identity of the
lawyer.725 We know that, according to the Carnegie Report's authors, the
master typically will model skills and capabilities for the apprentice as part
of the effort to form and transform her. 7 Thus, we can ask what sort or
sorts of person is best suited to model the form(s) that the apprentice must
realize or achieve during each of the three apprenticeships.
Following this line of inquiry, one question that may have to be
answered anew (as Grossman implies)7 27 is whether we should insist that a
721. Robert Stevens observed that "the law professor has developed vested interests which some-
times savor of the eighteenth century's 'parson's freehold."' Stevens, supra note 5, at 42.
722. See Grossman, supra note 214, at 163.
723. For a provocative discussion of the professoriate's qualifications that takes the Carnegie
Report as a starting point, see generally Newton, supra note 286.
724. Maclntyre has provided a short but potentially helpful general discussion of the virtues of
mastery and professorship. See MACINTYRE, AFFERVIRTUE, supra note 145, at 191-92.
725. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-29 for the framework of the three apprenticeships.
726. See, e.g., supra note 202 and accompanying text.
727. Grossman, supra note 214, at 171-72.
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master who teaches apprentice lawyers will have practiced law herself.728 A
related question is how long she should have practiced law. These
questions date back at least to the era of James Barr Ames, a professor and
later Dean at Harvard Law School from 1873-when Langdell hired him-
to 1910.729 As Robert Stevens observes,
Ames was the first non-practitioner teacher, yet for someone who
had little experience with practice, Ames became the role model for
the teacher at the elite law school. . . . Members of this new breed
of law teachers were normally young, at least when appointed, and
increasingly equipped with judicial clerking experience but rarely
with more than a couple of years experience in practice."3
A recent study by Brent Newton supports Stevens's point. According to
Newton, "[t]he data showed that the typical non-experiential, tenure-track
professor had only 3 years of practical legal experience before being hired
as a full-time faculty member."7 3' Entry-level tenure-track professors at
top-tier law schools had much less practical experience, and over 45 percent
had no practical experience at all. In my own institution, the University
of Kentucky College of Law, we have faculty members, both junior and
senior, with practice experience ranging from none whatsoever, to a year or
two in a judicial clerkship, to anywhere from two or three to ten or more
years at a major law firm.3 The question is whether it is defensible to
continue to hire and promote law professors with little or no lawyering
728. For a recent discussion of this issue, see generally Newton, supra note 286.
729. For Ames's biography, see generally Samuel Williston, James Barr Ames (1846-1910), 51
PROc. Am. ACAD. ARTS & ScI. 845 (1916).
730. Stevens, Challenge, supra note 219, at 482. Unlike his protdg6 Ames, Langdell himself
practiced law in New York City for 16 years, apparently in relative obscurity, before assuming the Dane
professorship at Harvard in 1870. See Batchelder, supra note 219, at 439. Writing in 1912, Columbia's
Dean Stone-who later served as an Associate Justice and then as Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme
Court-suggested that after Langdell introduced the case-dialogue method at Harvard, law schools
began to hire as faculty members recent law-school graduates with little or no practice experience be-
cause only recent graduates had actual experience with the case-dialogue method and could be expected
to use it properly. See Harlan F. Stone, The Importance of Actual Experience at the Bar as a Prepara-
tion for Teaching Law, 3 AM. L. SCH. REv. 205, 205 (1912). Thus, Langdell may have taken the then-
extraordinary step of hiring Ames because, one assumes, Ames had excelled in Langdell's classroom
and thereby demonstrated the ability to use Langdell's brand new method to teach other law students.
Of course, this rationale for hiring law school graduates with minimal practice experience no longer
holds water because almost everyone practicing law today has experienced the case-dialogue method of
education in some form. There is, however, considerable debate about whether the case dialogue is the
best way to educate lawyers. See supra notes 77-82, 221-24 and accompanying text.
731. Newton, supra note 286, at 129-30.
732. Id. at 130.
733. Faculty Directory, UNIV. OF KY. COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.law.uky.edulindex.php?pid=
80 (last visited on Sept. 20, 2012).
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experience if we accept the proposition that the law professor is a master in
an apprenticeship process designed to form the novice law student into a
journeyman lawyer. Dean Langdell, who hired Ames to teach at Harvard,
believed that learning law was the only experience relevant to teaching
law.734 But this suggests that Langdell's ideal teacher would be a master of
learning law,'73 a master student or perhaps a first-rate journeyman, and not
necessarily a master of the practice of law or a master of teaching law. 7 36 1
do not propose to enter further into the debate about whether and how long
a law professor should have practiced law before escaping to academe. I
simply suggest that we will have to address this potentially controversial
issue in any reasonably complete account of the virtues or excellences of a
person who can serve as a master law professor in the apprenticeship
process that the Carnegie Report outlines.
Any adequate account of the virtues or excellences of the Carnegie
Report's master law professor will have to address a second issue that is at
least as controversial as the question whether and how long a law professor
should have practiced law. In a rather biting attack on proposals to teach
practical skills in law school, Judge Clark-who had served as Dean of Yale
Law School from 1929 to 1939-made a provocative observation:
[I]t is this very independence, this attempt to follow the intellectual
life, to be true to matters of the mind, which in my view is the
foundation for the success the [law] schools have attained and for
734. See supra note 716 and accompanying text.
735. As Preble Stolz remarked, "[p]rofessors tend to teach to and grade on the talents that made
them successful law students." Stolz, Clinical Experience, supra note 194, at 74 n.67. If he is correct,
then each generation of law professors may reinforce, perhaps inadvertently, the tendency to pack the
professoriate with people who have the characteristics of a highly successful law student. The question,
which sounds almost paradoxical, is whether a highly successful law student is the best sort of person to
form novices into practicing lawyers.
736. In addition to asking whether a master in the apprenticeship process outlined by the Carnegie
Report should have experience practicing law, it would be appropriate to ask whether a master should
have some kind of experience or training as a teacher. It seems counterintuitive that the masters in the
legal apprenticeship process would have neither experience as lawyers nor experience as teachers and
yet they would claim to be master teachers of law. It may, of course, be possible to argue that law teach-
ing is itself a kind of apprenticeship in which junior faculty members serve as apprentices and some-
one-perhaps a more senior faculty member-serves as the master. The apprentice teacher would gain
the requisite teaching experience as a junior faculty member during a formative process that should
result in mastery. This line of argument would open up a range of new questions about the nature of the
law teaching apprenticeship, its purpose or telos, and whether its current structure adequately serves that
purpose or telos.
737. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 27-29. The issue is potentially controversial because
it reflects directly on the qualifications of everyone who currently teaches law. In my experience, the
issue arises in some form whenever a law faculty considers hiring a new junior faculty member. The
discussion surrounding a faculty candidate's practice experience and its relevance is almost always lively
and often quite personal.
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the high regard in which they are actually held by thinking members
of our profession. I suggest that here are values too important to be
sacrificed or damaged and that the more undesirable feature of the
pressure for practicality is that it is aimed fundamentally at the
intellectual life of the school. Raw vocationalism cannot be
practiced without sacrifice of things of the spirit, and the price of
requiring it is altogether too high for any possible gain.
Judge Clark here juxtaposes vocationalism to the intellectual and spiritual
life of the law school, thus reminding us that law professors typically do not
simply teach apprentices to practice law.139 At most law schools, professors
also do research on and write about law.740 If Judge Clark is correct, the
law school as an institution has an intellectual life, and that life concentrates
not only on training lawyers but on law as a subject of intellectual
discussion, analysis, and criticism.741 One assumes that in Judge Clark's
account, law students participate in the school's intellectual life with their
professors, perhaps by studying and discussing the law for its own sake and
not "just" learning the law as a vocation. According to Judge Clark, the
more we emphasize vocationalism and focus on what the Carnegie Report
might call the apprenticeship aspect of law school, the less we will
emphasize and support the intellectual life of law school, the life of
scholarship, and intellectual inquiry about law.742 In the process, we may
risk "killing the spirit" of the law school.743
It is beyond the scope of this Article to take a position on Judge Clark's
argument, but it is important for purposes of this propaedeutic punch list to
acknowledge that he implicitly raises at least three fundamental questions
about the function or telos of the law professor and her professional identity
and thus about the virtues or excellences we should demand in her.744 These
questions are: (1) to what extent is the scholarly or spiritual/intellectual
orientation to law an intrinsic part of the law professor's function/telos and
professional identity? 745 (2) assuming we adopt an account of the law
738. Clark, supra note 255, at 428.
739. See id.
740. As Professor Stolz observes, "[i]t is an article of faith in the law teaching profession that
good teaching and scholarship go together." Stolz, Clinical Experience, supra note 194, at 67.
741. See Clark, supra note 255, at 428.
742. Id.
743. I have borrowed the phrase "killing the spirit" from the title of a book by Page Smith criticiz-
ing modern higher education. See PAGE SMITH, KILLING THE SPiIT (1991).
744. See generally Clark, supra note 255.
745. See id at 428. Chief Justice Roberts recently set the legal professoriate atwitter with a biting
criticism of modern, impractical legal scholarship.
256 [Vol. 39
2012] TWO AND A HALF ETHICAL THEORIES 257
professor's function/telos and professional identity that incorporates a
scholarly and spiritual/intellectual orientation, how does that account square
with the Carnegie Report's account of the law professor as master in an
apprenticeship process? 74 and (3) assuming we can incorporate the account
of law-professor-as-scholar into the account of law-professor-as-master-of-
apprentice-lawyers, what virtues or excellences will this complex account of
the law professor demand?747 The Carnegie Report offers nothing useful on
"Pick up a copy of any law review that you see," Roberts said, "and the first article is likely
to be, you know, the influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th-century
Bulgaria, or something, which I'm sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but
isn't of much help to the bar."
Jonathan H. Adler, Chief Justice Roberts and Current Legal Scholarship, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY
(July 23, 2011, 11:07 AM), http://volokh.com/2011/07/23/chief-justice-roberts-and-current-legal-
scholarship/. The Chief Justice's comment suggests that he would approve of scholarship that provides
"help to the bar," i.e., practice-oriented scholarship. For a sample of the responses that the Chief Justice
provoked, see Debra Cassens Weiss, Law Prof Responds After Chief Justice Roberts Disses Legal
Scholarship, Comments, A.B.A. JOURNAL (July 7, 2011, 5:29 AM),
http://www.abajoumal.com/mobile/comments/law_prof responds after chiefjustice robertsdisses_1e
gal-scholarship/.
746. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23-29. Many commentators see a tension between
these two accounts of the law professor. As Dean Rubin observed,
virtually all the material rewards that tenured faculty members receive, other than basic job
security, depend on their research production. The quality of their research, as measured
largely by the attention that it attracts from other academics, determines their salary raises,
their summer grants, their supplementary expense funding, and their access to funds for
organizing conferences ....
Edward Rubin, Should Law Schools Support Faculty Research?, 17 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 139,
141-42 (2008). As Brent Newton has argued,
neither the Carnegie Report nor Best Practices appears to acknowledge the enormous obstacle
standing in the way of their proposed reforms: law schools' increasing practice of primarily
hiring impractical professors whose chief mission is to produce theoretical legal scholarship
and who not only lack practical skills, but also feel indifference toward (or in some cases
outright disdain for) both practicing attorneys and practical components of the law school
faculty such as clinicians.
Newton, supra note 286, at 113. The Carnegie Report comments that "the career and reward structures
of the legal academy . . . have increasingly emphasized theory over practice, scholarship over teaching,
cognitive over ethical engagement." CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 114. Indeed, this Article has
taken so long to prepare that I have received some not-so-subtle indications that I am failing to live up to
my College's expectations for scholarly productivity.
747. See Clark, supra note 255, at 428. There appears to be very little evidence suggesting that
prolific scholars make better law teachers. See Newton, supra note 286, at 138. Thus, there is no reason
to assume in advance of the evidence that the scholarly virtues are also the virtues of the master in any of
the three apprenticeships. Brian Tamanaha recently suggested that "it is by no means a safe assumption
that the bulk of law professors would have thrived in the practice of law." TAMANAHA, supra note 19, at
47. It is not intuitively obvious that people who would not have succeeded in legal practice are the ideal
group to teach the next generation of practitioners.
258 OHIO NORTHERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
any of these questions about the function/telos and professional identity of
law professors, 7 4 8 but we will need to address them as and when we attempt
to develop a formative, teleological approach to legal education based on
the Report.749
6. What Is the Proper Response to Emotivism in the Law
Faculty and Law Students?
As discussed in Part IV.A, the emotivist framework shadows the
Carnegie Report's teleological account of formative legal education.
Emotivism holds that a person's moral beliefs and precepts reflect nothing
more than the person's preferences, attitudes, and feelings.7 0 According to
the emotivist, there is and can be no impersonal, objective, rational basis for
adopting a particular set of moral beliefs and precepts or preferring one 'set
of moral beliefs and precepts over another.7 5 1 Emotivism thus implicitly
raises the fundamental question whether the ethical precepts and purposes
of lawyering and the legal profession to be taught in the third apprenticeship
will reflect nothing more than someone's preferences, attitudes, and
feelings.7 52 The preferences, attitudes, and feelings may be those of the
person doing the teaching or they may be those of some other person or
group, perhaps an "expert" on the subject of legal ethics or perhaps the
ABA and some of its members. The authors imply that emotivist views
748. See CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 188. The Carnegie Report does suggest somewhat
obliquely that there may be a tension between the roles of lawyer as scholar and lawyer as practitioner,
thus pointing us to questions about whether and how any master could model both roles in the formative
process. See id. (omitting practical training from law school will "prolong and reinforce the habits of
thinking like a student rather than an apprentice practitioner, thus conveying the impression that lawyers
are more like competitive scholars than attorneys engaged with the problems of clients."). The Report
does not discuss whether and how law professors who are themselves scholars and, often, competitive
scholars can or should be expected to teach an apprentice attorney to deal with clients or, more generally,
to practice law.
749. For an argument that the Progressive movement played a central role in forming the profes-
sional identity of law professors, see Auerbach, supra note 31, at 553-56. In contrast with Judge Clark,
Auerbach sees the tension in the professional identity of law professors not as a struggle between the
intellectual life and vocationalism but as a struggle between two conflicting objectives of legal educa-
tion: "mak[ing] the law into a responsive social institution" and "train[ing] practitioners." Id. at 568.
The conceptual link between Clark's view and Auerbach's may lie in the law professor's tendency to
treat making law more socially "responsive" (Auerbach) as a, if not the, telos of the law professor's and
the law school's scholarly and spiritual/intellectual life (Clark). According to this synthesis of Clark and
Auerbach, "true" scholarship and spiritual/intellectual activity apparently would be Progressive in its
focus on making law more responsive to supposed social needs. The affinities between this view of
legal scholarship and the Brandeis model of civic professionalism, itself a product of the Progressive era,
see supra notes 404-15 and accompanying text, are obvious.
750. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12.
751. Id. at 12.
752. See supra note 438 and accompanying text.
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may be widespread among members of the legal professoriate. But at no
point do the authors discuss the implications of emotivism and its presence
in the professoriate-or the student body-for the formative teleological
educational process that they describe and recommend.M Indeed, the
authors appear to dismiss the emotivist challenge by appealing to the power
or authority of the ABA, 75 a tactic that should not satisfy anyone who tries
to take the ethical foundations of the Carnegie Report seriously. If, as I
argue in Part IV.A, emotivism poses a fundamental challenge to the
teleological framework that supports the formative educational process, then
we need to develop an intellectually persuasive response, or perhaps a set of
responses, to emotivism as a condition for real progress in the direction that
the Report attempts to guide us. We do not, of course, need to cease work
on all other issues pending a resolution of this one, but we need to work on
this issue because it threatens to undermine the foundations for progress on
many, if not most, other issues related to legal education that emerge from
the Carnegie Report. In the following sections, I briefly outline two
strategies for dealing with the emotivist threat to the teleological
framework, strategies I have labeled "refutation" and "incorporation."
a. Refutation
From an intellectual standpoint, clearly the most satisfying way to
dispose of emotivism would be to refute it decisively. Otherwise, it may
continue to spring up like a mushroom in an otherwise attractive lawn.
Unfortunately, refuting emotivism through argument alone may prove
difficult precisely because emotivism in its modern form seems to have
emerged as a default or fallback position when attempts to construct
arguments in support of one or another ethical framework or theory
failed.756 In other words, emotivism is the mushroom that springs up on a
dying or dead moral theory, feasting on rotting, failed arguments. Since
emotivism is a product not of good arguments but of the absence of good
arguments, decisively refuting it probably would require constructing a
persuasive, valid argument for a moral theory or framework, an argument
that does not shrivel under pressure from the intellectual environment and
thereby provide decaying matter on which emotivism may feast. In other
words, refuting emotivism requires, at least in part, making out an
753. See supra notes 445-52 and accompanying text.
754. See supra notes 445-52 and accompanying text.
755. See supra note 453 and accompanying text (the authors do not suggest or imply that the
power or authority of the ABA is the power or authority of the superior rational argument).
756. See supra notes 479-80 and accompanying text.
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affirmative case for a moral or ethical position such as the teleological
framework derived from Aristotle and put forward by the Carnegie
Report.' This is essentially the point that MacIntyre makes in somewhat
pithier form when he titles the final chapter of his most famous book "After
Virtue: Nietzsche or Aristotle, Trotsky and St. Benedict."7 ss As MacIntyre
observes, "Nietzschean man, the Obermensch, the man who transcends,
finds his good nowhere in the social world to date, but only in that in
himself which dictates his own new law and his own new table of the
virtues."75 9  Nietzsche here represents emotivism and its nihilist
implications.760  Nietzsche's position will be persuasive to the extent that
competing positions such as Aristotle's fail under careful scrutiny.
Nietzschean nihilism is the default.76 ' As MacIntyre summarizes the point,
"the Nietzschean would at least have the consolation of being unpopularly
in the right-unless, that is, the rejection of the Aristotelian tradition turned
out to have been mistaken."762 Thus, for someone who wishes to build on
the Carnegie Report, the best and perhaps only way to refute emotivism
(and Nietzsche) is to construct a persuasive argument in favor of the
teleological ethical framework, i.e., to pursue the first two tasks on my
propaedeutic punch list.763
Short of constructing a full-scale defense of the teleological framework,
it may be possible to offer some reasons for rejecting emotivism that should
appeal to educators such as law professors, if not to everyone who
participates in the field of moral debate. These reasons would take the form
"if you are committed to X, Y, and Z as a law professor, particularly a law
professor who teaches ethics, then you must reject emotivism." Of course,
such reasons are persuasive only if the law professor is committed to X, Y,
757. See generally BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARISTOTLE, supra note 143; CARNEGIE REPORT, supra
note 1. I do not mean to suggest that a teleological framework is the only possible theory one might
defend in order to avoid emotivism. Clearly, a latter day Kantian or Utilitarian might attempt to defend a
very different type of moral theory in an effort to stave off emotivism. Such a theory would, however,
probably fit very poorly into the formative educational process described in the Carnegie Report, which
appears to rely upon an Aristotelian teleological framework. See supra Part ILI.B (discussing the teleo-
logical framework underlying the Carnegie Report).
758. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 256. MacIntyre says very little about the
significance of Trotsky and St. Benedict, but as I have suggested at various points in this Article, he has
a great deal to say about Aristotle's teleological ethics and about Nietzsche. See id.
759. Id. at 257. For Nietzsche's own comments about the Obermensch, usually translated as
"superman" or "overman," see, e.g., NIETZSCHE, ZARATHUSTRA, supra note 442, at 124-31. See also
WALTER KAUFMANN, NIETZSCHE: PHILOSOPHER, PSYCHOLOGIST, ANTICHRIST 307-16 (4th ed. 1974)
(examining the many passages in Nietzsche's work that discuss the Obermensch).
760. For Nietzsche's relationship to emotivism, see supra note 442.
761. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 257.
762. Id. (emphasis omitted).
763. See supra Part V.C.I.
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and Z and is not prepared to give up those commitments. A law professor
could continue to adhere to and defend emotivism if she is prepared to
accept the wages of her position. I will describe briefly four lines of attack
that one might pursue against emotivism. It is beyond the scope of this
Article to develop these lines of attack and I do not want to rule out the
possibility that emotivism may be able to mount a reasonably successful
defense against one or more of them. This discussion is intended to be
merely suggestive and I expect to pursue it in a later publication.
First, some law professors might reject emotivism because emotivism
seems to reduce the third apprenticeship to an exercise in manipulative
instrumentalism, an exercise that I assume many law professors would be
committed to reject. Emotivism appears to require professors to teach
students that ethical virtues and principles are nothing more than means to
an end, an end that itself reflects nothing more than preferences, attitudes,
and feelings.7" If an emotivist found herself teaching legal ethics (perhaps
at the insistence of her Dean), 765 how would she respond to a query from a
student about why lawyers should obey the rules of ethics? She should not
say "because it is right and good for everyone (or at least every lawyer) to
do so." Emotivism teaches that any such judgment reflects a personal
preference, attitude, or feeling that the student might not share. Indeed, the
judgment might reflect a personal preference that the professor herself does
not share. As an emotivist, she would be forced to say instead that the
student should follow the rules insofar as it is consistent with the student's
values to do so. If the student values physical liberty and/or economic
stability, for example, the student should follow the rules of ethics because
doing so will help to keep her out of jail while allowing her to remain in the
relatively lucrative legal profession. If the student happens to value
following rules per se, she should follow the rules of ethics as a means of
adhering to her personal rule-following preference. If she values the
admiration of family and friends that she might receive by obeying the
rules, she should follow the rules as a means to obtaining such admiration.
All of the emotivist law professor's justifications for following the rules
of legal ethics have in common the assertion that the student should follow
the rules as a means to achieving or realizing her own values and purposes,
764. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12.
765. The argument in the text does not depend for its persuasiveness on the plausibility of a sce-
nario in which an emotivist teaches legal ethics. I have used that scenario to highlight the issue of how
emotivism must deal with questions about the foundations of legal ethics. Ethical questions-end de-
bates about the foundations of ethical practice-might arise in any course in a law school from Antitrust
to Business Associations to Tax. An emotivist teaching any of those courses might have to confront the
same difficulties confronted by the emotivist who focuses on legal ethics.
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whatever those may be. The student's values and purposes are givens and
the rules of legal ethics function only as instruments or means for achieving
those given values and purposes, a position that I refer to here as
"instrumentalist." Reasoning about legal ethics should focus solely on the
means to achieve the student's values, purposes, and ends because, from an
intellectual standpoint that rejects teleological argument, "[r]eason is
calculative . . . . In the realm of practice therefore it can speak only of
means. About ends it must be silent."7  For the emotivist, legal education
cannot seek to reform and improve the student's character as an ethical
professional by inculcating a new and better set of values, purposes, or ends
because no set of values, purposes or ends is objectively better than any
other set. 6 Moreover, emotivism should treat the teloi of the first and
second apprenticeships as means to or instruments for achieving the
student's (or someone's) values and preferences. In other words, for the
emotivist, thinking like a lawyer, practicing skillfully, exercising
professional judgment, and following ethical rules can be nothing more than
instruments for achieving the student's (or someone's) ends, ends rooted
solely in the student's (or someone's) preferences, attitudes, and feelings, all
of which lie beyond rational debate and criticism.76 8  Instrumentalist
arguments will thus provide the "ethical" justification for every phase and
element of legal education. Nothing the student learns in legal ethics can or
will serve an end higher than the student's (or someone's) own preferences,
attitudes, and feelings, because there are no higher ends.769 There are only
instruments or means for achieving the student's (or someone's) ends.
766. Id. at 54. Macintyre's comment sbout calculative reason clearly relies on Max Weber's well-
known discussion of "instrumentally rational (zweckrational)" social action, i.e., action "determined by
expectations as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expecta-
tions are used as 'conditions' or 'means' for the attainment of the actor's own rationally pursued and
calculated ends . . . ." MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCiETY 24 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
1978). For Weber's own examination of this notion, see id. at 26.
767. See BLOoM, supra note 15, at 143.
768. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12. Dean Cramton makes a related point
when he observes that one of the "[miodem dogmas [that] entangle legal education ... [is] a pragmatism
tending toward an amoral instrumentalism." Cramton, supra note 182, at 262. In particular, Cramton
worries that law students have become "technicians who are trained in the dispassionate use of legal
skills for the instrumental purposes of those they serve." Id. at 251. Thus, what begins as "amoral
instrumentalism" in the service of one's own values becomes "amoral instrumentalism" in the service of
the client's values. See id. at 251, 262.
769. Robert Bellah makes a related point about the place of instrumental reason in university
education. See Bellah, supra note 200, at 111. As he observes, according to a widely held modem view,
"the university is composed of atomized, individualistic students with certain fixed impermeable goals.
The university's only purpose is to help students attain their goals by communicating to them certain
discrete skills and certain discrete bodies of fact about the external world which they can then 'use."' Id.
The emotivist would say that those "fixed impermeable goals" can be called values, and they are "im-
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In the most extreme form of emotivist instrumentalism, teaching ethical
virtues and precepts to the apprentice might entail training her to recognize,
parrot, and obey a new but to her foreign set of precepts and virtues and to
mimic when necessary the related preferences, attitudes, and feelings. She
would be taught to engage in this ethical performance for the purely
instrumental reason that she must learn to speak and act the way a lawyer
supposedly speaks and acts in order to obtain some benefit of lawyering-
perhaps a high salary or prestige-that she values. In this form of ethical
education, the virtues and precepts of legal ethics would not reflect the
apprentice's own preferences, attitudes, and feelings. Rather, the virtues
and precepts would become tools that she uses or, perhaps, an aspect of the
role that she plays when she walks on stage as a lawyer. She-the actress-
does not share the lawyerly virtues and precepts or the underlying
preferences, attitudes, and feelings any more than Laurence Olivier shared
the virtues, precepts, preferences, attitudes, and feelings of Hamlet; 770 but
she performs the part of a person who has these virtues, precepts,
preferences, attitudes, and feelings because that is the person whom her
professors and the bar apparently prefer her to play and with whom a client
apparently prefers to deal. In this extreme form, emotivism reduces virtues,
precepts, preferences, attitudes, and feelings to an instrumentalist
simulacrum, a theatrical performance that allows the student to achieve her
goals by paying lip service to certain principles and mimicking someone
else's preferences, attitudes, and feelings. Emotivism thus introduces a
pervasive instrumentalism into teaching, learning, and following the
principles of legal ethics that, I suggest, should make emotivism
unappealing to law professors committed to the view that ethical principles
and precepts are not mere means to arbitrary, subjectively defined ends.
As an example of the ease with which ethical education can descend
into a kind of cynical instrumentalism, it is helpful to look at a suggestion
that Professor Luban made.77 ' According to Luban, we should teach
lawyers to engage in what he calls "client counseling," which "is an
abbreviation for a morally activist vision of lawyering in which lawyers take
it upon themselves to judge and shape client projects."77 2 It emerges,
however, that "client counseling" may involve a radically instrumentalist
permeable" because they are rooted in the student's preferences, attitudes, and feelings, which lie beyond
rational disputation. See id
770. For a cinematic record of Olivier's performance, see HAMLET (Two Cities 1948).
771. David Luban, The Noblesse Oblige Tradition in the Practice ofLaw, 41 VAND. L. REV. 717,
738 (1988).
772. Id. at 738.
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and entirely situational approach to clients and traditional principles of legal
ethics:
Client counseling may mean kindling the clients' consciences,
but more often it will mean inventing alternative ways for clients to
satisfy their interests. Sometimes it means persuading clients that
the course of action they propose will harm them even when that is
not necessarily so. In other instances, client counseling will require
threatening to withdraw from a representation or refusing to follow
a client's instructions. In extreme cases, it means telling the client
that if he does not back away from a course of action, the lawyer
will blow the whistle on him."'
In other words, "client counseling" may include lying to clients, abandoning
them, defying them, or extorting their compliance with threats to rat them
out, all "in order to divert clients away from projects that harm the common
good." 774 The client, one presumes, would not have retained a lawyer who
did not at least pretend to possess the ethical virtues of honesty, loyalty, and
fiduciary responsibility and to espouse the related ethical principles. Thus,
to recruit a new client, the lawyer likely would act the part of an honest and
loyal counselor whom the client can entrust with her projects. According to
Luban, the lawyer should then feel free to disregard (or perhaps redefine?)
those ethical virtues and principles when necessary to achieve the "common
good."775  If we follow the emotivist, however, we must assume that the
common good as Luban sees it will differ from the common good or,
indeed, the good per se as the client sees it.776 It then becomes clear that
what Luban calls "client counseling" others would consider a radical form
773. Id. at 737-38.
774. Id. at 737.
775. See id. at 737-38. Professor Luban might respond that this discussion presumes the lawyer
would pretend to be honest, loyal, and tmustworthy while courting a new client. Luban, supra note 771,
at 737-38. Perhaps Luban would recommend instead that a lawyer disclose to potential clients that she
may lie to them, bully them, or betray them in pursuit of the "common good." Such full disclosure
clearly would allow the lawyer to avoid acting the traditional part of an ethical attorney and thereby
make instrumental, situational use of ethical virtues and precepts. Such full disclosure also would give
the client a good reason not to retain the lawyer in the first place. A lawyer who wishes to eat almost
certainly will have to pretend to be ethical in the traditional sense (i.e., honest, loyal, and trustworthy) if
she hopes to have the opportunity to engage in the kind of manipulative client counseling that Professor
Luban recommends. See id.
776. The client may believe that the "common good"-assuming the notion is meaningful at all-
is not the appropriate good to pursue. She might believe the proper good to pursue is her personal good
or the good of her family or friends or neighbors or stockholders. In other words, she might disagree
with Luban and, perhaps, her own attorney about the nature of the good and the hierarchy of goods
worthy of pursuit. For a discussion on the hierarchy of goods, see supra note 379 and accompanying
text.
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of instrumentalism or situational manipulation of ethical precepts to achieve
the lawyer's personal ends, i.e., the common good as she sees it. Indeed,
Luban appears to recommend employing almost any means necessary to
achieve a vision of the good rooted in the lawyer's personal preferences,
attitudes, and feelings. 7  I do not mean to suggest that Professor Luban
himself is an emotivist. His laudatory comments about "progressive
professionalism"778 suggest that he may believe he has gotten his hands on
some moral truths that are more than just personal preferences, truths that
apparently would justify lying to clients or bullying them into serving
purposes that the lawyer has identified. But his comments in support of
"client counseling" do seem to epitomize-perhaps unintentionally-the
radically instrumentalist, if not nihilistic, approach to basic ethical
principles and virtues that emotivism entails.
Some law professors who teach ethics might reject emotivism for a
second reason. Emotivism seems to offer an unsatisfying, if not
demoralizing, account of what occurs when the professor attempts to
inculcate legal ethical principles and patterns of ethical reasoning in her
students. I assume that many law professors are committed to the view that
what goes on in the law school classroom is, at least in part, a process of
reasoned discussion and debate.779  For the emotivist, however, moral
beliefs and precepts are not open to reasoned debate because they reflect
nothing more than personal preferences, attitudes, and feelings.7 80 As Allan
Bloom suggested, the only way to inculcate new values in a person is to
impose them, and a fortiori the same would hold for inculcating new
preferences, attitudes, and feelings.' If the emotivist law professor
acknowledges that the only way she can change a student's values,
preferences, attitudes, and feelings is by imposing-i.e., forcing-a new set
of values on the student, it should be clear why at least some emotivist law
professors say they hesitate to teach "ethical and social values" in the
777. See id.; see also MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12 (for reference to
personal preferences, attitudes, and feelings). I say "almost any means necessary" because Luban does
not recommend, for example, that the lawyer threaten his client with a gun or exploit the client's lust by
dangling the lawyer's irresistible sexual favors. See Luban, supra note 771, at 737-38. Rather, Luban
more insidiously seems to recommend that the lawyer use the client's vulnerability and dependency
within the attorney-client relationship to manipulate the client to achieve the lawyer's ends. See id. In
this way, Luban would treat the client, the attorney-client relationship, and lawyering itself as instru-
ments to be manipulated for the "common good," however defined. See id.
778. See, e.g., id. at 736, 739.
779. It is important to emphasize again that I am not suggesting all law professors are committed
to this view. I am suggesting only that law professors who are committed to this view will have consid-
erable difficulty squaring it with the emotivist moral framework.
780. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12.
781. See supra note 450.
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classroom.782 By hypothesis, the emotivist law professor acknowledges that
there is no rational basis for asserting that her values, or whatever values
she might teach the student, are somehow superior to the values that the
student already holds. Thus, inculcating values would mean making the
student adopt new values by whatever non-rational means might be
necessary, including such obvious "pedagogical" techniques as social or
peer pressure (repeatedly telling students what "we" believe to be ethical),
threats (of low grades or failure), mockery (in front of the student's peers),
and bullying (through the case-dialogue method). Moreover, the self-
conscious emotivist professor would engage in such non-rational
pedagogical techniques in full knowledge that the values, preferences,
attitudes, and feelings that she inculcates are no better, no more rationally
defensible, than the preexisting values, preferences, attitudes, and feelings
that the professor seeks to override and replace.7 83 It follows that a law
professor must either reject emotivism or surrender her commitment to the
view that what occurs during ethical education in the classroom is, at least
in part, a process of reasoned discussion and debate. The law professor who
holds on to the emotivist position must also accept the demoralizing
corollary that a key part of her job is to impose values, preferences,
attitudes, and beliefs on her students through non-rational means.
Of course, it is only fair to acknowledge that in a dark corner of the
academic bestiary, we almost certainly will find some emotivist law
professors who delight in imposing values, preferences, attitudes, and/or
feelings on students because those professors value imposing values,
preferences, attitudes, and feelings. I take it most law professors and,
indeed, most decent people would find troubling the prospect of a professor
bullying his students into accepting a new set of values, particularly a set of
values that the professor knows is no better or more defensible than the set
of values the student already holds. But from an emotivist perspective,
there can be no objective, rational basis for arguing that it is "wrong" to
impose a new set of values on students.7" Indeed, preventing a professor
who delights in imposing values from imposing values on students would
seem to require either imposing a set of values on the professor that she
does not herself accept or thwarting the professor's efforts to express her
values because those values conflict with other equally irrational but more
student-friendly values. Thus, either the professor imposes her values on
students with no outside interference or someone imposes values on the
782. See supra notes 449-51 and accompanying text.
783. See BLoM, supra note 15, at 201.
784. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12.
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professor. As Bloom argued, emotivism inevitably seems to lead to
someone imposing values on someone.78 s Emotivism clearly does not
require respect for or tolerance of differing views and values. Tolerance
and respect are just two more subjective preferences, two more values, that
some people have and others do not.
The third reason that a law professor might reject emotivism is a
corollary of the second reason. If a law professor remains committed to the
belief that what goes on in the classroom is, at least in part, a process of
reasoned discussion and debate, then her account of what occurs in the
classroom may require her to reject emotivism's account of the basis of
moral judgments and beliefs. Assume that examination of ethical issues in a
law classroom typically involves, at least in part, reasoned discussion about
competing beliefs and precepts. 8 The student remains free to stew over
the results of the reasoned discussion and, in the process, reach her own
conclusions. In some instances, those conclusions may lead her to adopt
new (to her) ethical beliefs and precepts. If, along with the emotivist, we
assume that moral beliefs and precepts find their roots in preferences,
attitudes, and feelings, then we would expect the student to develop new or
modified preferences, attitudes, and feelings that will serve as the basis for
her new ethical beliefs and precepts. Indeed, I would suggest that moral
education often follows this pattern. From my experience observing parents
with small children, it seems clear that parents often very deliberately seek
to inculcate particular preferences, attitudes, and feelings by communicating
precepts such as "be nice to your sister," "wash your hands before dinner,"
or "pick up your toys" in appropriate circumstances. By communicating the
appropriate precept in the appropriate circumstances, the parent seeks to
convey and inculcate positive preferences, attitudes, and feelings about
niceness, cleanliness, and tidiness, as well as negative preferences, attitudes,
and feelings about their contraries-meanness, dirtiness, and clutter. The
precept, in other words, is a tool or a means that the parent uses to instill the
relevant preference. In my experience, law professors adopt a similar
approach to ethical education but they place much greater emphasis on
discussion and argumentation than would the typical parent. I believe it
would be quite unusual for a law professor to attack a student's preferences,
attitudes, and beliefs directly and explicitly. Thus, in law school as in the
parent-child relationship, discussion of ethical principles and precepts often
and perhaps ordinarily precedes any relevant changes in preferences,
785. See BLOOM, supra note 15, at 201.
786. How law professors teach ethics and/or examine ethical issues in practice is, of course, an
empirical question worthy of study for its own sake.
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attitudes, and feelings. If a law professor believes that in many, if not most,
instances precept precedes or forms preference, and preference evolves to
reflect precept, then the law professor should reject as incomplete or
inaccurate the emotivist view that precept merely reflects preference.8  The
law professor who remains committed to the view that ethical education
occurs to a significant extent at the level of reasoned discussion and debate
should think hard before adopting the emotivist ethical framework.
A fourth reason for law professors to reject emotivism as an adequate
framework for ethical education is that emotivism runs into difficulty when
addressing the kinds of complicated ethical dilemmas that law professors
tackle with their students. Take, for example, the kind of situation
identified by Professor Luban in which a client wishes to accomplish an
objective that her lawyer firmly believes is contrary to the common good. 8
Should the lawyer follow her own preferences and sacrifice the client's
objective, as Luban seems to suggest?789 Should the lawyer instead ignore
her preferences and pursue the client's objective, as the virtue and principle
of loyalty apparently would demand? And how is the law professor to
"teach" this dilemma to students whose preferences may line up on either
side of the debate or students who are of "two minds" and have preferences
running in both directions? How does the emotivist account for a situation
in which principle might conflict with preference or in which two or more
preferences and two or more principles may conflict? The view that
principles reflect nothing more than preferences does not provide any
assistance when the problem is a conflict between preferences reflected in a
conflict between principles. I would suggest that the problems a professor
teaching legal ethics most typically confronts are those in which pre-
existing preferences either provide no adequate guidance or may actually
mislead. In those circumstances, emotivism will provide little help in
explaining or describing the problem and no help in solving it.7*
787. The emotivist might respond that when a student develops new values or modifies existing
values, this merely reflects her emerging or growing awareness of a pre-existing preference that she had
not previously recognized or appreciated. It is beyond the scope of this Article to pursue the debate
about whether precept can precede preference except to note that if emotivism attempts to rely on uncon-
scious or inchoate preferences, emotivism might become unfalsifiable and therefore disconnected from
any form of reasoned debated based on evidence.
788. Luban, supra note 771, at 724-25.
789. See supra notes 772-78 and accompanying text.
790. The emotivist might respond either by denying that a person can suffer from conflicting
preferences, a view that seems patently incorrect, or by admitting that conflicting preferences may occur
but that when they do there is no way to resolve the conflict. Any resolution would require either fol-
lowing one of the conflicting preferences because it is somehow stronger or following some new prefer-
ence that overrides the two conflicting preferences. It is beyond the scope of the Article to pursue this
debate but I would suggest that the law professor is unlikely to find any of these emotivist responses
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This argument against emotivism can, I believe, be pressed a step
further. As every adult who has spent time with a tiny infant knows, such
an infant's preferences, attitudes, and feelings are vehement but relatively
circumscribed. There is a large gap between the very restricted preferences,
attitudes, and feelings of a ten-day-old infant and those of a two-year-old
who has begun to deploy the word "no," or an eight-year-old who has clear
convictions about what she wants to do this afternoon, or a teenager who
adamantly believes that most of the adults in the world are stupid and
narrow-minded. Yet these varying and increasingly complex preferences,
attitudes, and feelings may reside in and animate the same person as she
grows from a newborn to a young adult. Moreover, parents, grandparents,
older siblings, school teachers, clergymen, and other authority figures seek,
sometimes successfully, to inculcate preferences, attitudes, and feelings
(among other things) in the growing child. 9' The emotivist can and, I
assume, would have to concede that a person's preferences, attitudes, and
feelings may have changed over time and that the person may have acquired
many of her preferences, attitudes, and feelings from or through the
influence of other people. Indeed, many emotivist law professors
apparently object even to questioning a law student about her values
because those professors recognize that a person in a position of authority
can influence and perhaps alter another person's values, presumably by
modifying her preferences, attitudes, and feelings.792
As we construct a defense of the Carnegie Report against the emotivist
challenge, we should ask whether it is possible, within the emotivist
framework, to make productive use of the concession that a person's current
preferences, attitudes, and feelings represent the perhaps temporary result of
an intergenerational process of inculcation. It is no exaggeration to say that
a law professor typically earns her living in the classroom by questioning
arguments, assumptions, and conclusions, and by teaching students to
useful as she tries to address an ethical dilemma by reasoning with her students to an answer that may be
correct but at the same time inconsistent with at least some of their and perhaps her personal preferences.
791. The emotivist could offer a scorched-earth argument to the effect that inculcating preferences,
attitudes, and feelings in infants and children (to the extent that it occurs) is per se improper and that in
an ideal world no such inculcating would occur. According to this line of argument, we should allow
children to develop preferences, attitudes, and feelings entirely on their own, without inculcation or
modeling by adults. A discussion of this radical child-rearing proposal is beyond the scope of the Arti-
cle. It may be worth observing, however, that a child in whom adults inculcated and for whom adults
modeled no preferences, attitudes, and feelings might well resemble the feral boys or young men depict-
ed in Francois Truffaut's L'Enfant Sauvage (Les Artistes Associ6s 1970) or Werner Herzog's Jederfir
sich und Gott gegen alle a/k/a The Enigma of Kaspar Hauser (Filmverlag der Autoren 1974). One
assumes that a feral young adult would not make an acceptable law student and that, therefore, an ac-
ceptable law student would be someone in whom adults have inculcated and for whom adults have
modeled at least some "civilized" preferences, attitudes, and feelings.
792. See supra notes 449-51 and accompanying text.
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distance themselves intellectual from their own first responses or gut
reactions to a problem or case. It seems incongruous, then, for the law
professor to concede that her own values, preferences, attitudes, and
feelings reflect a long, intergenerational process of inculcation, and yet to
deny that she can adopt a genuinely critical attitude toward those values,
preferences, attitudes, and feelings. Indeed, recognizing that many of her
own values, preferences, attitudes, and feelings resulted from an inculcation
process would seem to be a key step in adopting a critical attitude because it
involves stepping away from and transcending the results of that inculcation
process by subjecting those results to reasoned scrutiny. Subjecting
preexisting values to reasoned, critical scrutiny is the hallmark of the law
school classroom, but it is a process that emotivism cannot acknowledge, let
alone explain. For emotivism, values, preferences, attitudes, and feelings
are surds.7 They simply are. And they are all that we have. We cannot
escape them or transcend them in order to criticize them. They provide the
sole measure for our moral beliefs and judgments. Thus, we must return to
them and rely on them in the very act of transcending them-even as we
recognize that they themselves emerged from an intergenerational process
of inculcation. If a law professor remains committed to the view that
teaching legal ethics involves questioning, criticizing, and ultimately
transcending preferences, attitudes, and feelings, she should reject
emotivism.
As I hope this discussion makes clear, emotivism as a moral theory or
framework raises important questions and leads to awkward conclusions
that may make it unattractive to educators such as law professors who
accept or even sympathize with the Carnegie Report's contention that the
third apprenticeship or something like it is an important element of a
formative legal education. I do not mean to suggest that an emotivist could
not construct a response to some of the issues that I have raised. My
purpose here is entirely propaedeutic-raising questions about emotivism
for further exploration by those who seek to defend the teleological
framework at the core of the Carnegie Report. 9  I have devoted more
attention to this entry on the propaedeutic punch list only because I believe
that emotivism, which has become a kind of casual, unspoken background
793. As the Carnegie Report explains, learning to distance or detach oneself from immediate
concerns and reactions in favor of more abstract legal analysis is a key component of learning to think
like a lawyer. See supra notes 227-30 and accompanying text. If the emotivist is correct, however, it is
not clear how one could adopt a distanced, critical attitude toward one's own preferences.
794. See MAcINTYRE, AFTER vHLTuE, supra note 145, at 11-12.
795. See supra Part IIIB (discussing the teleological framework of the Carnegie Report).
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assumption for day-to-day moral debate in our culture, represents the most
serious threat to the intellectual foundations of the Carnegie Report.1 6
b. Incorporation
Emotivism has proven hard to defeat at least in part because it is based,
I believe, on a partial and obvious truth, namely that a person's preferences,
attitudes, and feelings in fact do provide motives for her actions and should
be recognized as doing so by any adequate ethical theory or framework.797
A theory or framework that is more adequate than emotivism would, among
other things, incorporate the truths of emotivism while avoiding its
mistakes. Using this criterion, it should be possible to show that the
teleological theory or framework is more adequate than emotivism, if in fact
the teleological framework is more adequate. At a minimum, this criterion
provides a useful test for the adequacy of the teleological framework.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to spell out the argument
here, the following is an outline of some key points.
A teleological ethical theory or framework contains three parts: the
person as-she-happen-to-be, the person as-she-would-be-if-she-realized-her-
telos, and a formative educational process designed to move her from the
former to the latter.7 99 As MacIntyre explains, "[w]e thus have a threefold
scheme in which human-nature-as-it-happens-to-be (human nature in its
untutored state) is initially discrepant and discordant with the precepts of
ethics and needs to be transformed by the instruction of practical reason and
experience into human-nature-as-it-could-be-if-it-realized-its-telos." 80 0 In a
brief account of the history of moral argument, MacIntyre has shown that
the teleological moral framework withered during the era between the mid-
sixteenth and the early nineteenth centuries when the notion of the human
telos ceased to be credible,o' thereby undermining and ultimately
obliterating the old notion of the person as-she-could-be-if-she-achieved-
her-telo.802
796. See supra note 446. In previous articles, I have argued that emotivism is a key element of the
post-Enlightenment paradigm through which we ordinarily organize and explain our experience. See,
e.g.; Kightlinger, Nihilism with a Happy Ending?, supra note 438, at 117-30 (describing the post-
Enlightenment paradigm).
797. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 11-12 (explaining emotivism).
798. For a more detailed discussion of how one tradition or framework of inquiry can both incor-
porate and surpass or transcend another rival tradition or framework, see MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL
VERSIONS, supra note 182, at 116-26.
799. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
800. MAcINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 53.
801. For a short description of this assault on teleological thinking, see supra notes 428-33 and
accompanying text.
802. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 54-55.
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[T]he elimination of any notion of essential human nature and with
it the abandonment of any notion of a telos leaves behind a moral
scheme composed of two remaining elements whose relationship
becomes quite unclear. There is on the one hand a certain content
for morality: a set of injunctions deprived of their teleological
context. There is on the other hand a certain view of untutored-
human-nature-as-it-is.s 3
By exposing the original teleological roots and rationale of our moral
injunctions, MacIntyre shows why Enlightenment moral philosophy failed
and had to fail in its attempt to connect or reconnect untutored-human-
nature-as-it-is to moral injunctions originally intended to censure and
transform untutored human nature.80 At the end of this story, emotivism
emerged as the only plausible explanation for our moral beliefs and
judgments.
We should, however, take a step back along this historical account, a
step that, to my knowledge, Maclntyre himself does not take. One appeal of
emotivism as a theory or framework is that it proposes to trace our moral
judgments and beliefs to a source that seems to be real, namely our
preferences, attitudes, and feelings, rather than to a source that seems to be
imaginary, namely an account of the human telos.sos Emotivism, I would
suggest, attempts to reconnect the two surviving elements of the three-part
teleological framework by adjusting the account of human nature as-it-
happens-to-be to fit a revised account of the moral precepts we should
follow. As a consequence, the moral precepts come to reflect what is left of
the notion of human nature as-it-happens-to-be, i.e., the individual's
personal, subjective preferences, attitudes, and feelings. From the
standpoint of the teleological framework, emotivism contains an important
kernel of truth: the assertion that human nature as-it-happens-to-be,
including our preferences, attitudes, and feelings, can and will influence our
803. Id. at 55.
804. Id. As he explains,
the eighteenth-century moral philosophers engaged in what was an inevitably unsuccessful
project; for they did indeed attempt to find a rational basis for their moral beliefs in a
particular understanding of human nature, while inheriting a set of moral injunctions on the
one hand and a conception of human nature on the other which had been expressly designed
to be discrepant with each other.
Id.
805. See id. at 11-12.
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actions and our moral lives.806  Emotivism's mistake, again seen from the
perspective of the teleological framework, is the claim that our given, pre-
existing preferences, attitudes, and feelings alone provide a complete and
adequate basis for and explanation of our moral beliefs and precepts. From
the perspective of the teleological framework, our preferences, attitudes,
and feelings provide the grist for our moral beliefs and precepts, but the
grist must be ground by a teleological formative education to produce,
among other things, properly amended, reformed and/or transformed
preferences, attitudes, and feelings.80 7  As MacIntyre says in another
context,
[v]irtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also
to feel in particular ways. To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later
to think, to act against inclination; it is to act from inclination
formed by the cultivation of the virtues. Moral education is an
'ducation sentimentale'. 808
Moral education is sentimental education because it involves, among other
things, educating the sentiments-the preferences, attitudes, and feelings-
to respond properly in particular circumstances. 809  Emotivism correctly
recognizes the importance of the role of the feelings-as well as the
preferences and attitudes-but emotivism mistakenly views those feelings
as surds that are given once and for all rather than formed and achieved. 1 o
Thus, the teleological framework not only can explain the genesis of
emotivism from the breakdown of a more complete account of ethical life,
but it also can acknowledge, preserve, and correct the insights of emotivism
806. This is one of the reasons why, for Aristotle, it is so important that a person embarking on
ethical education begin with virtuous habits inculcated by a proper upbringing. See supra notes 705-07
and accompanying text. A person with vicious habits built on bad preferences, attitudes, and feelings
will reason from bad maxims or premises to bad acts.
807. Another key element that teleological formative education should add is the ability to exer-
cise practical reason. For a short explanation of Aristotle's account of practical reason and its relation-
ship to a person's preferences and feelings, see Maclntyre, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 145, at 161-62.
808. Id. at 149. For a discussion of the Aristotelian roots of the connection between virtue and a
"settled disposition" to act in a particular way in particular circumstances, see BROADIE, ETmcs WITH
ARISTOTLE, supra note 143, at 58. See also Bernard Williams, Morality, the Peculiar Institution, in
VIRTUE ETHiCS 45, 55 (Roger Crisp & Michael Slote eds., 1997) ("One way in which ethical life serves
[important social ends] is by encouraging certain motivations, and one form of this is to instill a disposi-
tion to give the relevant considerations a high deliberative priority. . . .").
809. The Carnegie Report's account of the third apprenticeship recognizes that ethical education is
sentimental education. CARNEGIE REPORT, supra note 1, at 28. As the authors state, "[t]he essential goal
... is to teach the skills and inclinations, along with the ethical standards, social roles, and responsibili-
ties that mark the professional" Id. Clearly, teaching "inclinations" is a form of sentimental education.
See also id. at 194 (third apprenticeship inculcates "dispositions").
810. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTuE, supra note 145, at 11-12.
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by placing them in the context of a broader theory where they can play an
appropriately circumscribed role.
As I already indicated, this attempt to show how the teleological
framework can incorporate the insights of emotivism is intended as a sketch
of a longer argument. To show how the teleological framework can
incorporate the truths of emotivism, it would be necessary to look in greater
detail at the emotivist position and also to spell out with greater precision
the role of preferences, attitudes, and feelings in the teleological framework
itself. Both of these undertakings lie beyond the scope of this Article. It is
worth noting, however, that even the short sketch I have offered of how the
teleological framework might incorporate the truths of emotivism shows
also how the teleological framework might attempt to deal with some of the
problems internal to the emotivist position that I identified in Part V.C.6(a).
For example, the teleological framework would have no difficulty
explaining how a change in a person's moral beliefs and precepts might
help to trigger a change in a person's preferences, attitudes, and feelings
leading to new preferences that support the new beliefs and precepts. The
teleological framework allows us to distinguish between a person's
preferences, attitudes, and feelings as-they-happen-to-be at any particular
time and the amended and transformed preferences, attitudes, and feelings
that will result from a teleological formative education that pulls and pushes
the person toward the human telos. The teleological framework would
acknowledge that people can and must acquire preferences, but also would
contend that those preferences can and must undergo further formation and
amendment through, among other things, reasoned discussion and debate
about moral beliefs and precepts. Thus, from the standpoint of the
teleological framework, it is quite clear that preferences can and, indeed,
must change over time. Moreover, it is clear that one's preferences always
must be revisited and revised in light of the human telos, which one may
come to understand better over time. One's preferences, attitudes, and
feelings do not provide the only measure for and guide to revising one's
preferences, attitudes, and feelings. The human telos provides the measure,
and ethical education, including the sort of ethical education that law
professors offer, will help to form preferences, attitudes, and feelings in
accordance with the measure.
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